QUARTERLY ACCESS

Publications by the Australian Institute of International Affairs

The Australian Journal of International Affairs is edited by Dr Andrew O'Neil, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute, and publishes high quality scholarly research on international political, social, economic and legal issues, especially (but not exclusively) within the Asia-Pacific region. The journal is published four times a year by Routledge Taylor and Francis.

The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is proud to present the Emerging Scholars Series to enable young researchers to publish their work. The AIIA hosts a number of interns in its National Office who often write research reports to earn academic credit. To give these high quality papers an outlet, the AIIA produces an annual volume, the Emerging Scholars Series, in order to publicise their work.

Browse the catalogue online: www.internationalaffairs.org.au/publications/quarterly-access

QUARTERLY ACCESS

YOUR KEY TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN AUSTRALIA & THE PACIFIC

Quarterly Access (QA) is the national quarterly publication of the young professionals' networks of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA).

All the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the individual writers. While providing a forum for discussion and debate on international issues, the AIIA does not formulate its own institutional views, and eschews political bias.

Launched by ACCESS, the AIIA's Network for Students and Young Professionals, Quarterly Access is an entirely volunteer-based publication providing a forum for students and young professionals with an interest in international affairs to contribute to the exchange of ideas.

The Editorial Committee comprises a group of students and young professionals.

Editorial Team

- *Editor-in-Chief* **Nina Roxburgh**
- *Deputy Editor* **Tamara Tubakovic**
- *Editor* **Felicity Driver**
- *Editor* **Alyce Hogg**
- *Graphic Editor* **Alicia Sherman**

Contact the Committee via email quarterlyaccess@gmail.com or for information on submitting an article visit: www.internationalaffairs.org.au/publications/quarterlyaccess

CONTENTS

From the Editor-in-Chief

It is my pleasure to bring you another captivating issue of Quarterly Access. In this issue, four talented authors bring unique and sharp perspectives on the issues of climate change, indigenous health, the EU's continuing refugee crisis, and ISIS' continued discerning use of media. All our authors are young professionals, providing a fresh glance at some of the biggest challenges in International Relations at this moment.

Sophie Pascoe presents an illuminating interview with Ursula Rakova, Executive Director of Tulele Peisa. In the interview, Pascoe explores the challenges to women's involvement in the international climate regime, from Rakova's perspective as a long time activist and advocate in the climate change debate. She reflects on her time at Paris COP21 and provides her thoughts and how the climate change issue can progress from here.

Saskia Llewellyn offers an interesting analysis of the effect the refugee crisis has had on the fundamental EU values of solidarity and human dignity, and its subsequent strength as an organisation in Europe. Llewellyn wades through different considerations of the failure of the EU and its member states to uphold these values in combination with the decline of support for EU-centred political parties. Llewellyn makes her case for why this is the most important challenge facing the EU today.

Kaitlyn Krahe reminds readers of perhaps one of the more shameful public policy failures in recent Australian history. Krahe builds her analysis of the failure of the Coalition of Australian Governments (COAG) to meet their commitment to "Closing the Gap." Inequality between Indigenous and non-Indigenouc maternal-infant health outcomes is still a current issue in Australia, and Krahe presents a series of recommendations for how to address it.

Jessica Herne writes on the relationship between ISIS and both traditional and non-traditional media. Unlike any political ideological group before, ISIS use media to both its advantage - to spread its message of power, capacity, and fear - and in some cases its demise - resistance from media can lead hinder propagation of its message. Herne presents an enriching analysis of these forms of media, examining how the targeting of different audiences through different channels effects the formation and subsistence of the ISIS ideology.

As always, a big thank you to our editorial team for their hard work to bring you this issue. Happy reading!

Nina Roxburgh, Editor-in-Chief

Women in the Paris COP21 Climate Negotiations: An Interview with Ursula Rakova

Article by **Sophie Pascoe**

Sophie Pascoe is a political ecologist currently completing her PhD in the School of Geography at the University of Melbourne researching local understandings and experiences of climate change and mitigation in Papua New Guinea.

Climate change is one of the most serious collective threats of our time, but the impacts of climate change are distributed unevenly making some groups more vulnerable than others. Women, who constitute the majority of the world's poor, are disproportionally affected by climate change. In the context of social and economic marginalisation, women are particularly vulnerable to environmental changes.[1] Due to gender norms, the gendered division of labour, and gender inequalities experienced in different societies, women face distinctive challenges from climate change. Despite this, women have been severely underrepresented in decision making around climate change, particularly in the international climate regime under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[2] While the UNFCCC explicitly acknowledged the need to improve the participation of women in climate negotiations at COP7 in 2001,[3] the gender balance within the climate regime remains a concern. While the past two Executive Secretaries of the UNFCCC have been women – Christiana Figueres, followed by Patricia Espinosa in July 2016 – this has not translated at other levels of the UNFCCC. The percentage of women in governing bodies of the UNFCCC ranges from 36-41 per cent, with women making up just 26-33 per cent of heads of delegations.[4] This leads us to question whether women's voices, interests, and knowledge are adequately represented in the international climate regime.

To investigate this issue, I interviewed Ursula Rakova following the Paris COP21 climate negotiations, which were held in December 2015. Ursula Rakova is the Executive Director of Tulele Peisa, a local NGO in Papua New Guinea coordinating the relocation of communities from the Carteret Islands to mainland Bougainville due to rising sea levels. Tulele Peisa's model of climate migration is based on self-determination and promotes environmentally and culturally sustainable resettlement.[5] Ursula Rakova is a prominent environmental campaigner and advocate of human rights and works tirelessly to ensure the future of her atoll community in the face of climate change.[6] She

has attended three Conference of the Parties (COPs), including COP13 in Bali 2007, COP16 in Cancun 2010, and most recently COP21 in Paris. In the following interview, Rakova reflects on her experiences in the climate negotiations and the ways that women and vulnerable communities are included in the climate regime.

