The Smart Power Capability Requirements of Australia as a Middle Power

Report of Seminar Proceedings

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Executive Summary

The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) held a one-day seminar in Canberra on 15 February 2012 entitled *The Smart Power Capability Requirements of Australia as a Middle Power*. The aims of the seminar were to discuss the concept of smart power in the context of Australia as a middle power, identify Australia's smart power capability requirements across the peace/conflict spectrum and report its findings to government.

Australia's capability requirements were reviewed in terms of conventional and public diplomacy, international aid, defence, law enforcement and economics, especially international trade, marketing and investment. Australia's role in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was also reviewed as a case study in the application of smart power.

Seminar participants concluded that smart power, which involves the prudent use of soft power (persuasion) and hard power (coercion) as the tools of foreign policy, is a valid concept in the Australian context.

Participants identified Australia's sound reputation and positive image, both internationally and especially regionally, as a significant strength and capability within its smart power toolbox. Australia's soft power strengths included being viewed as a politically and economically stable, non-threatening and non-hegemonic Western democracy. Australia respects and works cooperatively in partnership arrangements with other countries, promotes liberal economic policies that benefit regional and other developing countries, has a high quality aid program and honours its bilateral and multinational commitments. Australia's preference is to resolve tensions or conflict by soft power means. However it is prepared to exercise hard power, including the use of political and economic sanctions, and the deployment of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Australian Defence Force (ADF), when required. Both the AFP and ADF have demonstrated their capability in peacekeeping operations, and the ADF its capability as a coalition partner in war. Australia has also demonstrated its capability to concurrently employ both soft and hard power in complex regional situations, often in a leadership role. RAMSI was reviewed as successful example of this.

Participants also identified areas where Australia needs to improve its capabilities to protect and promote its national interests better in an increasingly complex and challenging international environment. These include the allocation of increased resources to enable the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to increase its international reach and influence by establishing new missions overseas, selectively enhancing existing missions and providing the additional staffing to meet these and other critical headquarters needs. There is a requirement also for DFAT, Austrade, the ADF, the AFP and other relevant departments and agencies to raise and maintain the skill levels of staff, and their interoperability generally, through increased training and development. In the context of aid, two requirements in particular were noted: the increased use of 'branding' to raise Australia's visibility and influence in recipient countries, and using Australia's aid commitments to secure management positions on the boards of, and thus increase its influence within, UN and other international aid agencies. Participants also identified the need for Australia to develop a more effective media and public affairs capability to promote a better understanding of Australian issues and culture within the Asia-Pacific region.

Seminar participants noted that, in most cases, tangible means exist for measuring the effectiveness of Australia's smart power capabilities, but for some aspects of diplomacy the means available remain less tangible.

The AIIA commends the seminar report to government and encourages the implementation of its recommendations.

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Seminar Coordinator and AIIA ACT Branch President

Melissa Conley Tyler
National Executive Director, AIIA

The Smart Power Capability Requirements of Australia as a Middle Power

Summary of Key Findings and Recommendations

- Participants agreed that smart power is a valid concept in the context of Australia as a middle power
- It was noted that the essential precondition for the development of effective smart power strategies is a clear understanding of the goals, aims and preferred outcomes of those strategies.
- Participants noted that to understand how others perceived Australia, and the importance of such perceptions as a diplomatic tool, it is necessary for Australia to understand itself and what it stands for, and not try to be what it is not.
- Australia's national values and related positive image and reputation are important national smart power capabilities. When threatened, national image and reputation must be protected by sophisticated, timely and targeted responses.
- Officials representing Australia internationally should have both a sound general knowledge of Australia's national characteristics and domestic and foreign policies, and especially those characteristics and policies relative to the country of visitation.
- The Australian public were also often ignorant about Australia's place in the world, especially basic facts about countries in the region and Australia's relativity to those countries. Public education is needed to rectify this situation.
- Participants noted the findings of previous reviews that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) required additional government investment in its infrastructure to improve its capability to implement smart power strategies in order to promote and protect Australia's interests, regionally and internationally. Preferred areas of additional investment include:
    - The opening of new diplomatic missions overseas and expanding the representation at some existing diplomatic positions overseas.
    - Additional personnel to staff the expanded overseas representation above, to provide additional depth in key areas of continuing interest, and to enable coverage of new areas of interest, within the DFAT headquarters.
    - Additional personnel to enable improved career development training to increase the level of capability of DFAT staff.
- Seminar participants readily endorsed public diplomacy as a very important smart power capability tool.
- Several participants emphasised the importance of the Asia-Pacific region as being the priority focus of Australian public diplomacy.
- Participants noted Australia's requirement for a comprehensive smart power media capability as an important tool to enable Australia to communicate more effectively with foreign audiences, especially regional audiences.
- Several participants suggested that discussion on media issues should be the subject of a separate seminar.
- The ability to measure effectiveness is an important part of all smart power strategies.
- Participants agreed that Australia's overseas aid development programs, both AusAID's diverse and high-quality program and those undertaken by non-government organisations (NGOs), are a key soft power asset in Australia's smart power capability toolbox. In particular, Australia's aid programs contribute significantly to:
    - Australia's overall image and reputation as a respected international citizen.

- o Australia's national strategic interests, through the positive contribution of such aid to greater social, economic and thus political stability in those regional countries that are the primary recipients of Australian aid.
- Other observations by participants on the planning and implementation of aid that serves Australia's smart power interests included:
  - o The importance of working closely with local officials in aid-recipient countries.
  - o The importance of coordinating, and potentially partnering, Australian aid programs with those of other government and non-governmental donors/administrators, where practical and desirable to do so.
  - o The application of a comprehensive risk-mitigation strategy to minimise corruption related to Australian aid.
  - o The importance of scholarships and other means to undertake short and long term academic or other specialist training in Australia.
  - o The importance of "branding" Australian aid to ensure that Australia is recognised as the donor amongst the recipient community.
  - o Using the Australian Government's aid commitments to the UN and other aid agencies to secure a more appropriate level of representation of Australians on the management boards of those organisations.
- The ability to measure the effectiveness of Australian aid depends on the nature of the aid:
  - o In those cases where outcomes are tangible and occur within a finite timeframe, measuring effectiveness is relatively easy.
  - o In those cases where outcomes are more intangible or the timeframe is less finite, measuring effectiveness is more difficult.
  - o It is important to establish the measurement criteria to identify when an aid program is not successful and should be discontinued.
- The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) provide Australia with critical smart power capabilities across both the hard and soft power spectrum.
- A significant characteristic of both the ADF and AFP is the increased awareness of members at all levels that they are part of a whole-of-government hard and soft power capability.
- There are a range of lessons to be taken from effective operations including:
  - o The importance of cooperation and coordination with local officials, community leaders and the general public in the country of deployment, as well as the military, police and other officials of other countries also deployed there.
  - o The awareness that all hard power operations involve the concurrent and effective application of soft power. This was and remains a characteristic of all above operations and deployments.
  - o The importance of comprehensive briefings and training for ADF and AFP members who are deployed on overseas operations and who are responsible for supervising such operations at a headquarter, including regional headquarters level.
- Participants noted the following important ADF smart power capabilities:
  - o Maintaining a credible and flexible unilateral combat capability to deter or defeat any direct military, terrorist or other external threat to Australia.
  - o Maintaining alliance and military relationships with other countries to protect and promote regional security.
  - o Creating a higher level of mutual understanding and related influence amongst foreign military personnel due to the close professional and personal relationships that resulted from Defence Attaché appointments, military exchanges, secondments and joint training.

- o Creating a high level of respect and related influence that flows from the readiness and demonstrated professionalism of the ADF in providing humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and other crises.
- Participants noted the similar application of AFP smart power capabilities with those of the ADF above:
  - o The high level of professionalism and related international respect for the AFP (and the police forces in all Australian states) that contributed to the deterrence of major domestic and international crime, and to a lower rate of such criminal activity generally relative to most other regional countries.
  - o The close professional relationship between the AFP and the law enforcement communities of other countries, especially regional countries, and the high level of respect and related influence of the AFP within those communities.
- Participants who were experienced in AFP-ADF cooperation overseas described that relationship as very positive. They noted the importance of maintaining a wide level of understanding at all levels within the AFP and ADF of the respective roles of both organisations and the importance of conducting joint training including "gaming" to maintain the readiness of this capability.
- Measuring the effectiveness of defence and law enforcement activities was considered relatively straightforward. Most preferred outcomes would be tangible and able to be quantified by statistics, or other means.
- Seminar participants noted that RAMSI has been widely acknowledged, including within the UN, as a successful example of a regional, integrated and collaborative mission that could potentially serve as a model in a number of respects for peace-building missions in fragile conflict-affected states. Participants agreed that given the fragility of many other Pacific Island states, the need could arise for Australia to take a similar leadership role in future. Australia should maintain and further develop the related smart power capabilities to meet any such requirement in the future.
- Australia's good reputation internationally as a strong economic performer, and its open and sound economic policies, has given Australia a high level of respect and strengthened its influence, particularly among international economic institutions.
- The global economic environment is very complex, contestable and changeable. Australia must enhance its capability to adjust to new power balances and shifts in centres of economic gravity and be creative in finding new means to pursue key policy objectives.
- The capability requirements to maximise influence are very demanding in terms of human capital investment. To protect its interests and influence, Australia must meet and sustain this investment.
- There is a need for closer understanding between government and the private sector of their respective roles, interests and capabilities, and a need to develop ways to increase trust and cooperation in order to promote their mutual interests.
- Australia should make greater use of foreign members of overseas alumni associations and, selectively, members of the Australian diaspora overseas to promote its economic interests, and national interests generally.
- Australian industries should increase their use of "branding" of quality and popular goods and services as a 'smart' marketing strategy.
- Most factors relating to economic activities were noted to be tangible and quantifiable and therefore relatively easy to measure. However, in addition to the use of 'routine' statistical criteria, special market surveys are also as an important part of measuring and understanding overseas market conditions.

Dennis Richardson, Ian Dudgeon

John McCarthy

Melissa Conley Tyler

Report of Seminar Proceedings

Introduction: Aims and Seminar Structure

The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) held a seminar entitled *The Smart Power Capability Requirements of Australia as a Middle Power* at its Conference Centre in Deakin ACT on 15 February 2012. Some 50 people participated in the seminar which was a closed event held under the Chatham House Rule. The seminar was chaired by Ian Dudgeon, President of the AIIA's ACT Branch.

The seminar brought together a variety of government officials from related departments and agencies including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT); AusAID; Austrade; the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Parliamentary Services and Defence; members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian Federal Police (AFP); academics; industry professionals; and the media.

Aims

The aims of the seminar were:

- To discuss the concepts of soft power, hard power and smart power in the context of Australia as a middle power.
- To identify Australia's smart power capability requirements across the peace/conflict spectrum and means of measuring effectiveness.
- To report to government on the principal issues discussed, including Australia's identified smart power capability requirements and the potential use of smart power in support of national objectives.