SP: *Ursula, you attended the Paris COP in December 2015 with the Climate Wise Women program; could you explain the background of that organisation?*

UR: *Climate Wise Women was formed in 2012 by a group of women from Uganda, the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, the Maldives and the United States. The main purpose of the organisation is to advocate for the issues experienced at the local level to the international community. The first gathering of Climate Wise Women was supported by Greenpeace US, Oxfam US and the Mary Robinson Foundation. We still receive technical support from the Mary Robinson Foundation and our coordinator tries to find funds and small grants to support gatherings and tours.*

SP: *How successful do you think the Climate Wise Women are in terms of communicating those local issues at the global stage?*

UR: *I think a lot of the issues we are facing locally have really been promoted publically because of the Climate Wise Women and our affiliation as a group of women who are affected at the local level but are able to have a coordinated voice. This is particularly true in the United States where our voices are beginning to be heard. Our connection with the Mary Robinson Foundation adds more value to this advocacy process.*

SP: *Within the international climate regime, specifically the Paris COP, do you feel that your voice is being heard?*

UR: *I think to an extent it is, but to me the voices of women really need to be heard more. I was at the Paris COP and I would have really loved to see more women there. It was really helpful to see the government leaders of different nations forming an alliance. The women leaders were at the forefront, but this should have also happened with civil society groups. I was fortunate to be involved in a breakfast session with all the foreign affairs ministers who were women leaders in their own countries. I presented at this breakfast, but I think the voices of women need to be heard at a wider level at the COPs. Women leaders from civil society organisations also need to be included in government delegations. This needs to happen.*

SP: *So how do you feel about the Paris Agreement that came out of the negotiations?*

UR: *As a person coming from an already affected and very vulnerable community, I feel more should have been done. A lot of the Pacific Islands sold out; they had to do away with loss and damage to get support for the 1.5 °C target. That was a compromise. But I guess they couldn't do any better than that because they are small island states and they had to compromise one or the*

1   Alam, Mayesha, Rukmani Bhatia & Briana Mawby (2015) Women and Climate Change: Impact and Agency in Human Rights, Security, and Economic Development. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security: Georgetown.

2   Ivanova, Maria (2015) Paris climate summit: why more women need seats at the table, https://theconversation.com/paris-climate-summit-why-more-women-need-seats-at-the-table-50116, 14 September 2016.

3   UNFCCC (2002) Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add. 4.

4   UNFCCC (2015) Report on gender composition. FCCC/CP/2015/6.

5   Pascoe, Sophie (2015) "Sailing the Waves on Our Own: Climate Change Migration, Self-Determination and the Carteret Islands" in QUT Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 72.

6   Tulele Peisa (n.d.) Executive Director, Ursula Rakova, http://www.tulele-peisa.org/about/ursula-rakova/, 14 September 2016.

other. The other thing that came out in the agreement was human rights. Mexico, and later the European Union, really pushed that; but unfortunately the gender inequality content was also omitted from that clause.

SP: *Do you feel like your indigenous knowledge and gendered knowledge are reflected in the agreement?*

UR: *I don't think so. I mean look at human rights and then gender inequality: that clause isn't there. I don't think the traditional knowledge or culture is really in the agreement, and it needs to be. I think the nations refused to acknowledge the clause on loss and damage because they know this.*

SP: *As an affected community member and someone with cultural and traditional knowledge, do you feel marginalised by this?*

UR: *Well the agreement basically sets us outside of this, so yes. It's kind of hypocritical in the sense that it talks about protecting our rights as vulnerable people, but then it places us outside this agreement. We are left to either swim or drown; that's our business. Most of the affected communities have cultural knowledge and cultural beliefs, but where is the justice when all of these beliefs and values are completely forgotten? We have to deal with things the way other people think.*

SP: *Do you think that in the negotiation process, the largely Western, scientific discourse dominates?*

UR: *Yes to an extent. The IPCC report is everywhere. Westerners need scientific information and science to illustrate the impacts of climate change. For us, living in the atolls and islands, we don't need facts. We are seeing things; it is happening before our eyes. And when you look at what is happening, what is really destroying the fabric of our culture, where are human rights and where is justice? For us, our coral reefs are being covered with sand that is being washed from the island. Our reef is dead. There is hardly any coral left in the shallow parts of the water, where previously we couldn't paddle our canoes because of coral and huge giant clams.*

SP: *So do you feel like your lived experiences of climate change aren't really represented?*

UR: *That's why I say that doing away with the clause on loss and damage really undermines our cultural beliefs and norms. This is why we really need to see justice redressed in the international arenas like the UNFCCC.*

SP: *What do you think needs to change within the international climate regime, specifically within the COP negotiations and UNFCCC, in order for vulnerable communities and women, like yourself, to receive climate justice?*

UR: *Climate change is already upsetting people's lives. Countries need to act now. If we want to stop global warming, we can't wait twenty years to act. I really believe Australia needs to act immediately on this because impacts are getting worse. Australia is our biggest neighbour and it has the ability to work now.*

The richest countries need to put resources in place to provide support, especially to communities that are most affected.

SP: *In addition to wealthier nations contributing more to supporting mitigation and adaptation, is there anything in the structure of the climate regime that you think could be changed to facilitate climate justice?*

UR: *I think that climate investment funds should be made available to communities finding their own solutions and initiating their own futures. Climate funds should really be going towards supporting these communities; it shouldn't just be going to governments. And the other thing is that governments need to sign and ratify the Paris COP agreement and fulfil their commitments to the agreement. It's not just business as usual anymore. Governments also need to work closely with civil society to find ways to respond to issues that are affecting their own communities. They need to take action seriously.*

—

Ursula Rakova highlights that in order to ensure that the impacts of climate change do not further marginalise already vulnerable groups; we need to include women's voices, interests and knowledge in the international climate regime.[7] Gender aspects are rarely addressed in climate change policy making, partly because of a lack of gender-sensitive data and knowledge about the links between gender inequality and climate change, but also due to the limited participation of women and gender experts in climate change negotiations.[8] While literature on climate change and gender typically frame women as vulnerable or virtuous in relation to the environment, these assumptions and discourses can divert attention from inequalities in decision-making.[9] In addition to understanding the impacts of climate change on women, we need to recognise their voices and agency in addressing its threats. Ursula Rakova's reflections on her experiences at the Paris COP21, and in the climate change regime more broadly, provide valuable insights into the ways that women participate and engage in decision-making around climate change. She also exposes some of the obstacles and challenges that they face. With this knowledge, the international community not only need to improve the participation of women in the climate change negotiations, they need to critically examine the systems and structures in the international climate regime and the ways that they enable or constrain the involvement of women in future decision-making.

7   Denton, Fatima (2002) "Climate change vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation: Why does gender matter?" in Gender and Development, Vol. 10, No. 2, 10.

8   Hemmati, Minu and Ulrike Rohr (2009) "Engendering the climate-change negotiations: experiences, challenges, and steps forward" in Gender and Development, Vol. 17, No. 1, 19.

9   Arora-Jonsson, Seema (2011) "Virtue and vulnerability: Discourses on women, gender and climate change" in Global Environmental Change, Vol. 21, 744.

Testing the *solid* in solidarity: An examination of why the ongoing refugee crisis is the most important challenge facing the EU

Article by **Saskia Llewellyn**

Saskia Llewellyn is a final year International Relations student at the University of St Andrews. In her third year of study, she took part in two executive exchanges with Sciences Po (Paris) and the University of Melbourne.

In trying to identify the most important challenge facing the European Union (EU), it is imperative to take into account the "the context of forces that have made [the EU] and are still making it".[1] The EU is in essence a project whereby European nation-states have voluntarily conceded some of their national sovereignty to a collective supranational body. The functionality and future of the EU therefore depends on nation-states to continue to believe in and abide by the EU's acquis communautaire.[2] Considering this context, the most important challenge facing the EU today is the on-going refugee crisis. In dealing with the highest influx of refugees into Europe since World War II,[3] the EU and its member states have not upheld core EU values, namely solidarity and respect for human dignity. These values are at the forefront of the constitutional basis of the EU outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, which have been codified in Article 1a:

"'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail."[4]

The values of solidarity and respect for human dignity are undeniably significant as they are the values that continue to hold the EU together (internally) and set the EU out as a leader in international relations (externally). This article examines how the neglect of these constitutional values, specifically regarding the refugee crisis, by member states, has created the biggest challenge facing the EU. The argument is two-fold. The EU's Dublin Regulation II and specifically, its 'first entry rule', has created an unfair European asylum system for the EU's external member states. This in turn had a negative domino effect, in that the pressure of refugees resulted in these external states sporadically opening their borders, creating a spiral of distrust within the EU. The consequences of undermining EU solidarity throughout the humanitarian crisis poses several internal challenges to the EU, namely a lack of EU legitimacy, the decline in centre-parties and, in turn, an increase in euro-scepticism. Such internal challenges are vastly important as they threaten the EU's functionality and, more importantly, the future existence of the EU as a set of institution. In addition, there is a necessary examination of the way in which a lack of solidarity has resulted in disrespect for human dignity by member states when managing the crisis. This is highlighted in the prominent M.S.S v Greece and Belgium case. The consequence of not abiding by the value of respect for human dignity is extremely challenging for the EU as a global actor because it undermines the EU's normative power.[5]

Part 1: Solidarity

- **Dublin Regulation II**

The EU's primary law regarding asylum seekers, the Dublin Regulation II, does not espouse the value of solidarity, which has been codified in the Lisbon Treaty as it places a burden on member states, which lie at the external borders of the EU. The most problematic aspect of the revised Dublin Regulation II is the 'first entry rule'. The 'first entry rule' specifies that the first country an asylum seeker enters is the country solely responsible for examining their application.[6] This rule, in fact, neglects the principle of solidarity in that it places a disproportionate burden on the external southern states of the EU, such as Greece, Italy and Malta, where most refugees and migrants arrive via North Africa or the Aegean Sea.[7] Considering that these external southern states were greatly affected by the 2008 financial crisis, the first entry rule places a further strain on already weakened economies. This disproportionate sharing of responsibility, as European scholar Stefan Lehne writes, has created an "asymmetrical impact".[8] To reiterate, Lehne means that the influx of refugees has affected some member states enormously, whilst others, due to their geographical position in Europe, have been barely affected. The 'first entry rule' of the Dublin Regulation II therefore does not inspire or promote solidarity between member states as it has imposed an unfair burden on the EU's external border states.

- **A spiral of distrust and lack of solidarity between member states**

Having examined the Dublin Regulation II and its 'first entry rule', it comes as no surprise that certain member states, such as Greece, which have been overwhelmed with asylum applications have begun to overtly disregard the Dublin Regulation.[9] As countries such as Greece did not comply with the 'first entry rule' of the Dublin Regulation II, many refugees began moving onwards to other member states, further undermining the specific objective of the Dublin Regulation, which was to prevent 'secondary movement.'

Following this series of events, member states began to neglect the value of solidarity. In light of the failures of the Dublin Regulation II, the European Commission attempted to remedy the "asymmetrical impact" of the crisis by putting forward a series of reconstructive measures within its 'European Agenda on Migration'. The central proposal in this agenda was to install an emergency relocation scheme of 160,000 refugees from the three 'frontline states',

1 Nugent, Neill (2010) The Government and Politics of the European Union 7th ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p1.