Structure

The seminar was structured into sessions as follows:

- An introductory pre-recorded message by Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University's J.F. Kennedy School of Government (often referred to as the 'father' of smart power) outlining the smart power concept
- Smart Power in the Australian Context
- Diplomacy: Conventional and Public Diplomacy
- Aid and Other National Assets
- Defence and Law Enforcement
- RAMSI: a Case Study
- Markets, Trade and Investment
- Capability Requirements: Current and Future Challenges

A copy of the seminar program is at **Attachment A** and the list of participants is at **Attachment B.**

Paul Gallagher, Rosalyn Turner, Zara Kimpton

Alan Ryan, Ric Smith, James Batley, Graeme Wilson

What is Smart Power?

The concept of 'smart power' was developed by Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr of Harvard University some 20 years ago and subsequently gained international traction through his two books on the subject: *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* published in 2004 and *The Future of Power* published in 2011.

Smart power, in simple terms**,** was identified by Nye as the prudent use of all the resources available to a nation in order to maximise a nation's influence and interests in international affairs. He described smart power as the synthesis of the related concepts of soft and hard power, where:

- **Soft power** is the ability to obtain national interest outcomes by 'persuasion and co-option', through the attraction to others of a nation's policies, actions, values and culture. Examples of soft power include conventional and public diplomacy, aid, police, military and intelligence training and cooperation, dialogue and cooperation amongst think-tanks or special focus groups, education programs, cultural programs, business and trade linkages, and tourism. Nye identified soft power as including both 'tangible' and 'intangible' ingredients and noted that developing soft power is a continuous requirement. He described many aspects of soft power as outside the realm and control of government. In some cases, soft power can take years to yield results, for example in the impact of culture and educational assistance.

- **Hard power** is the ability to achieve national interest outcomes through the use of different forms of 'coercion and command', be it political, economic or, at the extreme, military force. Examples of hard power include war or the threat of military force, alliance building and political and economic sanctions or their threat. Nye identified the ingredients of hard power as 'tangible'. He also described hard power as a tool normally controlled and implemented by government and one that should only be used when necessary. Relative to soft power, the effects of the application of hard power could be immediate and rapid.

In the above context, Nye described smart power as the prudent application of these two forms of power in order to deliver effective foreign policy strategies, actions and preferred outcomes tailored to each international target of national interest, whether bilateral or multilateral.

In sum, these resources comprise the capability requirements for what US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described as the smart power 'tool box' i.e. the tools of foreign policy.

Smart Power Strategies, Tactics and Tools

Professor Nye described all strategies as a means to an end and prescribed strict clarity of preferred outcomes, resources and tactics. The capability skill requirements included knowing what was in the smart power toolbox and when and how to use those tools to maximum effect. It also included knowing what is *not* in the toolbox and any resultant weakness relative to others.

Nye referred to the above as 'contextual intelligence' and identified the need for a smart strategy to provide answers to the following five questions:

- what goals or outcomes are preferred?
- what resources are available and in which contexts?
- what are the positions and preferences of the attempted targets of influence?

- which forms of power behaviour are most likely to succeed?
- what is the probability of success?

Nye also noted that any one strategy may involve multiple concurrent targets with each target requiring different tactics and tools.

Smart Power Measures of Effectiveness

Nye described these as varying according to circumstances and being dependent upon the values and perceptions of each nation. They could be quantifiable such as negotiating a treaty or less quantifiable in areas such as public diplomacy. A simple measure would be achieving preferred goals and outcomes, but this needs to be qualified by cost, durability and any related implications for other relationships.

The Concept of Smart Power in the Context of Australia as a Middle Power

Two issues were discussed relating to the smart power concept:

- The validity of the smart power concept in general.
- The validity of the smart power concept in an Australian context.

Participants endorsed smart power as a valid concept. It was seen as a valuable aid to facilitate holistic thinking about the range and relevance of all the implements available in the national tool box when formulating and implementing foreign policy strategies.

Participants agreed that smart power is a valid concept in the context of Australia as a middle power. Some participants thought the concept was more applicable to the US as a much larger country with greater resources and influence. However, most participants expressed the view that smart power was equally applicable to Australia in order to develop highly effective strategies to protect and promote its national interests in the crowded and competitive middle power arena.

It was noted that the essential precondition for the development of effective smart power strategies is a clear understanding of the goals, aims and preferred outcomes of those strategies.

A proper appreciation of aims would, in turn, identify the target and selection of the appropriate strategy and tools to implement that strategy. It was agreed that any given strategy could involve concurrent sub-strategies, such as bilateral and multilateral, and a mix of soft and hard power.

Ric Smith

Graeme Wilson

Peter Quinn, Zara Kimpton, Daniel Flitton

Conventional and Public Diplomacy

Conventional and public diplomacy were seen as two separate but often interconnected activities. Defining the differences in some instances could be difficult, but for seminar purposes:

- **Conventional diplomacy** is the conduct by government of international relations with other states or international organisations. It involves exercising negotiating skills, soft power and, where appropriate, hard power to influence an outcome in the national interest. Activities may seek a positive and quantifiable advantage or may seek to prevent or minimise disadvantage.

- **Public diplomacy** is soft power activities conducted by government, non-government organisations, a combination of both, or the public generally. This includes Track 2 dialogue, think-tank and academic exchanges, cultural tours or exchanges involving sport, art, literature, music, science and tourism.

As background considerations to discussion about both conventional and public diplomacy, the recommendations of the following three prior public reviews relating to Australian diplomatic activity and resource requirements were distributed to participants prior to the seminar. It was assumed that unless otherwise stated, the recommendations of these reviews had been agreed in principle for implementation according to priorities as resources allow.

- Recommendations, *Australian Public Diplomacy: Building our Image,* Report by the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2007. **See Attachment C**

- Recommendations, *Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy,* Lowy Institute Blue Ribbon Panel report, 2009. **See Attachment D**

- Recommendations, *Diplomatic Disrepair: Rebuilding Australia's International Policy Infrastructure*, Lowy Institute, 2011. **See Attachment E**

Australia's Image

The key issues raised during discussion on diplomacy were the perceptions of Australia, its reputation and self-knowledge.

International perceptions of Australia's national values were noted as an important part of Australia's diplomatic capability.

Participants noted that to understand how others perceived Australia, and the importance of such perceptions as a diplomatic tool, it is necessary for Australia to understand itself and what it stands for, and not try to be what it is not.

Seminar participants noted that Australia, generally, is seen as a rich, developed Western democracy that is politically and economically stable, that values the rule of law, human rights and people's freedom, that is generally tolerant of race and religion, and treats its citizens well. It is viewed as a good nation to visit and, selectively, to trade with and to invest in. Australia is also an all-round international 'good citizen'. Australia has no expansionist or hegemonic ambitions, works well and comfortably with other nations in bilateral and multilateral partnership arrangements, would exercise leadership where required, is a

generous donor of quality aid and is committed to and contributes to the activities of the UN. Generally, Australians are open and direct in expressing their views and what you see is what you get.

However, participants also acknowledged that Australia must not be deluded by its perceived image and reputation:

- Australia was not as well known internationally as some might think, especially amongst countries in Africa and Latin America. Because of Australia's geographic remoteness to many countries, Australia is not routinely seen by some as part of the global village. Australia needs to review ways of increasing its international profile more broadly within the global village.

- Many Australians believe the nation regularly punches above its weight. Sometimes Australia does, but most of the time it does not, and is merely punching up to its weight, often in highly contested circumstances. Australians need to know where the nation fits contextually and its relative strengths and limitations.

- Although widely respected, Australia is not necessarily liked by all. Some of Australia's policies and actions attract strong criticism, even from good friends. For example, within the Asia-Pacific region in particular, Australia is seen by some as too committed to US policies, sometimes patronising and morally aloof, and many Australians are still seen as racist. If this is not an accurate perception, Australia needs to correct misperceptions about its image.

- For some regional observers, it is also unclear where Australia belongs and where Australians view themselves as belonging: are Australians Asian, European or both when it suits?

- Aspects of Australia's image and reputation could quickly tarnish, whether justified or not. The recent Indian student crisis was cited as an example. The regional media 'beat-up' that ensued adversely affected Australia's image and reputation, in India and other Asian countries, both in racial terms and as a preferred provider of education services. Australia needs the capability to adopt timely strategies and actions in response to such circumstances.

- Domestic politics do impact on Australia's image and reputation internationally. For example, Australian policy on asylum seekers arriving by boat sends mixed messages internationally, compounded by the visible lack of bipartisan agreement on some issues. Comments made in the heat of domestic debate can have an international impact.

Despite some negatives and gaps in diplomacy responses, Australia's international image is generally viewed as positive. Australia's values and way of life are admired, the nation is generally seen as stable, reliable and non-threatening and, in terms of wealth and fortune, as a "lucky country".

Australia's national values and related positive image and reputation are important national smart power capabilities. When threatened, national image and reputation must be protected by sophisticated, timely and targeted responses.

It was also noted that many officials representing Australia internationally lacked a depth of knowledge about many of Australia's basic policies and how Australia compares internationally. Examples include the size and structure of the economy, population mix, and defence and aid budgets. While DFAT had introduced a program to address this situation amongst its staff, many departments and agencies had not.

It was recommended, therefore, that:

- *Officials representing Australia internationally should have both a sound general knowledge of Australia's national characteristics and domestic and foreign policies, and especially those characteristics and policies relative to the country of visitation.*

- *The Australian public were also often ignorant about Australia's place in the world, especially basic facts about countries in the region and Australia's relativity to those countries. Public education is needed to rectify this situation.*

Conventional Diplomacy

Seminar participants noted that there were multiple stakeholders within government, both federal and state, that actively engage in conventional diplomacy. These include at the federal level:

- The Prime Minister, Ministers and other politicians;
- DFAT and other agencies within the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio e.g. Austrade, AusAID and ASIS;
- Members of other government departments and agencies, including the ADF and AFP; and
- Special envoys or other eminent persons.

Most discussion on conventional diplomacy focused on DFAT because of its primary responsibility for advice to government on, and the management of, Australia's international relations. Based on the prior reviews:

Participants noted the findings of previous reviews that DFAT required additional government investment in its infrastructure to improve its capability to implement smart power strategies in order to promote and protect Australia's interests, regionally and internationally.

Preferred areas of additional investment include:

- *The opening of new diplomatic missions overseas and expanding the representation at some existing diplomatic positions overseas.* Subject to availability of resources, priorities include an embassy in Mongolia, further embassies in Africa, additional consulates in India China and Thailand, and expanded representation within existing missions including those in G20 countries.

- *Additional personnel to staff the expanded overseas representation above, to provide additional depth in key areas of continuing interest and to enable coverage of new areas of interest, within the DFAT headquarters.* While DFAT consistently looks at ways of increasing the productivity of existing resources, it was noted that resources were finite and new or unexpected requirements were normally met by a reallocation of existing resources to meet changed priorities. Inevitably this meant a reduction in the coverage of the area from which assets were removed. Such a reduction could be short term to meet a temporary consular or other international crisis, or long term where there was an enduring change of priorities.

- *Additional personnel to enable improved career development training to increase the level of capability of DFAT staff.* Initiatives would include increased language training, selective secondments and exchanges with other departments or government and non-governmental organisations, and attendance on longer term courses especially at academic or other institutions

in Australia and overseas. Seminar participants also noted the value of specialist development training, including 'gaming' or other exercising, increasingly offered by the National Security College at ANU, the National Security Institute at the University of Canberra, the Australian Civil-Military Centre in Queanbeyan, and by other institutions. The longer-term value of networking was also noted as an additional benefit of such training.