2 Acquis communautaire is the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states.

3 IOM (2015) Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015, https://www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom, accessed May 25, 2016.

4 Treaty of Lisbon 2007/C 306/01

5 Note to reader: this article was written in June 2016 and thus not take into account any events that have taken place since then.

6 Dublin II regulation, Feb. 18, 2003.

7 Gayle, Damien (2016), Aegean Sea Refugee Crossings Rise 35 Fold Year-on-Year in January - Watchdog, The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/30/refugee-arrivals-greece-exceed-52000-january. Accessed May 24, 2016

8 Lehne, Stefan (2016) "How the Refugee Crisis Will Reshape the EU," Carngie Europe http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/04/how-refugee-crisis-will-reshape-eu-pub-62650. Accessed May 26, 2016.

9 Trauner, Florian (2016) "Asylum Policy: The EU's 'crises' and the Looming Policy Regime Failure," in Journal of European Integration Vol. 38, No. 3, p321.

Greece, Italy and, Hungary.[10] However, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban rejected this proposal and instead erected a new fence on its border with Croatia and Serbia. Hungary's rejection of the EU proposal demonstrates two things. Firstly, it emphasizes the negative impact that the Dublin Regulation II has had on promoting solidarity between member states of the EU. Secondly, it highlights the way in which EU member states have boldly been defying the value of solidarity in the face of the refugee crisis. The undermining of EU solidarity poses an internal challenge for the EU internally as it compromises the values that make up the foundation of the EU.

- Internal Challenges

Values, such as solidarity, are of utmost importance for the EU as it is the shared belief in values that holds the EU together as a set of institutions. However the EU and its member states have evidently not upheld this value. The EU is by its very nature a heterogeneous body and has thus, since its creation, had to construct a commonality based on shared values and principles. In reference to solidarity, Frans Timmermans rightly points out that solidarity emerged from the necessity to not repeat the devastating world wars of the early 20th century.[11] In their analysis of the principle of solidarity in an enlarged EU, Ines Hartwig and Phedon Nicolaidis conceptualise solidarity as being based on a concept of "we-ness", which is rooted in a perception of commonality amongst members of a community.[12] This perception of commonality is vital for the survival and efficient functioning of the EU, precisely because the EU, unlike individual European nation-states, cannot draw upon a common heritage or a shared identity.[13]

It therefore becomes clear that when member states defy the values that hold the EU together, the EU is exposed to further problems. Particularly, a lack of solidarity undermines the legitimacy of the EU and thus puts into question the very existence of the EU. Legitimacy can be conceptualised in sociologist Max Weber's framework, whereby legitimacy is empirical and exists as long as a governed peoples believe that an authority is acceptable.[14] Weber's understanding of legitimacy is useful, as it points out that for the EU to continue to exist it must be believed in by its citizens. The lack of support for the EU has manifested in a number of ways, particularly in the decline of euro-enthusiast political parties.

Across Europe, "the centre-left social democrats and centre-right Christian democrats who have dominated national politics for 60 years are in decline".[15] Considering the EU relies upon the support of centre right and left parties,[16] a decline in these parties poses a real threat to the continued existence of the EU. Furthermore, in light of the decline of centre politics in Europe, there has been an increase in the rise of euro-scepticism across the EU. An example of this can be seen in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has long been viewed as one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the EU.[17] Recent opinion polls reveal however that the PVV (Party for Freedom) is currently the most popular party in the Netherlands, which is problematic for the EU.[18] Take for instance how one of the main campaigning points of the PVV is to leave the Euro with the eventual aim of leaving the EU. The Dutch example, whilst unique in its national context, highlights the way in which there has been a rise of euro-scepticism across the EU. The rise in euro-scepticism is linked to the undermining of EU solidarity throughout the refugee crisis as it represents a decline in 'we-ness' amongst EU citizens and in turn a lack of legitimacy of the EU.

The challenge of not abiding to the value of solidarity can once again be analysed by drawing on Weber and his concept of 'neighbourhood communities'.[19] One can conceptualise the EU as a community constituted on the basis of "durable spatial proximity and interest dependence".[20] Such a conceptualisation highlights why the value of solidarity is at the heart of the EU community. Neighbours are not necessarily forced to help one another, but it can be in their social and economic interest to do so. The perceived value and importance of solidarity is therefore vital for the legitimacy of the EU. A rejection of the principle of solidarity is thus a rejection of the conceptualisation of the EU as a neighbourhood community. As Frans Timmermans pointed out in speech given at the 'Prague European Conference', the EU is a European construction, and "any political construction can be undone".[21] If member states and their citizens no longer perceive themselves as being part of a wider EU community, then the future legitimacy and, consequently existence of the EU, is at stake.

10 Robinson, Duncan (2015) "Why Hungary Wanted out of EU's Refugee Scheme," FT (Financial Times), http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2015/09/22/why-hungary-wanted-out-of-eus-refugee-scheme/ Accessed May 23, 2016

11 Timmermans,Frans (2015) Broederschap: Pleidooi Voor Verbondheid, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Podium, p38.

12 Hartwig, Ines. and Phedon Nicolaides (2003) "Elusive solidarity in an enlarged European Union" in EPIAScope, No. 3, p21.

13 Bolleyer, Nicole and Christine Reh (2012), "EU Legitimacy Revisited: The Normative Foundations of a Multilevel Polity," in Journal of European Public Policy Vol.19, no. 4, p474.

14 Weber,Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press, p213.

15 Henley, Jon, Helena Bengtsson, and Caelainn Barr (2016), "Across Europe, Distrust of Mainstream Political Parties Is on the Rise," The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/25/across-europe-distrust-of-mainstream-political-parties-is-on-the-rise

16 Stefan, "How the Refugee Crisis Will Reshape the EU"

17 EurActive (2013) Euroscepticism: More Than a British Phenomenon, https://www.euractiv.com/section/med-south/linksdossier/euroscepticism-more-than-a-british-phenomenon, accessed June 5, 2016.