E-diplomacy was also discussed and identified as a capability tool for smart power. However, it was not assessed by DFAT as having priority over some other resource requirements. It was suggested that additional consideration is required about how e-diplomacy should be implemented, especially at overseas missions.

Public Diplomacy

Seminar participants readily endorsed public diplomacy as a very important smart power capability tool.

It was noted that a great deal of public diplomacy did not involve government. However, there are many instances where government cooperates with non-government organisations through its diplomatic missions overseas, including the facilitation of such matters as contact with counterpart organisations and potential audience groups, visa approvals and publicity generally. The outcome of such cooperation enhanced, often significantly, the positive outcomes of the specific activity.

It was also noted that for many Track 2 events, conscious 'partnership' arrangements were able to deliver networking and dialogue outcomes that were of equal benefit to both government and non-government participants.

Participants also cited examples of cultural diplomacy that involved major differences in terms of target audience and resources, but delivered significant benefits to Australia. One was the visit to the US in 2011 of the Sydney Theatre Company and its Director Cate Blanchett. Although the event reached an audience of approximately 1000 only, it was a significant success as many of those it did reach were senior and highly influential US politicians and Administration officials. Another example was the audience reached by the Australian Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, exposing Australia to some 73 million Expo visitors from more than 200 countries. Although these events were vastly different in size, character and cost, both were highly effective in smart power terms.

Several participants emphasised the importance of the Asia-Pacific region as being the priority focus of Australian public diplomacy.

Not only is this region Australia's neighbourhood, but it includes approximately half the world's population and the economic engine room of the 21st Century. Participants noted that the forthcoming White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century was expected to reinforce this consideration.

The Media

Participants noted Australia's requirement for a comprehensive smart power media capability as an important tool to enable Australia to communicate more effectively with foreign audiences, especially regional audiences.

Although the media was not listed as a separate session for discussion during the seminar, media issues arose during the seminar, especially during the diplomacy session. The characteristics of an effective government owned or sponsored regional media capability were noted as including:

- The technical capability to reach, potentially, target audiences across the whole of the Asia-Pacific region, i.e. Australia's audience of priority interest.

- Prioritising those targets according to available resources to maximise effectiveness. Programs might be broadcast on a case-by-case basis through local in-country networks rather than from Australia.

- Understanding the different values, cultures and interests of the diverse audiences involved, and tailoring products to the interests of those audiences. Where these products are interactive, they have the opportunity to project values, cultures and interests on a two-way basis.

- Versatile programs including news broadcasts, interviews, open forum debates, talk-back, and community service programs on issues such as health and hygiene, or cultural issues generally. Programming should also include use of the social media as appropriate. Such versatility provides flexibility of communications to maximise content and audience interest.

- Credibility of programs, especially news programs. Participants cited as an example the BBC's reputation for integrity and credibility as an ideal regional benchmark for news and current affairs programs. Any programs that were, or were perceived to be, subjected to government constraint or censorship would lack credibility and influence.

Several participants suggested that discussion on media issues should be the subject of a separate seminar.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Diplomacy

The ability to measure effectiveness is an important part of all smart power strategies.

Nye's comments on measuring the effectiveness of smart power strategies were endorsed by participants.

Measuring effectiveness was noted as easier when inputs and outcomes were quantifiable or tangible but less easy where these were intangible. In all developed and many developing countries, a range of reliable statistics existed for measuring tangibles. However, in countries where such systems generally were less reliable, available statistics might be indicative only. Intangibles were much harder to measure.

Several participants raised the importance of conducting special surveys to measure intangibles.

Mandy Newton

Peter Baxter

Annemaree O'Keeffe

Aid and Other Assets

As background to discussion, the following document was circulated to participants prior to the seminar:

- Recommendations, *Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness*: Report by the Commonwealth of Australia, 2011. **See Attachment F**

Participants agreed that Australia's overseas aid development programs, both AusAID's diverse and high-quality program and those undertaken by non-government organisations (NGOs), are a key soft power asset in Australia's smart power capability toolbox.

In particular, Australia's aid programs contribute significantly to:

- *Australia's overall image and reputation as a respected international citizen.* In dollar terms, Australia is the world's 11th largest aid donor and 13th largest donor on GNP terms. By 2015 Australian aid is expected to reach 0.5% of GNP.

- *Australia's national strategic interests, through the positive contribution of such aid to greater social, economic and thus political stability in those regional countries that are theprimary recipients of Australian aid.* The fundamental purpose of Australian aid is the alleviation of poverty, which in turn, improves specific areas of public welfare and promotes national wellbeing and stability. Australian aid focuses on five strategic goals: saving lives through improved health services; promoting better opportunities for all, especially through education; sustainable economic development through improved food security and other rural and urban-based activities; effective governance to improve the service delivery of aid projects, security, and enhance justice and human rights; and humanitarian and disaster response. The primary geographic focus for Australian aid is the Asia-Pacific region, with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) being Australia's two largest bilateral programs. Australia's aid to Africa has also increased significantly in recent years. Australia provides aid to a wide range of developing countries both directly and through bilateral programs, and through partner organisations including UN agencies and NGOs.

Other observations by participants on the planning and implementation of aid that serves Australia's smart power interests included:

- *The importance of working closely with local officials in aid-recipient countries.* This is to ensure, where practical, the mutual identification and coordination of Australian aid with the local authority's assessment of national developmental needs and priorities. It also promotes the transfer of related knowledge.

- *The importance of coordinating, and potentially partnering, Australian aid programs with those of other government and non-governmental donors/administrators, where practical and desirable to do so.* China, India and Brazil were identified as increasingly becoming major aid-donor countries. One participant expressed the opinion that there was scope for AusAID to make much greater use of NGOs in the implementation of some aid, particularly in PNG and East Timor. AusAID's position was that it did work closely with NGOs in a range of different countries. The strong growth in AusAID funding to NGOs over recent years underlined the

value that AusAID placed on NGOs as partners in delivering aid. The appropriate choice of partner in delivering aid, whether a recipient government, an NGO, or an international agency, depended on the specific circumstances in each country.

- *The application of a comprehensive risk-mitigation strategy to minimise corruption related to Australian aid.* AusAID recognised that there is a high level of corruption in many of the countries that receive Australian aid. To protect the integrity of aid funds, AusAID only delivers aid through partner government financial systems where these are assessed as meeting appropriate governance requirements.

- *The importance of scholarships and other means to undertake short and long term academic or other specialist training in Australia.* Not only does this contribute to the overall development of recipient countries but also ensures an understanding of Australia, a better sharing of Australian values and the formation of enduring friendships and networking of long-term mutual benefit. The former Colombo Plan was cited as a highly successful example of this. It was noted that Australia's current scholarship program is approximately three times the size of the Colombo Plan.

- *The importance of "branding" Australian aid to ensure that Australia is recognised as the donor amongst the recipient community.* It was reported that such branding is being increasingly undertaken by AusAID.

- *Using the Australian Government's aid commitments to the UN and other aid agencies to secure a more appropriate level of representation of Australians on the management boards of those organisations.* It was noted that Australia is under-represented on such management boards relative to its aid contributions. Increased representation on such boards would provide the means for Australia to influence more effectively the activities and outcomes of those organisations and raise its profile and influence across the aid spectrum.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Australian Aid

The ability to measure the effectiveness of Australian aid depends on the nature of the aid:

- *In those cases where outcomes are tangible and occur within a finite timeframe, measuring effectiveness is relatively easy.* Examples include humanitarian assistance in response to a national disaster (e.g. the number of people housed and fed), construction of a road or water supply facility (e.g. when completed, accessibility and impact) and some health matters (e.g. number of people immunised, the reduction of disease, reduction of deaths, etc).

- *In those cases where outcomes are more intangible or the timeframe is less finite, measuring effectiveness is more difficult.* For example, measuring an agricultural improvement program may take several years while the flow-through benefits of a national education program may take decades. In these cases, the selection of appropriate criteria to measure success, including the criteria to measure interim progress of a program, is very important.

- *It is important to establish the measurement criteria to identify when an aid program is not successful and should be discontinued.*

Defence and Law Enforcement

As background to discussion, the following documents were circulated to participants prior to the seminar:

- Summary of Roles, *Principal Roles of the ADF*: extracted from the Defence White Paper, 2009. **See Attachment G**

- Recommendations, *Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations*: Report by the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2008. **See also Attachment H**

Seminar participants noted that:

- *The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) provide Australia with critical smart power capabilities across both the hard and soft power spectrum.* While both organisations have and fulfil different roles internationally, where they have been deployed together on regional peacekeeping operations their roles effectively complement each another.

- *A significant characteristic of both the ADF and AFP is the increased awareness of members at all levels that they are part of a whole-of-government hard and soft power capability.* This has provided a greater sense of purpose of operations, an increased awareness of the political and other sensitivities associated with operations and the importance of cooperation and coordination in order to deliver preferred outcomes. This situation was reported to be unique in a regional context and unusual in a global context. It constitutes a major national capability asset.

- *There are a range of lessons to be taken from effective operations including:*

  o *the importance of cooperation and coordination with local officials, community leaders and the general public in the country of deployment, as well as the military, police and other officials of other countries also deployed there.* These were key factors in the success of ADF operations in Bougainville and Cambodia and for current operations and deployments in East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands in support of RAMSI.

  o *the awareness that all hard power operations involve the concurrent and effective application of soft power.* This was and remains a characteristic of all above operations and deployments.

  o *the importance of comprehensive briefings and training for ADF and AFP members who are deployed on overseas operations and who are responsible for supervising such operations at a headquarter, including regional headquarters level.*

The Australian Defence Force

Participants noted the following important ADF smart power capabilities:

- *Maintaining a credible and flexible unilateral combat capability to deter or defeat any direct military, terrorist or other external threat to Australia.*

- *Maintaining alliance and military relationships with other countries to protect and promote regional security.*

- *Creating a higher level of mutual understanding and related influence amongst foreign military personnel due to the close professional and personal relationships that resulted from Defence Attache appointments, military exchanges and secondments, and joint training.* This was broadly described as a part of "defence diplomacy ."

- *Creating a high level of respect and related influence that flows from the readiness and demonstrated professionalism of the ADF in providing humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and other crises.*

The Australian Federal Police

Participants noted the similar application of AFP smart power capabilities with those of the ADF above:

- *The high level of professionalism and related international respect for the AFP (and the police forces in all Australian states) that contributed to the deterrence of major domestic and international crime, and to a lower rate of such criminal activity generally relative to most other regional countries.*

- *The close professional relationship between the AFP and the law enforcement communities of other countries, especially regional countries, and the high level of respect and related influence of the AFP within those communities.* Factors that have contributed to this respect and influence include:

  - the professional conduct of the AFP on overseas deployments such as in the Solomon Islands. Unlike the police forces of some other countries on the same deployments, AFP policy is to interact widely with the local population and treat them with respect. The AFP gained a positive reputation as not being corrupt.