18 NOS (2016) Peilingwijzer: PVV Bij de Hond Groter Dan Bij Anderen, http://nos.nl/artikel/2080151-peilingwijzer-pvv-bij-de-hond-groter-dan-bij-anderen.html. Accessed June 5, 2016.

19 Weber, Economy and Society

20 Ferrera, Maurizio (2014) "Solidarity in Europe After the Crisis," in Constellations Vol. 21, No. 2, p232.

21 COMM (2015), Speech of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans at "Prague European summit" Conference, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6079_en.htm.

Part 2: Respect for Human Dignity

- **General disrespect for human dignity**

The lack of solidarity amongst member states has indirect consequences for the way these countries have addressed the refugee crisis. The refugee crisis has undermined the EU's core value of respect for human dignity, as member states have not abided to the principle when dealing with the crisis. Recent examples include, but are not limited to: refugees being detained in dire conditions on the Greek islands of Lesvos and Chios,[22] Macedonian police firing tear gas and rubber bullets at refugees,[23] and the on-going slum conditions that make up the Calais refugee camp.[24] These examples highlight the way in which several EU member states, for perhaps economic or political reasons, have not upheld the value of human dignity when handling the refugee crisis. In all of these examples, the lack of solidarity (both economic and political) between member states is at the heart of why the value of human dignity has not been upheld. This link can be best demonstrated when examining the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of M.S.S v Belgium and Greece.

- **M.S.S v Belgium and Greece**

As mentioned above, the case of M.S.S v Belgium and Greece effectively demonstrates the way in which a lack of EU solidarity has far reaching negative consequences for the respect of human dignity. This case concerned a refugee who, upon arrival in Greece, was detained and then ordered to leave the country. Subsequently, he arrived in Belgium but was later sent back to Greece on the basis of the 'first rule entry' of the Dublin Regulation ll. After returning to Greece he was detained under conditions that did not comply with the minimum standards outlined by the EU asylum directives, and as a result he was made destitute.[25] The ECtHR held that both Greece and Belgium had violated article 3 prohibition on torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of the European Convention on Human Rights.[26] Legal PhD candidate Lillian Langford highlights how "the overextension of struggling asylum systems in Southern states contributes to inadequate reception and processing, which leads to human rights violations under EU and international law".[27] The verdict of the case clearly demonstrates the way in which an absence of solidarity between Belgium and Greece resulted in

disrespect for the value of the human dignity of the refugee.

The verdict of the case is further complicated by the EU's constitutional values. Langford goes on to point out that a government's "knowledge that it can be held responsible for another's failings...is likely to stifle any feeling of solidarity that a blind presumption might [have] cultured".[28] Langford's analysis is useful in that it highlights the vicious cycle of a lack of mutual solidarity and disrespect for human dignity. When states do not respect the value of solidarity while handling refugees, disrespect for human dignity and human rights is more likely to occur within member states whose resources are being overstretched by a high influx of asylum applicants. As the value of human dignity is violated by member states, mutual solidarity becomes even harder to uphold as there is distrust created between member states. Such non-abidance by member states to uphold the values of solidarity and respect of human dignity poses a challenge to the EU, in that it puts into question the EU's normative power and subsequently its influence as a global actor.

- **External Challenges**

The actions of some member states have challenged EU's role as a normative power in its external relations. In order to understand why the disrespect for human dignity is so challenging for the EU, it is imperative to analyse the importance of the value. Both Adler and Manners argue that the EU has adopted a 'Kantian' culture in order to promote an image of a 'Cosmopolitan Europe'.[29] Cosmopolitan Europe is a self-image of the EU as a union, which abides by Kantian cosmopolitan rights of hospitality to strangers and a universal community.[30] Concerning the present analysis, the cosmopolitan value that humans should provide hospitality to strangers is of most interest. Considering that the EU has focussed on promoting these Kantian principles rather than building up military strength, it is of utmost importance that the EU, amidst the refugee crisis, continues to show "hospitality to strangers".

By failing to demonstrate "hospitality to strangers", the EU's role as a normative power is undermined, as its power rests on being consistent in its internal and external actions. This in turn damages the EU's position in international relations. The EU is firstly seen as a normative power "by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance".[31] Secondly, the EU acts as a normative power by "promoting a series of normative principles" with the aim of creating a more "cosmopolitical world".[32] A more cosmopolitical world, as Manners describes, is one, which empowers people through

22 Amnesty (2016) Greece: Refugees Detained in Dire Conditions Amid Rush to Implement EU-Turkey Deal, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/04/greece-refugees-detained-in-dire-conditions-amid-rush-to-implement-eu-turkey-deal/ Accessed May 26, 2016.

23 Al Jazeera (2016) Refugees Tear-Gassed at Macedonia-Greece Border, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/refugees-tear-gassed-macedonia-greece-border-160410140009203.html. Accessed May 26, 2016.

24 Gentleman,Amelia (2015) "The Horror of the Calais Refugee Camp: 'We feel like we are dying slowly,'" in The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/03/refugees-horror-calais-jungle-refugee-camp-feel-like-dying-slowly. Accessed May 29, 2016

25 Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [2011]

26 Ibid.

27 Langford, Lillian (2013) The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity, in Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 26, p239.

28 Langford, "The Other Euro Crisis", p236.

29 Adler, Emmanuel et al., eds (2006)., The Convergence of Civilization: Constructing a Mediterranean Region German and European Studies Toronto: University Toronto Press, p11; Lucarelli, Sonia and Ian Manners, eds.(2004), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, Taylor Francis: London, p39.

30 Kant, Immanuel (1991), Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p105-106.

31 Manners,Ian, "The Normative Ethics of the European Union," in International Affairs Vol,.84, no. 1, p65.

32 Ibid. p65-67.

universally accepted values and principles.[33] Special advisor to the European Commission, Robert Cooper, summarises such normative power well by arguing that the EU's "magnetic allure compels countries to rewrite their laws and constitutions to meet European standards".[34] Thus the EU has used normative power in order to expand its overall power in international relations.

Promoting a cosmopolitical world, as Manners advocates, is therefore in the interest of the EU, as it is a world in which the EU has a leading role to play. This potential normative power is, however, undermined by way of member states not upholding the values of solidarity and human dignity in the face of the refugee crisis. Manners argues that the "EU promotes substantive principles by virtue of the principles of 'living by example'".[35] The managing of the refugee crisis, or lack of management by EU member states, has therefore weakened the EU's normative power. As refugees and migrants continue to live in squalid camps, such as they do in Calais, France, or on the borders of Macedonia, the normative power of the EU is weakened. Hypothesising the damage that can be caused by not living by the principles it promotes, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Sophie Meunier argue that at the heart of the EU's legitimate exercise of power is

its "claim to consistency between its internal and external actions".[36] The EU as a normative power therefore faces a weakening of its legitimacy in the international arena by not being consistent in its internal and external actions.

It is evident that the refugee crisis has undermined two of the most fundamental EU values, namely solidarity and respect for human dignity. Internally, the undermining of solidarity is challenging in that it highlights a reduction in the commonality of values that are espoused in the EU's acquis communautaire. This in turn undermines the legitimacy of the EU as a set of institutions. The ramifications of this are practical in nature, and have in part led to a decline in the support for centre-EU supporting political parties, giving rise to the support of euro-scepticism across Europe. This poses a very tangible threat to the EU as its continued functioning and existence rests on the support of the nation-state and its electorate. Externally, disrespect for human dignity through failed solidarity among member states is challenging for the EU in that it reduces its normative power in international relations. The refugee crisis is therefore the most important challenge facing the EU as it has undermined the EU's core values, which lie at the very heart of the EU project.

33   Ibid. p80.

34   Cited in Khanna, Parag (2004) "The Metrosexual Superpower," in Foreign Policy, no. 143, p67.

35   Manners, "The Normative Ethics of the European Union",p66.

36   Meunier, Sophie and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2006) "The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power," in Journal of European Public Policy Vol.13, no. 6, p919.

Give Indigenous Australian Women and Infants a Chance at Life: Addressing the Disparity in Maternal-Infant Health Outcomes

Article by **Kaitlyn Krahe**

Kaitlyn Krahe is a final year paramedic student at Victoria University. She is passionate about gender issues and their intersection with health inequities within the Australian population. She advocates strongly for needs-based, culturally competent health care as a vehicle to empower women.

Introduction

Urged by a national public awareness campaign in 2008, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) formally committed to "Closing the Gap" between the health outcomes of Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians within a generation.[1] Almost a decade since this agreement, significant discrepancies persist.

This cycle of poor health outcomes is underpinned by more than two hundred years of systematic dispossession and underinvestment; exacerbated by a distinct lack of accessible facilities offering culturally sensitive resources to Indigenous women. The responsibility to overcome this entrenched cycle of endemic disadvantage compels all members of civil society, government policy makers, and key stakeholders in the education, health and social support spheres to "Close the Gap."

The Department of Health and Aging stipulates that Australia is considered to be one of the safest countries in the world for a woman to experience pregnancy and childbirth.[2] However, this statement is not an absolute certitude, as it remains grossly inconsistent with the reality of many women living within Australia.[3]

Within the contemporary Australian context, there exists a vast disparity in the outcomes relating to maternal, antenatal, and perinatal and infant health among Indigenous women and infants when compared to non-Indigenous Australians.[4] Merely four per cent of women who gave birth during 2012 in Australia identified as Indigenous,[5] however these women are disproportionately affected by higher rates of maternal morbidity and mortality compared to non-Indigenous women.[6] Their infants suffer higher incidences of foetal, neonatal, and infant death than their non-Indigenous co-residents.[7]

Evidently, these discrepancies in health status do not exist within a vacuum. The intersectional disadvantage experienced by Indigenous women on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status has consistently lead to marginalisation and oppression from the economic and social mainstream. As a result, health problems inevitably have and will continue to proliferate unless these root causes are recognised and addressed.[8]

These barriers discourage Indigenous women from engaging with the limited health facilities available to them, thus perpetuating a vicious, transgenerational cycle of poor health throughout the woman's life and particularly during pregnancy and childbirth.[9] In order to overcome the multidimensional barriers that hinder the provision of culturally sensitive healthcare demands, the issue requires the development of equity-based policies that prioritise the operationalization of community consultation. This will ensure that holistic strategies are developed with, and not merely for, the Indigenous women and infants of Australia.

Australia's Indigenous health status in a global context

Having mandated the complex and multifaceted area of health as a focus for the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,[10] international rhetoric around the issue continues to espouse health as a fundamental human right, echoing the constitution of the World Health Organisation.[11] Specifically, improving access to adequate reproductive healthcare for women and decreasing maternal and infant mortality rates have been posited as global priorities by the UN over the last 15 years. These aims were codified in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)[12] and have since been included in Goal 3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that replaced the MDGs in September 2015.

The 2015 UN evaluation of the MDG targets considered national progress between countries and excluded explicitly assessing sector-specific trends.[13] This is significant as the OECD stipulates that countries acknowledge the socioeconomic spectrum that

1   Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA). (2012). Closing the Gap: Prime Minister's report 2012. FaHCSIA, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory.

2   Department of Health and Aging. (2008). Improving maternity services in Australia: A discussion paper from the Australian Government. Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia.