  - the quality of training given to foreign police force personnel, and the readiness to provide technical and other investigative assistance to foreign police forces, especially in times of crisis (e.g. the Bali bombings). One noted characteristic of AFP assistance is the AFP's readiness to respect the primacy of foreign police forces during such activities and to use these opportunities for knowledge-sharing and training generally. One outcome of this is a higher level of reciprocal cooperation by many foreign governments on law enforcement or other issues.

- *Participants who were experienced in AFP-ADF cooperation overseas described that relationship as very positive. They noted the importance of maintaining a wide level of understanding at all levels within the AFP and ADF of the respective roles of both*

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organisations and the importance of conducting joint training including "gaming" to maintain the readiness of this capability.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Defence and Law Enforcement

Measuring the effectiveness of defence and law enforcement activities was considered to be relatively straight forward. Most preferred outcomes would be tangible and able to be quantified by statistics, or other means.

For the ADF, the provision of humanitarian assistance would be mostly tangible and measuring effectiveness would be relatively easy, such as the provision of food, water and shelter to designated recipients within a finite timeframe. Measuring the effectiveness of wartime activities could be surrender by an enemy or, in a civil war environment such as Afghanistan, the completion of security transition arrangements to the local government as part of a politically defined exit strategy. Criteria for peacekeeping operations could be the avoidance or cessation of armed resistance.

For the AFP, measuring effectiveness would also mostly involve tangible factors. Such criteria could include the successful conclusion of a criminal (including forensic) investigation as for the Bali bombings, the restoration of law and order as in the Solomon Islands, or the reduction of drug or people smuggling into Australia by selected assistance to regional law enforcement authorities.

However, it was noted that in many cases, measuring effectiveness in an ADF or AFP context would not necessarily mean the permanent resolution of underlying problems. It might simply represent a transition from a more to less critical situation.

Ian Dudgeon, Michael Shoebridge, John Sanderson

Ruth Pearce, Victoria Walker

James Batley

Chris McNicol, Mike McCluskey, Lee Goddard, John Frewen

Case Study: The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

RAMSI was included in the seminar as a case study because the smart power strategies employed reflected an astute combination of both hard and soft power. RAMSI is also particularly relevant because it is a regional mission involving strong regional partnerships and because Australia plays the major leadership role.

In 2003 the Parliament of the Solomon Islands (SI) unanimously passed legislation that enabled the establishment of RAMSI. This legislation gave effect to the RAMSI Treaty which was signed by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) participating states and which enshrined RAMSI in international law. RAMSI was commended by the UN Secretary General and welcomed by the President of the UN Security Council.

RAMSI was established to prevent the total collapse of the SI, and its mandate included restoring security and supporting national stability and economic recovery through the "three pillars" of law and order, economic governance and growth, and effective machinery of government. RAMSI operates under a "partnership" arrangement between the SI government and 15 Pacific countries: Australia and NZ (who jointly fund RAMSI), PNG, Fiji, Niue, Tonga, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. RAMSI presently numbers about 450 people drawn from all PIF countries. The successive heads of RAMSI, known as the Special Coordinator, have been experienced DFAT officers. Australia provides over 90% of RAMSI's budget and remains a major contributor of police, military and civilian aid experts.

In 2009 the SI-RAMSI "Partnership Framework" was finalised. The Framework is similar to a strategic work plan to guide RAMSI's assistance to the SI by setting objectives, targets and indicative time frames across the mission's mandate. It provides a clear, structured way forward, guards against 'mandate creep', contains rigorous and independent performance review provisions and serves as the basis of a flexible 'exit strategy' for RAMSI.

RAMSI is now drawing down, consistent with the Partnership Framework, as part of a transition process although there is no exit date. This date will be conditions-based and the result of extensive consultations, including with the SI government.

Some key features and lessons learned from RAMSI and noted by presenters and participants were:

- RAMSI represented a major commitment by Australia, New Zealand and other PIF countries. That commitment has been worthwhile. RAMSI has been very successful and has contributed to continued progress with local security and development outcomes, although a number of challenges remain.

- RAMSI's regional nature has underpinned its success. Every member of the PIF participates in RAMSI, which has boosted the legitimacy of the mission and promoted regional solidarity. In addition, the PIF provides a broad governance oversight mechanism for RAMSI's work.

- RAMSI came to the SI in a broadly permissive environment. It was invited by the SI government and had strong support among the general public, which it still retains today.

- It was important to the success of RAMSI that it had watertight international and domestic legal coverage, an appropriate mandate, and sufficient resourcing.

- Involvement in RAMSI has provided a capacity development opportunity for all Pacific Island participants, but RAMSI has also benefited from the diverse skills and cultural awareness of these participants.

- RAMSI has successfully used a mix of hard and soft power in accordance with changing local circumstances. While the security operation was police led from the start, RAMSI employed significant military hard power resources to re-establish law and order and stabilise the security situation. Once this was achieved, the police largely replaced the military as the main hard power force, with the military playing a supporting role. Prior experience and joint training by the Australian military and police facilitated their effectiveness on the ground, including in gaining the early trust and confidence of the SI public.

- Once the security situation was stabilised, the focus of RAMSI work shifted to longer term soft power activities in support of capacity development and institutional strengthening across the key pillars of RAMSI's mandate. Crucial to ensuring the effectiveness of that work has been aligning RAMSI's support with national priorities through the Partnership Framework.

- Another key element of RAMSI's success has been the integrated nature of the mission, collaborative leadership and effective coordination.

- However, the coordination challenges in RAMSI are enormous. This is because RAMSI has such a wide array of stakeholders in the SI and across the region, and because civilians, police and military within the mission come from different cultures, skill experiences, work disciplines, planning horizons and accountability frameworks. There has needed to be a conscious and sustained effort to communicate regularly and honestly, and to promote mutual understanding across the mission, including on objectives and ways of working.

- The ability to get coordination right represents an essential capability of smart power. To exercise smart power effectively, Australia must be able to operate seamlessly in a whole-of-government way itself if is to do so in coalition with a range of regional partners.

Seminar participants noted that RAMSI has been widely acknowledged, including within the UN, as a successful example of a regional, integrated and collaborative mission that could potentially serve as a model in a number of respects for peace-building missions in fragile conflict-affected states. Participants agreed that given the fragility of many other Pacific Island states, the need could arise for Australia to take a similar leadership role in future. Australia should maintain and further develop the related smart power capabilities to meet any such requirement in the future.

Markets, Trade and Investment

As background to discussion, the following document was circulated to participants prior to the seminar:

- Summary of Key Points, *Reform of the Australian Trade Commission: Maximising Our Value* : Austrade, 2011. **See Attachment I**

Discussion on markets, trade and investment was wide-ranging and reflected views of participants from both government and the private sector, especially industry associations. Major findings were that:

- *Australia's good reputation internationally as a strong economic performer, and its open and sound economic policies, has given Australia a high level of respect and strengthened its influence, particularly among international economic institutions.*

  o Australia's policies include agricultural trade liberalisation, unilateral tariff reductions and a well-regulated open financial services sector. However, not all countries support these policies, and in some cases those that did commit to them used other means to protect their domestic industries. Several industry participants suggested that the Australian government should be more aggressive in negotiating and managing international agreements, and raised the option of applying selective restrictions, including tariffs and quotas, to those countries that did not reciprocate or honour their commitment to open market access measures. The government response was that such measures would be counter-productive as they would undermine Australia's international respect and influence.

  o Regional and global economic-related institutions are very important for protecting and promoting Australia's economic interests as a middle power. Although the performance of some international institutions has been patchy, institutions do matter, and warrant the investment of time and energy. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) were cited as important organisations, even though in some cases they require reform or rejuvenation to better meet the complexities of the changing global economic environment.

- *The global economic environment is very complex, contestable and changeable. Australia must enhance its capability to adjust to new power balances and shifts in centres of economic gravity and be creative in finding new means to pursue key policy objectives.* All markets offered challenges. While Australia is relatively 'comfortable' operating in established markets, it is less comfortable targeting developing and emerging new markets. The Asian region, including particularly ASEAN countries, should be Australia's major focus for economic growth and development. One industry participant stated that businesses should seek to maximise the opportunities to integrate their operations regionally, not just settle for cooperative arrangements.

- *The capability requirements to maximise influence are very demanding in terms of human capital investment. To protect its interests and influence, Australia must meet and sustain this investment.* The complexity and changeability of the international economic environment is

compounded by issues of globalisation and related legal and social issues. This requires highly skilled and experienced officials within government to monitor the environment, advise on and implement related policies. A similar requirement applies to the private sector, especially industry associations. In addition, person-to-person relationships, amongst Australian and international stakeholders, are an indispensable part of the operational environment, and may involve even decades to build the desired levels of mutual understanding and trust. The Australian government and industry must factor these requirements into its personnel policies for related staff.

- *There is a need for closer understanding between government and the private sector of their respective roles, interests and capabilities, and a need to develop ways to increase trust and cooperation in order to promote their mutual interests.* Several participants identified the means of promoting better trust and understanding as including reciprocal secondments, more frequent dialogue at all levels and the importance of counterpart staff having the knowledge and experience to properly represent their organisation and apply that knowledge and experience in context with the policies and interests of other organisations.

- *Australia should make greater use of foreign members of overseas alumni associations and, selectively, members of the Australian diaspora overseas to promote its economic interests, and national interests generally.* Participants noted that some embassies in Canberra are very active in maintaining and utilising such networks throughout Australia.

- *Australian industries should increase their use of "branding" of quality and popular goods and services as a 'smart' marketing strategy*. Examples cited included the marketing of Australian education services under the brand of "Future Unlimited". However, the potential vulnerabilities of brand marketing were also noted. These include the rapid loss of brand reputation and the difficulty of reputation recovery should quality and image decrease. In addition, the loss of image and reputation of an iconic Australian brand could impact unjustifiably on the image and reputation of other Australian goods and services.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Markets, Trade and Investment

Most factors relating to economic activities were noted to be tangible and quantifiable and therefore relatively easy to measure. However, in addition to the use of 'routine' statistical criteria, special market surveys are also as an important part of measuring and understanding overseas market conditions. Statistics are readily available on all exports of Australian goods and services, and foreign investment within Australia. However, as in all circumstances involving marketing, trade and investment, special surveys tailored to local conditions are required to understand both positive and negative factors about markets, and monitor market trends.

Conclusion

Smart power is the effective use of foreign policy tools, including soft and hard power tools, in order to maximise a country's ability to shape and implement strategies and action that best protect and promote its national interests. It is a valid concept for Australia, particularly as a middle power.

Australia is fortunate already to have many smart power capabilities because of the characteristics of the country and its people. It is important that Australia be aware of these strengths and use them to maximum effect.

Australia has a sound reputation and positive image, particularly regionally. It is viewed as a politically and economically stable, non-threatening and non-hegemonic Western democracy. It prefers to operate in partnership with other nations to mutual as well as national benefit via soft power means and takes its responsibilities and commitments seriously as a donor of high quality aid and participant in other bilateral and multilateral fora. Australia has also demonstrated a credible hard power, and combined soft/hard power capability, and a willingness to take on a leadership role, especially regionally, and has done so in Bougainville, Cambodia, East Timor and through RAMSI. At the personal level, Australians are seen as open, honest and innately friendly. What you see is what you get.

However, it is also important that Australia know and work within its limitations. Generally, Australia operates effectively within these boundaries, but it is hard work and in a competitive and changing environment there is no scope for complacency.

There is also room for Australia to improve its influence through further investment in the required capabilities. Those priority areas identified as requiring greater investment include DFAT resources to increase its reach and influence in key target areas overseas through, selectively, the opening of new missions, the selective expansion of existing missions and additional staffing to meet overseas and headquarters requirements. Other priority areas include an enhanced government-owned or sponsored media capability to reach foreign audiences, especially regional audiences, using Australia's aid credentials to attain increased membership on the boards of international organisations, which would give greater influence over their management and direction, and increased training and development of all government staff and ADF and AFP members engaged internationally. Such training should include joint training to enhance better whole-of-government awareness and cooperation, and effectiveness of outcomes generally. There is also a requirement for greater dialogue to build higher levels of trust, understanding and cooperation between government and the private sector in order to improve the mutual interests of both.

The means of measuring the effectiveness of Australia's smart power capabilities were also reviewed. In most cases these means are assessed as tangible, but for some aspects of diplomacy, they are less tangible.

In conclusion, the findings and recommendations within this report are based on the input of a cross section of very highly experienced government and private sector professionals in international affairs. It identifies Australia's smart power strengths and those areas where further investment is required if Australia is significantly to increase its capability to serve the national interest better.

The AIIA thanks all participants and members of the seminar coordination team for their valued contribution to the success of the seminar and production of this report.

The AIIA commends this report to government and encourages the implementation of its recommendations.

Innes Willox

Bruce Gosper

Andrew Shearer

Seminar Program

Wednesday 15 February 2012

Session 1: Welcome & Introduction to Smart Power   0845-0900

Mr Ian Dudgeon, President, AIIA ACT Branch & Seminar Coordinator
- Welcome to participants
- Aim and conduct of seminar

Session 2 : An Introduction to Smart Power in the Australian Context   0900-0930

Mr John McCarthy, AO FAIIA, National President, AIIA
Pre-recorded message by **Professor Joseph Nye,** Kennedy School, Harvard University

Session 3 : Diplomacy – Conventional & Public Diplomacy   0930-1030

Moderator: **Ms Melissa Conley Tyler**, Executive Director, AIIA
Opening Comments: **Mr Dennis Richardson AO**, Secretary, DFAT

Morning Tea   1030-1100

Session 4 : Aid & Other National Assets   1100-1145

Moderator: **Ms Annmaree O'Keeffe AM**, Research Fellow, Lowy Institute
Opening Comments: **Mr Peter Baxter**, Director General, AusAID

Session 5 : Defence & Law Enforcement   1145-1230

Moderator: **Lt General (R) John Sanderson AC FAIIA**, former Military Commander, UNTAC
Opening Comments: **Mr Michael Shoebridge**, FAS Strategic Policy Division, Defence
          Asst. Commissioner Mandy Newton APM, International Deployment Group, AFP

Lunch   1230-1330

Session 6 : RAMSI – A Case Study   1330-1430

Moderator: **Mr Ian Dudgeon**, President, AIIA ACT Branch
Opening Comments: **Mr James Batley PSM**, former Special Coordinator, RAMSI
          Mr Graeme Wilson, former Special Coordinator, RAMSI

Session 7 : Markets, Trade and Investment   1430-1515

Moderator: **Mr Innes Willox**, Chief Executive, Australian Industry Group
Opening Comments**: Mr Bruce Gosper,** Deputy Secretary, DFAT

Afternoon Tea   1515-1530

Session 8 : Capability Requirements: Current and Future Challenges   1530-1645

Moderators: **Mr Ric Smith AO PSM FAIIA,** former Secretary of Defence
          Mr Andrew Shearer, former Director of Studies, Lowy Institute
          Ms Melissa Conley Tyler, Executive Director, AIIA

Conclusion   1645-1700

Closing Remarks: **Mr John McCarthy AO FAIIA**, National President, AIIA

List of Participants

Mr Dennis Richardson AO, Secretary, DFAT, former Ambassador to the USA, former DG ASIO, former Deputy Secretary Department of Immigration & Citizenship, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister

Ms Ruth Pearce, Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy & Information Branch, DFAT, former Ambassador to Poland, the Czech Republic, Russia, the Philippines and High Commissioner to the Solomon Islands, former DDG AusAID

Ms Emily Pollnitz, Acting Director, Public Diplomacy Section DFAT

Mr Graeme Wilson, Head, Global China Dialogue Secretariat, DFAT, former Special Coordinator RAMSI, former Ambassador to Mexico

Dr John Carter, Secretary, Foreign Affairs Sub Committee, JSCFADT, Parliament House

Ms Victoria Walker, Australia in the Asian Century Taskforce, PM&C

Mr Peter Baxter, DG AusAID

Ms Annmaree O'Keeffe AM, Research Fellow, Lowy Institute, former DDG AusAID, former International editor ICRC, former Ambassador to Nepal.

Mr James Batley PSM, DDG AusAID, former High Commissioner to Fiji, former special representative later Ambassador to Timor Leste, former Head of RAMSI, former special representative Bougainville Truce and Peace Monitoring Group

Mr Philip Flood AO, former Vice Chairman CARE Australia, former Secretary DFAT, former DG ONA and DG AusAID, former High Commissioner to UK, former Ambassador to Indonesia, author of *Dancing with Warriors- A Diplomatic Memoir*

Ms Susan Huchinson, Manager Civil Military Affairs, Australian Council for International Development

Mr Ben Davey, Executive Officer, Asia Pacific & Program Enabling Group, AusAID

Lt General John Sanderson AC FAIIA (Retd), former Governor of Western Australia, former Chief of Army and former Military Commander UNTAC (Cambodia)

Mr Michael Shoebridge, FAS Strategic Policy Division, Defence, former FAS Defence, Intelligence & Research Coordination Division PM&C, former DDIO

Dr Alan Ryan, CEO Australian Civil-Military Centre, former Principal, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College

Mr Lachlan Wilkins, Assistant Director, Counter Terrorism and Domestic Security, SPD Defence

Mr Paul Scarmozzino, Policy Officer, Malaysia, SPD Defence

Mr Lachlan McGovern, Policy Officer, PNG and Solomon Islands, SPD Defence

Brigadier John Frewen AM, Chief of Staff Forces Command, former Australian National Commander, Afghanistan, former Commander, Regional Military Intervention Force RAMSI, former member UNAMIR (Rwanda)

Commodore Peter Quinn CSC RAN, DG Naval Capabilities, Transition & Sustainment, former IO INTERFET, former member Op Damask (Persian Gulf), former Task Force commander regional naval capacity development

Captain Lee Goddard CSC RAN, Director, Military Strategy Commitments ADF HQ

Colonel Dennis Malone: Director Research and Analysis, Army, former ADF deployments to Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq & ADFLO US State Department

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Lopsik: Deputy Director Strategy, Army, former ADF deployments to Afghanistan & Op OSIER (Bosnia Herzegovina)

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Scott: SO1 Future Land Force, Army, former ADF deployments Bougainville, Iraq & Afghanistan

Assistant Commissioner Mandy Newton APM, International Deployment Group, AFP

Superintendent Adrian Norris, Coordinator, Business Support Team, AFP, former AFP deployments to RAMSI & Afghanistan

Mr John Murray APM, former AFP Liaison Officer South Pacific, Interpol (Paris) and UN (Cyprus), author of *Minnows of Triton, Policing, Politics, Crime and Corruption in the South Pacific*

Mr Bruce Gosper Deputy Secretary DFAT, former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO (Geneva)

Mr Innes Willox, Chief Executive, Australian Industry Group

Mr Peter Yuile, Executive Director Education & Corporate, Austrade, former Deputy Secretary Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry, and of the Department of Transport & Regional Services

Mr Colin Heseltine, Director, Sino Gas & Energy Holdings, Vice Chair Australia-Korea Business Council, former Ambassador to South Korea, former Executive Director, APEC

Mr Charlie McElhone, General Manager, National Farmers' Federation

Mr Paul Gallagher, Executive Director of Australian-ASEAN Business Council and Australian-Japan Business Cooperation Council, Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Mr Ken Waller, Director, Australian APEC Study Centre, RMIT University

Mr Chris McNicol PSM, Manager, Course Development and Delivery, National Security College, ANU, former Deputy Chief Negotiator, Peace Monitoring Group, Bougainville

Dr Jeremy Farrall, Centre for International Governance and Justice, ANU

Mr Bruce Dover, Chief Executive, Australia Network, ABC

Dr Mike McCluskey, Chief Executive, Radio Australia ABC

Mr Daniel Flitton, Senior Correspondent, The Age

Mr Ric Smith AO PSM FAIIA, Special Envoy for Afghanistan & Pakistan, former Secretary of Defence, former Deputy Secretary DFAT and Defence, former Ambassador to Indonesia & China

Mr Andrew Shearer, former Director of Studies, Lowy Institute, former International Policy Advisor to Prime Minister and Defence Minister, co-author of Lowy Institute report *Diplomatic Disrepair*

Mr John McCarthy AO FAIIA, National President AIIA, former High Commissioner/Ambassador to India, Japan, Indonesia, USA, Thailand, Mexico, Vietnam, former Deputy Secretary DFAT

Ms Zara Kimpton OAM, National Vice President, AIIA

Ms Melissa Conley Tyler, National Executive Director, AIIA

Brigadier John Robbins CSC (Retd), National Deputy Director, AIIA

Mr Ian Dudgeon RFD, President AIIA ACT Branch

Ms Emily Dale, Research Intern, AIIA

Ms Katherine Flynn, Research Intern, AIIA

Mr Ingram Niblock, Research Intern, AIIA

Ms Hayley Channer, Research Intern, AIIA

Ms Gaya Raghavan, Research Intern, AIIA

Ms Rosie Turner, Research Intern, AIIA

Professor Joseph Nye Jr, former Dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, the 'father' of the Soft Power concept and author of *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,* and *The Future of Power.* He provided a pre-recorded message for Session 2.

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Australian Public Diplomacy: Building our Image
Report by Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2007

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) give a higher priority to tracking opinions of Australia in countries of greatest significance to Australia as a means of obtaining better insights into the attitudes of others toward Australia. To this end, DFAT should devote appropriate resources to develop a capacity to conduct and evaluate regular assessments of attitudes towards Australia and its foreign policy.

Recommendation 2

The committee recommends that the government's public diplomacy policy attach greater importance to creating an awareness of public diplomacy domestically. It recommends that the government formulate a public communication strategy and put in place explicit programs designed:
- to inform more Australians about Australia's public diplomacy; and
- to encourage and facilitate the many and varied organisations and groups involved in international activities to take a constructive role in actively supporting Australia's public diplomacy objectives.

Recommendation 3

The committee recommends that the government take a more active role in working with Australian educational institutions to develop stronger and more effective alumni programs for overseas students who have studied in Australia.