3   Kildea, S., Kruske, S., Barclay, L., & Tracy, S. (2010). 'Closing the Gap': How maternity services can contribute to reducing poor maternal infant health outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women. Rural and Remote Health, 10.

4   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014a). Hilder L, Zhichao Z, Parker M, Jahan S, Chambers G. M. (2014). Australia's mothers and babies 2012. Perinatal statistics series no. 30. Cat. no. PER 69. Canberra: AIHW.

5   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014b). Johnson S, Bonello MR, Li Z, Hilder L & Sullivan EA. 2014. Maternal deaths in Australia 2006–2010, Maternal deaths series no. 4. Cat. no. PER 61. viewed 14 April 2016, http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=60129548375

6   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014a).

7   Ibid.

8   Bowleg, L. (2012). The problem with the phrase women and minorities: intersectionality—an important theoretical framework for public health. American journal of public health, 102(7), 1267-1273.

9   Reibel, T., Morrison, L., Griffin, D., Chapman, L., & Woods, H. (2015). Young Aboriginal women's voices on pregnancy care: Factors encouraging antenatal engagement. Women and Birth, 28(1), 47-53.

10   United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. (2015). State of the World's Indigenous Peoples : 2nd Volume, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/55c89dac4.html [accessed 29 April 2016]

11   World Health Organization. (2006). Constitution of the World Health Organization. Basic Documents, Supplement, October 2006. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO. http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf

12   Travis, P., Bennett, S., Haines, A., Pang, T., Bhutta, Z., Hyder, A. A., & Evans, T. (2004). Overcoming health-systems constraints to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The Lancet, 364(9437), 900-906.

13   Hill, K., Barker, B., & Vos, T. (2007).

underpins the health status of its population.[14] Sustainable Development Goal 10 "Reduced Inequality" directly addresses the dire situation still facing Indigenous populations.[15] Despite these efforts, poor health status among Indigenous populations remains an acute and urgent global issue.[16]

Indigenous populations of developed nations such as New Zealand, Canada and the United States have consistently lower life expectancies coupled with higher incidences of disease throughout the lifespan of women and children.[17] Research indicates that health disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Australia are far more severe when compared to those of other developed countries.[18]

Australia and Nepal have the highest inequality in life expectancy between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.[19] Indigenous Australian males can expect to live approximately eleven years less than non-Indigenous Australian males, while non-Indigenous females have a life expectancy at birth that exceeds that of Indigenous females by approximately nine years. Indigenous Australians are also disproportionately affected by higher incidences of chronic systemic conditions such as cardiovascular disease across their lifespan.[20] The fact that the process of birth and pregnancy presents a significantly increased risk for Australian Indigenous women and their infants is not an anomaly.[21]

The importance of accurate health-related data

The Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) Census of Population and Housing provides a database of estimates relating to Australia's Indigenous

population.[22] The ABS then undertakes an independent post enumeration survey (PES) to calculate the net undercount.[23] The resultant estimated Indigenous resident population (ERP) is instrumental in reporting the current health status disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous co-residents of Australia, including those relating to maternal-infant health.[24]

Ensuring that robust and comprehensive methodology is used to collect reliable data is crucial to ensuring that the magnitude of inequality existing between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians is illustrated accurately. Indigenous Australians were disproportionately represented in the 2011 PES undercount, which reached almost 17 per cent in some parts of Australia. One million Census records denoted an unknown Indigenous Status.[25] This significant undercount is highly problematic as the Australian Census data is influential in guiding investment aimed at reducing inequality between cohabitating populations, as well as monitoring the effectiveness of government policy and programs.[26]

The ABS and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) acknowledge that geographical locations hindered the collection of reliable data for the Indigenous population.[27] While the majority of Indigenous Australians live within metropolitan or regional areas, 142,900 Indigenous Australians are reported to live in remote or rural locations.[28] Their disproportionate level of poor health occurs as result of environment-specific factors that include: increased distance to adequate health infrastructure; social isolation; and increased socioeconomic disadvantage.[29] The consequences of applying collected data about metropolitan-dwelling Indigenous Australians to those who are geographically isolated has likely led to a statistical underestimation of the severity of the health status disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous maternal-infant mortality and morbidity.[30]

Data collection and subsequent investment into the provision of needs-based public healthcare is generally

14   de Looper, M. Lafortune, G. (2009) 'Measuring Disparities in Health Status and in Access and Use of Health Care in OECD Countries', OECD Health Working Papers, no. 43, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/225748084267

15   United Nations. (2016). Sustainable Development Goals: Goal 10 Reducing Inequality within and among nations. Retrieved 30 April, 2016, from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg10

16   Hill, K., Barker, B., & Vos, T. (2007). Excess Indigenous mortality: are Indigenous Australians more severely disadvantaged than other Indigenous populations? International Journal of Epidemiology, 36(3), 580-589.

17   Cunningham, C., & Stanley, F. (2003). The health status of indigenous peoples and others. Human Rights, 2.

18   Anderson, I., Crengle, S., Kamaka, M. L., Chen, T. H., Palafox, N., & Jackson-Pulver, L. (2006). Indigenous health in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific. The Lancet, 367(9524), 1775-1785.

19   United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. (2015).

20   ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2013a). Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Survey: Updated Results, 2012–13 cat. no 4727.0.55.006, viewed 14 April 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/5A9A320939BC0A3DCA257CEF002323C3?Opendocument; ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015). Deaths, Australia, 2014. ABS cat. no. 3302.0.viewed 14 April 2016. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3302.0Main%20Features 72014?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=3302.0&issue=2014&num=&view=

21   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014a).

22   ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2012) Census of Population and Housing - Details of Undercount, 2011 cat. no 2940.0, viewed 29 April 2016, http://abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/2940.0

23   Ibid.

24   Ibid.

25   Ibid.

26   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2013). Towards better Indigenous health data. Cat. no. IHW 93. Canberra: AIHW.