Recommendation 4

The committee recommends that:
- all visitors' or training programs sponsored or funded by the government have clearly identified public diplomacy objectives;
- DFAT ensure that all government sponsored or funded visitors' or training programs adopt a longer-term perspective and include measures or plans that are intended to consolidate and build on the immediate public diplomacy benefits that accrue from such activities; and
- as an accountability measure, the organisers or sponsors of a visitors' or training program report on how the program has contributed to Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 5

Consistent with the findings of previous parliamentary reports, the committee recommends that the government consider introducing additional incentives for Australian students not only to study an Asian language but to combine their studies with cultural studies.

Recommendation 6

The committee recommends that the government restructure the interdepartmental committee on public diplomacy (IDC) so that its functions extend beyond sharing information between departments and agencies to include coordinating and monitoring Australia's public diplomacy activities. It recommends:

- more senior representation on the IDC than is currently the case— Departments should be represented at the Deputy Secretary level;
- expanding the functions of the IDC to ensure that it has a central role in planning and overseeing a whole-of-government long-term strategic plan for Australia's public diplomacy;
- the IDC have responsibility for ensuring that the synergies among government departments and agencies are identified and exploited in pursuit of the government's foreign policy objectives;
- the IDC produce a coherent public diplomacy strategy that outlines priority objectives for public diplomacy along the lines of the UK Public Diplomacy Board;
- the government's public diplomacy strategic framework acknowledge the potential of local governments, particularly the major city councils, to engage in Australia's public diplomacy;
- the government's strategic framework take account of non-state stakeholders and adopt as one of its key operating principles in its public diplomacy strategy 'work with others, including business, NGOs and Australian expatriates';
- some cross membership on the IDC and the Australia International Cultural Council;
- the IDC produce a report on discussions and decisions taken at its meetings to be published on its website;
- establishing a sub-committee of the IDC with responsibility for ensuring that non-state organisations involved in international activities, including diaspora communities, are incorporated into an overarching public diplomacy framework;
- establishing a sub-committee of the IDC that would be responsible for ensuring that Australia's public diplomacy stays at the forefront of developments in technology.
- The committee does not intend the IDC to encroach on the independence of statutory bodies such as the ABC or of non-government organisations bound by their own charters. The IDC would recognise and respect their independence. Its objective would be to work in partnership with them, advising and offering guidance and assistance where appropriate to maximise their contribution to Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 7

The committee recommends that if, after considering the above recommendation, the government is of the view that the IDC cannot or should not be the body to take on this leadership and whole-of-government coordinating and advisory function, the government establish an appropriate separate and permanent body that would do so.

Recommendation 8

The committee recommends that the Australian Government explore opportunities for greater and more effective collaboration and coordination with Australian capital city councils in promoting Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 9

The committee recommends that the Australia International Cultural Council (AICC) take note of the evidence relating to the coordination and planning of international cultural activities with a view to addressing the concerns raised in evidence. Close consultation with the relevant sections in the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, DFAT and Australia's cultural

institutions would be central to AICC's consideration. The committee suggests that a report of the Council's deliberations and decisions be made available to the committee and also made public by publishing them on DFAT's and the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts' websites (also see recommendation 6).

Recommendation 10

The committee recommends further that the government consider that the AICC be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Arts and Sports. The committee suggests that this would contribute significantly to greater coordination and cooperation in the area of cultural diplomacy.

Recommendation 11

The committee recommends that the government establish a small but specifically tasked cultural and public diplomacy unit in the Department for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts. In liaison with DFAT, the unit would provide the necessary institutional framework to ensure that Australia's cultural institutions are well placed and encouraged to take full advantage of opportunities to contribute to Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 12

The committee recommends that DFAT ensure that its public diplomacy framework accommodates the concerns of the educational institutions especially with regard to industry engagement by formulating with the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) and the Vice Chancellors of Australian Universities appropriate strategies to facilitate a more productive engagement by these institutions in Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 13

The committee also recommends that DFAT initiate and sponsor a public debate on measures that could be taken to promote a more productive partnership between government departments and educational institutions in promoting Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 14

The committee recommends that DFAT review the findings of the Lowy report, *Diaspora*, reconsider the relevant recommendations made in March 2005 by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee on Australian Expatriates and consider the evidence set out in this report with regard to Australian expatriates and Australia's public diplomacy. The committee urges DFAT to formulate and implement strategies that would enable DFAT to take advantage of the significant resource of the diaspora and encourage Australian expatriates to engage more constructively in Australia's public diplomacy.

Recommendation 15

The committee recommends that DFAT conduct an independent survey of its overseas posts to assess their capacity to conduct effective public diplomacy programs. The survey would seek views on the effectiveness of the post's efforts in promoting Australia's interests, and how they could be improved, the adequacy of resources available to conduct public diplomacy activities, the training and skills of staff with public diplomacy responsibilities, the coordination between agencies in public diplomacy activities; and the level of support provided by the Images of Australia Branch (IAB) and how it could be improved.

The survey would also seek a response from the overseas posts on observations made by the educational and cultural organisations, noted by the committee in this report, levelled at the delivery of Australia's public diplomacy programs. Such matters would include suggestions made to the committee that public

diplomacy opportunities are being lost in the absence of an effective mechanism for the coordination of activities.

Recommendation 16
The committee recommends that DFAT explore the application of innovative technologies to enhance the delivery of its public diplomacy programs.

Recommendation 17
The committee recommends that, as a matter of priority, DFAT put in place specific performance indicators that would allow it to both monitor and assess the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs.

Recommendation 18
The committee recommends that, two years after the tabling of this report, DFAT provide the committee with a report on developments in, and reforms to, Australia's public diplomacy programs giving particular attention to the role and functions of the IDC and the way DFAT evaluates the effectiveness of its public diplomacy activities.

Recommendation 19
The committee recommends that DFAT undertake a review of the nine bilateral foundations, councils and institutes (FCIs) with a view to assessing their effectiveness in contributing to the conduct of Australia's public diplomacy. The review should consider, among other matters, whether the FCIs should receive an increase in funding.

Recommendation 20
The committee recommends that each FCI produce an annual report to be tabled in Parliament.

Request to the Australian National Audit Office
The committee requests that the Australian National Audit Office consider undertaking a performance audit of DFAT's public diplomacy programs giving particular attention to the evaluation of the effectiveness of such programs.

Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy
Lowy Institute Blue Ribbon Panel Report, 2009

Recommendations

Closing the Diplomatic Deficit

The Panel recommends that government make a major, staged reinvestment in Australia's overseas diplomatic network. This should include:

- new resources to support 75 additional A-based staff over the next three years across overstretched Australian missions;
- opening 20 new Australian diplomatic missions over the next 10 years in regional India, regional China, regional Indonesia, Africa, Latin America, North Asia and Central Asia;
- setting a goal of raising the proportion of DFAT's A-based staff (excluding passports staff) posted overseas to 40 per cent of the total; and
- ensuring heads of mission have the leadership ability, organisational authority and resources to direct a cohesive whole-of-government approach.

Consular Services: Recognizing Reality

A major reconsideration of consular services is needed. Government should:

- establish a separate head of consular services in DFAT with a discrete and publicly transparent budget, to be responsible solely for consular policy and delivery of all consular services;
- provide a one-off injection of funds to boost the pool of consular staff in Canberra and at posts proportionate to the increase in consular cases and put in place an agreed funding formula to ensure consular resources keep pace with future demand;
- consider ways to ensure that the government's obligation to provide consular support to its citizens is matched on the part of the traveller, including by an obligation to take out travel insurance, register with Smartraveller and, where appropriate, pay for consular services; and
- export new media techniques for keeping travellers informed.

Diplomats for the 21st Century: Rebuilding Our Intellectual Infrastructure

Australia needs to develop a more professional approach to human resources across the entire international policy community. This should include:

- a major reinvestment in language skills (particularly East Asian and Pacific languages, Arabic and Hindi/Urdu) and expansion in the number of language-designated positions and funding for other specialist skills;
- a more strategic approach to human resources, supported by human resources professionals, including enhanced training and mentoring for team leaders and a focus on priority specialist skills; and
- encouraging an organisational culture that promotes leadership and initiative at all levels, is open to ideas and focuses on results and managing rather than avoiding risk, including by giving heads of mission significantly greater flexibility in managing their resources and priorities.

Public Diplomacy: Integration and Targeting

Australia's approach to public diplomacy needs to be overhauled. Government should:

- appoint a senior strategic communications coordinator, to work across government and with civil society, reporting to the National Security Adviser;
- review existing guidelines on staff contact with the media, with a view to making them less restrictive;
- make a major investment in new media, including blogs, Wikis and video sharing as public diplomacy tools; and
- reorient cultural diplomacy away from elite audiences towards key target audiences such as youth, potential leaders and Islamic communities.

Economic Diplomacy: Boosting Exports and Investment and Supporting Jobs

In light of the global financial crisis, government will need to work in closer partnership with the private sector. Together they should develop an aggressive plan to grow Australian markets and improve our export performance, particularly in the services and manufactures sectors:

- as well as addressing traditional trade and investment promotion activities, the government's response to the Mortimer Review should also focus on marketing Australia as a destination for students, skilled migrants and tourists.

Aid: Maximising Impact

We can leverage our aid program better in support of our international policy goals, including by:

- adapting the program quickly to changing needs in recipient countries if necessary because of the effects of the global financial crisis;
- retaining a focus on development foals but ensuring AusAID is also conscious of Australia's broader international policy aims;
- improving the badging of Australian aid – including for scholarships to study in Australia – and integrating it with whole-of-government public diplomacy objectives; and
- intensifying engagement with civil society.

Improving Outreach: Building New International Policy Networks

The government needs to build a stronger domestic constituency for international policy and leverage a wider range of Australian stakeholders, both groups and individuals. It should:

- establish policy task groups on complex international policy challenges (starting with climate change, energy security, the food crisis and biosecurity). These would be jointly chaired by government and non-government representatives and would bring together relevant government, business and non-government expertise; and
- use new media (for example, closed-group Wikis, video teleconferences, electronic newsletters) to network government agencies, interested businesses, think tanks and NGOs, and individual citizens.

International Policy Machinery: improving Strategic Focus and Cohesion

Coordination and integration of policy needs to be further strengthened across agencies. The regular foreign policy statements foreshadowed in the National Security Statement should:

- set a limited number of strategic goals and priorities for agencies involved in developing and implementing international policy, with clear measures of performance against those goals; and
- include a regular detailed breakdown of language skills and deficiencies in DFAT and across the international policy community.

Diplomatic Disrepair: Rebuilding Australia's International Policy Infrastructure
Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2011

Summary of Major Recommendations

This report includes a review of progress since the publication of Lowy's 2009 report entitled *Australia's Diplomatic Deficit*. It concludes that while there has been some progress in resources and capability since 2009, 'Australia remains severely underweight internationally.' The report's major recommendations, in summary, include:

- DFAT needs a substantial and sustained boost to its funding base to attain the resources and capabilities required to better fulfil its role;

- Australia's diplomatic footprint needs to be increased, by opening new diplomatic posts and increasing the resources at some existing posts, in order to address both changes in our national interests and changing centres of power;

- DFAT needs to increase its diplomatic staffing and critical staffing skills (including language training) in order to build an enhanced policy capacity, and meet the requirement for increased overseas representation, and increased consular demands;

- DFAT needs to increase its public diplomacy capability; and

- DFAT needs to increase its e-diplomacy capability, in Australia and overseas.

Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness
Report by the Commonwealth of Australia, 2011

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The objective of the Australian aid program should be cast as follows:

The fundamental objective of Australian aid is to help people overcome poverty. We work to improve the lives of those living in conditions far below what Australians find acceptable. We focus our resources and effort on areas of national interest, and where Australia can make a real difference.

Recommendation 2

Aid allocations to countries and regions should be defined to include the geographic distribution of global programs supported by Australia, as well as country program aid.

Recommendation 3

Decisions about country allocations should be based on poverty, national interest, capacity to make a difference and current scale and effectiveness. Decisions about country programs should also reflect the need to consolidate the aid program.

Recommendation 4

In scaling up the aid program, country allocations and programs should be adjusted in line with the Review Panel's specific recommendations based on these criteria.

Recommendation 5:

Australia should join the African Development Bank.

Recommendation 6:

The Direct Aid Program should at least double, with the highest increases in countries with no country program.

Recommendation 7:

The aid program should be driven by country programs, rather than by predetermined sectoral targets.

Recommendation 8:

Sectoral selectivity should be increased at the country level. Sectoral spread in country programs should be low, outside of Indonesia, East Timor, PNG and the Pacific Island region.

Recommendation 9:

An organising framework should be adopted to enhance the aid program's strategic clarity and facilitate communication of results. This should be built around the following four themes:

- investing in pro–poor, sustainable economic growth and private sector development;
- promoting opportunities for all;
- supporting social stability, improving the quality of government, and strengthening civil society; and

- preparing for and responding to crises.

Recommendation 10:

The aid program should increase its emphasis on private sector development and strengthening civil society. Policy statements in relation to each should be developed.

Recommendation 11:

Promoting gender equality should be a critical cross–cutting objective for the aid program. Australia should be a firm and persistent advocate and practical supporter of gender equality, especially in the Pacific.

Recommendation 12:

Humanitarian and emergency assistance should be increased as a share of the program.

Recommendation 13:

A small number of flagships should be identified where Australia should exercise leadership and be recognised for its efforts.

Recommendation 14:

Reliance on bilateral modes of aid delivery should largely be restricted to East Asia, the Pacific, and Afghanistan and Pakistan. Aid delivered to other regions should be mainly through partners.

Recommendation 15:

Core funding to multilateral organisations and NGOs should be significantly increased as a share of total spending. Core funding increases should be made on a case–by–case basis, linked to effectiveness, capacity and relevance.

Recommendation 16:

AusAID should devote greater senior management resources to developing and managing relationships with key partners. Predictable, multi–year funding of partners should be provided and micromanagement avoided.

Recommendation 17:

Core funding to multilateral organisations should be linked to performance and relevance to Australia through the introduction of a multilateral rating system.

Recommendation 18:

In relation to multilateral organisations, Australia should use its more prominent 'seat at the table' to seek greater influence over policy and program directions, better recognition for contributions and better monitoring of effectiveness.

Recommendation 19:

AusAID's existing accreditation system should be used as a basis for Australian NGOs to access increased funding. AusAID should consider further means to improve the accreditation process for small NGOs.

Recommendation 20:

The share of aid being disbursed through government systems should be expanded.

Recommendation 21:

The power of business should be harnessed and business innovation should be encouraged, including through an annual consultative forum.

Recommendation 22:

There should be increased use of partnership arrangements with other bilateral donors, both traditional and non–traditional.

Recommendation 23:

There should be more aid funding for research by Australian and international institutions, particularly in agriculture and medicine.

Recommendation 24:

The government should develop and implement a Cabinet–endorsed Four–Year Strategy for the entire aid program for policy and funding clarity.

Recommendation 25:

There should be a Cabinet discussion of an annual review of progress against the Four–Year Strategy and pre–determined hurdles, with consequences if hurdles are not met.

Recommendation 26:

The budget process should be reformed to provide greater funding certainty, including allocating funds on the basis of the Four–Year Strategy and its annual updates, not through NPPs, as at present.

Recommendation 27:

Four–yearly independent reviews of the aid program should be instituted to inform each new Four–Year Strategy.

Recommendation 28:

Ministers should continue to provide leadership to the aid program, and particularly the strengthening of the program for the crucial and challenging period of scaling up over the next five years. An effectiveness culture focused on results, rather than an announcement culture leading to fragmentation, should drive the program.

Recommendation 29:

The words 'International Development' should be added to the title of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Recommendation 30:

A 'whole–of–ODA' approach should be strengthened by creating uniform standards across government departments to planning, delivery, monitoring and reporting, overseen by the Development Effectiveness Steering Committee.

Recommendation 31:

Corporate reform efforts within AusAID should be accelerated to promote a culture geared towards delivering results and enhancing productivity, especially by reducing staff turnover, building the workforce with the requisite skills, streamlining business processes and reducing paperwork.

Recommendation 32:

AusAID should be provided with increased resources to manage effectively the increasing program.

Recommendation 33:

The aid program should foster a culture of risk management rather than risk aversion by balancing various forms of risk and ensuring they are well understood across AusAID as the program grows. It should increase the relative importance of risks to development effectiveness as compared to other risks. There should be a greater focus on results and reward for innovation and acceptance that in a big program some activities will fail.

Principal Roles of the ADF
Summary of Roles Extracted from the Defence White Paper 2009

Use of Armed Force
- Deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations
- Contribute to military contingencies in the Asia Pacific region, including external challenges and alliance obligations
- Contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world

Domestic Security and Emergency Response
- Includes border protection

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Recovery

Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations
Report by Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2008

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The committee recommends that, before the Australian Government commits personnel to a peacekeeping operation, it is satisfied that the mandate has:
- clearly stated and achievable goals based on an assessment and understanding of risks, including the worst case scenario;
- a level of commitment that can be sustained throughout the life of the mission in order to achieve the stated objectives; and
- adequate resources to meet the objectives—the proposed force to have the capacity and capability to fulfil its tasks as set out in the mandate, and sufficient financial resources available to implement the mandate.

Furthermore, where Australia is taking a key or lead role in the proposed mission, the committee recommends that the Government of Australia ensure the terms of the mandate strictly meet these fundamental requirements. This would be done in consultation with the host country, the UN and potential partners.

Recommendation 2

The committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to support actively the R2P doctrine and, through its representations in the UN, ensure that international deliberations are informed by the doctrine. The committee also recommends that in the committee's proposed white paper on peacekeeping (Recommendation 37), the Australian Government include a discussion on, and an explanation of, Australia's current position on this evolving doctrine.

Recommendation 3

The committee recommends that before the Australian Government decides to contribute to a non-UN mandated peacekeeping operation, it is satisfied that the mission has a proper legal framework with recognised authority to deploy the operation and is consistent with Australian law. In this regard the committee recommends that:

- as early as practicable, the UN is consulted and fully informed about developments and any proposals for a peacekeeping operation;
- the Australian Government places the highest priority on securing regional support for the peacekeeping operation;
- the host country, through its legally recognised authorities, has requested the establishment of a peacekeeping operation and willingly consented to the deployment of forces and the conditions under which they are to operate—the agreement to be documented in appropriate legal instruments and provided to the Security Council; and
- the legal documents authorising the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to be treated, if not in the form of a treaty, in a way similar to treaties; that is, tabled in Parliament with an accompanying National Interest Analysis and examined by a parliamentary committee.

Furthermore, that the operation's mandate:

- is in complete accord with the UN Charter and is accountable to universally accepted human rights standards and Australian law;
- contains arrangements to ensure that the Security Council and the peacekeeping operation complement each other's efforts to keep the peace; and
- includes provisions making the mission accountable to the UN and covers issues such as reporting procedures and channels for the exchange of information.

Finally, through both formal and informal channels, the government endeavours to obtain UN endorsement of the operation even though the operation may have commenced.

Recommendation 4

In light of the concerns raised about the conditions under which some members of ATST-EM were deployed, the committee recommends that the ADF conduct a review of this deployment to identify any shortcomings and ensure that lessons from ATST-EM's experiences inform the deployment of similar small contingents. This case study would, for example, examine matters such as their preparation to serve as unarmed peacekeepers, the chain of command arrangements and the provision of health services.

Recommendation 5

The committee recommends that, before deploying Australian personnel to a peacekeeping operation, the Australian Government ensure that all instruments covering the use of force are unambiguous, clearly understood, appropriate to the mission and provide adequate protection.

Recommendation 6

The committee recommends that all government agencies advising the Australian Government on Australia's participation in a proposed peacekeeping operation address clearly the adequacy of force protection provided in the mandate and accompanying ROE. This consideration is not only from the perspective of the physical safety of Australian personnel but also their mental wellbeing. Ultimately, the government must be satisfied that the mandate matches the needs on the ground.

Recommendation 7

The committee recommends that, when considering a proposed peacekeeping operation, the Australian Government examine in detail the mission's exit strategy to ensure that Australia's contribution is part of a well-planned and structured approach to achieving clearly stated objectives. When committing forces to an operation the Australian Government should clearly articulate its exit strategy.

Recommendation 8

The committee recommends that the ADF place a high priority on its undertaking to give training for peacekeeping operations a 'more prominent place' in its training regime. This training should extend to reservists as well as regular members of the ADF.

Recommendation 9

The committee recommends that the AFP adhere to a procurement policy that requires, where possible, any equipment purchased for use in a peacekeeping operation to be compatible with equipment or technology used by the ADF.

Recommendation 10

The committee recommends that the ADF and the AFP work together to devise and implement programs—joint training and exercises—and develop shared doctrine that will improve their interoperability when deployed overseas. In particular, the committee recommends that the ADF implement a program of secondments of their members to the AFP's International Deployment Group.

Recommendation 11

The committee recommends that DFAT and AusAID jointly review the pre- deployment training arrangements for Commonwealth officers being deployed on peacekeeping missions with a view to establishing a government approved course of training. The committee recommends further that:

- all Commonwealth personnel deploying to a peacekeeping operation satisfy the requirements of this course;
- relevant government agencies require all their external contractors providing services to a peacekeeping operation to undergo appropriate screening and training; and
- to ensure the effective transfer of skills and knowledge, DFAT and AusAID include in their pre-deployment preparations a 'training for trainers' course for personnel whose duties involve instructing or coaching people in a host country.

Recommendation 12

The committee recommends that DFAT undertake a comparative review and analysis of the strategic level arrangements for the planning and coordination of RAMSI and peacekeeping operations in Timor-Leste and to use the findings as a guide for future missions.

Recommendation 13

The committee recommends that AusAID coordinate a consultation with DFAT, Defence, AFP, ACFID and key NGOs to establish a more effective mechanism for involving the NGO sector in the planning of Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations.

Recommendation 14

The committee recommends that a whole-of-government working group, such as the Peace Operations Working Group, arrange to hold regular meetings with representatives of NGOs engaged in peacekeeping operations to discuss and develop training programs and courses that would improve their working relationship. The committee recommends further that, in consultation with other government agencies and relevant NGOs, DFAT and AusAID review this arrangement in 2010 to assess the value to each organisation involved, and how it could be improved. The results of the review would be contained in DFAT's annual report.

Recommendation 15

The committee recommends that, in consultation with AusAID and ACFID, Defence review its civil–military cooperation doctrine, giving consideration to identifying measures to improve coordination between the ADF and the NGO sector when engaged in peacekeeping activities.

The committee recommends further that Defence include a discussion on its CIMIC doctrine in the upcoming Defence White Paper as well as provide an account of the progress made in developing the doctrine and its CIMIC capability in its annual report.

Recommendation 16

As part of this review process, the committee recommends that, in consultation with AusAID and other relevant government agencies and ACFID, Defence and the AFP consider the merits of a civil–military–police cooperation doctrine. The consideration given to this doctrine would be reflected in the committee's proposed white paper on peacekeeping.

Recommendation 17

The committee recommends that in conjunction with its review of CIMIC doctrine, ADF consider ways to strengthen its CIMIC capability.

Recommendation 18

The committee recommends that AusAID, ACFID and Defence jointly review the current pre-deployment education programs, exercises, courses and other means used to prepare military and civilian personnel to work together in a peacekeeping operation. The committee recommends further that based on their findings, they collectively commit to a pre-deployment program that would strengthen cooperation between them and assist in better planning and coordinating their activities.

Recommendation 19

The committee recommends that Defence, AFP, AusAID and DFAT commission a series of case studies of recent complex peacekeeping operations, as proposed by Austcare, with the focus on the effectiveness of civil–military cooperation and coordination. Their findings would be made public and discussed at the Peace Operations Working Group mentioned in Recommendation 14.

Recommendation 20

The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider the lessons from RAMSI regarding the positive local reaction to the mission's 'relatively low profile' with a view to adopting this approach as policy and best practice.

Recommendation 21

The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission independent research to test, against the experiences of past deployments, the relevance of the factors identified by the committee that should inform Australia's approach to, and planning for, a regional operation. These include the need for understanding sensitivities regarding sovereignty, language skills and cultural awareness, local ownership and involving local community groups (for complete list see paragraph 16.61). The committee further recommends that the information be used to develop a template for the conduct of future missions.

Recommendation 22

The committee recommends that a whole-of-government working group review the language and cultural awareness training of government agencies with a view to developing a more integrated and standardised system of training for Australian peacekeepers. The Peace Operations Working Group may be the appropriate body to undertake this work.

Recommendation 23

The committee recommends that exchange programs and joint exercises with personnel from countries relevant to peacekeeping operations in the region continue as a high priority. It also suggests that such activities form part of a broader coherent whole-of-government strategy to build a greater peacekeeping capacity in the region.

Recommendation 24

The committee recommends that greater impetus be given to the implementation of UN Resolution 1325. It recommends that the Peace Operations Working Group be the driving force behind ensuring that all agencies are taking concrete actions to encourage greater involvement of women in peacekeeping operations. The committee recommends further that DFAT provide in its annual report an account of the whole-of-government performance in implementing this resolution. The report should go beyond merely listing activities to provide indicators of the effectiveness of Australia's efforts to implement Resolution 1325.

Recommendation 25

The committee recommends that Australian government agencies actively pursue opportunities to second senior officers to the United Nations. Furthermore, that such secondments form part of a broader departmental and whole-of-government strategy designed to make better use of the knowledge and experience gained by seconded officers. In other words, appointments should not be terminal postings and should be perceived as important and valuable career opportunities.

Recommendation 26

The committee recommends that the ADF develop a comprehensive and reliable database on Australian peacekeepers that would provide accurate statistics on where and when ADF members were deployed. The database would also enable correlations to be made between particular deployments and associated health problems.

Recommendation 27

The committee recommends that the ADF broaden the scope of the research and studies being done on veterans' mental health by the Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health and the Centre for Military and Veterans' Health to include the rehabilitation of veterans with mental health problems; the retraining opportunities or career transition services provided to them; the quality of, and access to, appropriate and continuing care; and the stigma attached to mental health problems in the ADF.

Recommendation 28

The committee recommends that the Australian Government release a policy paper outlining the options and its views on a rehabilitation and compensation scheme for the AFP, invite public comment and thereafter release a draft bill for inquiry and report by a parliamentary committee.

Recommendation 29

The committee recommends that the ADF commission an independent audit of its medical records to determine the accuracy and completeness of the records, and to identify any deficiencies with a view to implementing changes to ensure that all medical records are up-to-date and complete. The audit report should be provided, through the Minister for Defence, to the committee.

Recommendation 30

The committee recommends that the Australian Government requests ANAO to audit the hardware and software used by the ADF and DVA in their health records management system to identify measures needed to ensure that into the future the system is able to provide the type of detailed information of the like required by the committee but apparently not accessible.

Recommendation 31

The committee also recommends that Defence commission the Centre for Military and Veterans' Health to assess the hardware and software used by Defence and DVA for managing the health records of ADF personnel and, in light of the committee's concerns, make recommendations on how the system could be improved.

Recommendation 32

The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider additional funding for the proposed Peacekeeping Memorial.

Recommendation 33

The committee recommends that the Australian Government include Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations in East Timor in the terms of reference for the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations.

Recommendation 34

The committee recommends that the relevant government agencies jointly develop standard measurable performance indicators that, where applicable, would be used across all agencies when evaluating the effectiveness of their peacekeeping activities (also see Recommendation 36).

Recommendation 35

The committee recommends that the Australian Government designate an appropriate agency to take responsibility for the whole-of-government reporting on Australia's contribution to peacekeeping.

This means that the agency's annual report would include a description of all peacekeeping operations, a list of the contributing government agencies, and, for each relevant agency:

- a description of its role in the operation;
- the agency's financial contribution to the operation during that
- reporting year;
- the peak number of personnel deployed by the agency during the reporting year and the date at which the peak occurred; and
- the number of personnel deployed as at the end of the reporting year.

Recommendation 36
In light of the committee's discussion on the adequacy of performance indicators, the committee also recommends that the agencies reporting on peacekeeping activities provide in their annual reports measurable performance indicators on the effectiveness of these activities.

Recommendation 37
The committee recommends that the Australian Government produce a white paper on Australia's engagement in peacekeeping activities. Asia–Pacific Centre for Civil–Military Cooperation

Recommendation 38
The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a task force to conduct a scoping study for the Asia–Pacific Centre for Civil–Military Cooperation, focusing on best practice. The task force would:

- include representatives of the ADF, the AFP, DFAT, AusAID and NGOs;
- visit the major international peacekeeping centres and hold discussions with overseas authorities—visits could include the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada, Centre for International Peace Operations in Germany and centres in Malaysia and/or India;
- examine the structure, reporting responsibilities, administration, funding and staffing of these institutions—the task force would seek specific information on matters such as the civil–military–police coordination, administration of a civilian database and domestic/regional focus;
- assess the strengths and weaknesses of the various institutions with a view to identifying what would best suit Australia and the region; and
- based on this assessment, produce a final report for government containing recommendations on the Asia–Pacific Centre for Civil– Military Cooperation.

The government should make the report available to the committee.

Reform of the Australian Trade Commission: Maximising Our Value
Austrade 2011

Summary of Key Points

In May 2011, a review of the Australian Trade Commission was published with the intention of modifying the organisation to account for the fundamental shifts that have occurred in the global economy, and the new functions and responsibilities it has been allocated by the Australian government, since its initial establishment in 1985. The Trade Review bases its findings on previous research conducted by Austrade, views of stakeholders from government, business and industry, and surveys and submissions by Austrade staff.

The report recognises that, like its other smart power tools, Australia's trade budget is a critical element of its national strategy. Insofar as it is responsible for both encouraging investment in and promoting knowledge of Australian business abroad, Austrade's role in projecting Australian smart power is twofold: the organisation is capable of projecting both hard (economic) and soft (attractive) power.

The Trade Review proposes a more effective "new operational model" for the organisation, intended to help it maximise its effectiveness in carrying out these roles, which is comprised of the following elements:

A Clearer Rationale and Purpose

Austrade's unique value stems from its knowledge of, and connections in, international markets and its status as a government organisation. Because of this combination of assets, Austrade has the ability to play a substantial role in the promotion of Australia's national interest insofar as it promotes knowledge of and encourages investment in Australian business, which helps to strengthen the Australian economy and promote a favourable image for Australia abroad.

A Realigned International Network

The report suggests that Austrade should begin to establish itself more prominently in emerging and growth markets rather than limiting its international presence to North America and Europe. It recommends that this be a strategic expansion in which different markets attract a different focus reflecting their commercial potential as well as the nature and scale of impediments to business in those markets and the optimal role for Government.

A Focus on Providing Services to Internationally Ready Firms

The report recommends that Austrade services be more clearly directed to those companies ready to tackle international business opportunities. To support this, it proposes that Austrade implement:

- an International Readiness Indicator, designed to judge the suitability and preparedness of various Australian firms for engagement with the international market;

- a streamlined suite of services that Austrade can provide to help those firms engage effectively with the international market; and
- simple packaging of those services.

Opportunity Identification and Delivery

The Trade Review also proposes that identifying and bringing tangible foreign business opportunities directly to Australian business and to other relevant organisations should be a key element of Austrade's new strategy. To achieve this, it suggests that:

- Austrade should engage in a program of generically promoting Australia's attractiveness as a destination for foreign direct investment;
- Austrade should act as a coordinating body that fosters close cooperation across levels of government and plays a role delivering targeted information and investment leads to relevant government branches and state and territory authorities; and
- Austrade should adopt a more open and contemporary approach to sharing its information and insight, with new investment in online service delivery and information dissemination and strengthened collaboration with government and commercial service providers.

Better-Targeted Promotions

The report found it to be important for Austrade to actively seek to partner with relevant allies to organise events and missions. It recommended that agreements with major exhibition companies for logistics and recruitment be pursued. Offshore, the establishment of Australia Unlimited branding, promotions and events should be accorded priority.

More Online Services and Information

The success of Austrade's new operational model will depend on the organisation's ability to improve its online service delivery and allocate resources to developing this area. To expand and transform online capacity to support a range of service and information capabilities, the report recommends the following initiatives:

- providing online access to the new International Readiness Indicator tool;
- establishing integrated online and offline support functionality;
- providing online referrals and linkages to appropriate service providers;
- disseminating market insights and opportunities via external networks;
- providing access to a portal of searchable third party information on Australian suppliers; and
- providing online business registration and enhanced access to content and functionality for registered users.

Sharing Our Insight

Austrade possesses considerable information and commercial insight regarding specific developments and opportunities in international markets. The Aid Review found there to be high demand from other organisations, both government and business associations, for this information to be made more readily available. Therefore, the report recommends that ways of opening access to Austrade's market insights and market information on international commercial opportunities be explored.

Building Strategic Partnerships to Benefit Australian Firms

The Trade Review encourages enhanced, practical collaboration between Austrade and other government

and private sector service providers in Australia. It suggests that where the latter are better placed to deliver opportunities to companies or to develop export capability, their collaboration with Austrade would benefit Australian firms.

Simpler Organisational Structure

The report recommended that Austrade be restructured based upon the following objectives:
- allowing for more focus, effort and resources offshore, recognizing that is where Austrade's major value lies;
- creating a globally integrated organisation;
- reducing the fragmentation of functions and consolidates areas of expertise; and
- being simpler, clearer and improving lines of accountability.