27   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2013).

28   ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014) Estimates and projections, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, 2001 to 2026 cat. no. 3238.0, viewed 14 April 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/C19A0C6E4794A3FACA257CC900143A3D?opendocument

29   Leveratt, M. (2006). Rural and remote Australia-equity of access to health care services. Australian Health Consumer, 2(2006-2007), 16.

30   AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2013). Towards better Indigenous health data. Cat. no. IHW 93. Canberra: AIHW.

the principal responsibility of respective State and territory governments.[31] However, it is crucial that the development and implementation of a comprehensive Indigenous data collection strategy incorporates a top-down approach that outlines achievable commitment targets for COAG and the healthcare sector. Nationally endorsing the recommended standardised question format to obtain Indigenous self-identification data in a culturally respectful manner within health facilities is a feasible goal that will result in improved measurement of all Indigenous Australians, geographical location notwithstanding.

Social determinants of health and disparities in maternal health status

Policy-makers can engage with the social determinants of health as a theoretical concept and tool for understanding the complex interplay of socioeconomic factors that cause increased risk of morbidity and mortality in Indigenous Australian mothers and infants.[32] Since 1990, the global maternal mortality rate has been reduced by almost 50 per cent.[33] Despite this, Indigenous Australian women are three times more likely to die during pregnancy and childbirth and have double the risk of experiencing severe maternal morbidity during their pregnancy than non-Indigenous women.[34]

It is widely understood that poor maternal health care during pregnancy and childbirth severely impacts the foetus and increases its risk of lifelong health problems.[35] The ABS suggests that Indigenous children aged up to four years old are twice as likely to die during their first year of life[36] and as such are considered to be the most vulnerable group of children within Australia.[37] This statistic is often further complicated by isolating geographical factors: the predisposition of Indigenous women and infants to poor health and limited engagement with healthcare services.

International research suggests that discrepancies in the health status of pregnant Indigenous women may be attributed to both a lack of high quality, antenatal care, which adequately responds their cultural needs and the intersecting categories of socioeconomic disadvantage

facing them.[38] Indigenous women are less likely to have completed secondary school, limiting the proportion of them who pursue tertiary education, which subsequently greatly reduces their ability to find employment opportunities and achieve sustained financial stability.[39]

Prioritising cultural sensitivity and community consultation on healthcare

Safeguarding culturally sensitive healthcare services that maintain spirituality, customs and traditions are vital for Indigenous Australians to feel comfortable seeking the services they need.

Indigenous women are more likely to access and improve their health outcomes during pregnancy and childbirth within a system underpinned by holistic healthcare facilities. Community-centric, Indigenous-staffed healthcare services can be implemented throughout rural and remote communities to assist in achieving this outcome. The Townsville Aboriginal and Islander Health Service's Mums and Babies Project and Daruk Aboriginal Community Controlled Medical Service in Western Sydney are examples of effective and culturally responsible initiatives.[40] These facilities respect Indigenous customs, emphasise maternal autonomy in decision making and create a demand for Indigenous health care practitioners, subsequently increasing the amount of Indigenous mothers engaging with antenatal care.[41]

Significant reductions in rates of maternal and infant mortality can be realised through the nationwide implementation of such holistic, community-centric facilities. To achieve this, intersecting divisions of COAG can actively engage to consult with spokespeople of rural and remote Indigenous communities. Such engagements must encourage the right to be self-determinant in assessing the healthcare needs of Indigenous people and contribute to developing the relevant infrastructure. This is in line with Article 23 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that Indigenous peoples "have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health... economic and social programmes affecting them and....administer such programmes through their own institutions."[42]

Since the abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in 2005, there is a distinct lack of legitimate platforms through which Indigenous Australians have the opportunity to be formally involved in the policy processes that affect them.[43] This current status quo is a barrier to the formulation of legitimate,

31 Lindquist, A. C., Kurinczuk, J. J., Wallace, E. M., Oats, J., & Knight, M. (2015). Risk factors for maternal morbidity in Victoria, Australia: a population-based study. BMJ open, 5(8), e007903.

32 Hankivsky, O., Grace, D., Hunting, G., Giesbrecht, M., Fridkin, A., Rudrum, S. & Clark, N. (2014). An intersectionality-based policy analysis framework: critical reflections on a methodology for advancing equity. International journal for equity in health, 13(1), 119.

33 v Travis, P., Bennett, S., Haines, A., Pang, T., Bhutta, Z., Hyder, A. A., & Evans, T. (2004).

34 AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014a).

35 Arabena, K. (2014). The 'First 1,000 Days': Implementing Strategies across Victorian Government Agencies to Improve the Health and Wellbeing Outcomes for Aboriginal Children and their Families, Indigenous Health Equity Unit, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

36 ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015).

37 Arabena, K. (2014).

38 de Looper, M. Lafortune, G. (2009).

39 ABS: Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2012).

40 Maternity Services Inter-Jurisdictional Committee (MSIJC). (2014). The Characteristics of culturally competent maternity care for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women.

41 Ibid.

42 United Nations General Assembly. (2008). United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (A/RES/61/295)

43 Kildea, S., Kruske, S., Barclay, L., & Tracy, S. (2010).

needs-based national health policy and infrastructure.

Indigenous Australians are chronically under-represented in the healthcare workforce across all sectors.[44] This under-representation is a barrier to the provision of culturally sensitive healthcare that adequately responds to the needs of Indigenous women.[45] As international evidence suggests that Indigenous women are more likely to engage with health services when delivered by Indigenous health professionals,[46] it is recommended that secondary schools strive to develop partnership programmes with both mainstream and Indigenous community-run healthcare services. These partnerships will act as channels through which Indigenous youth can positively engage with, and be mentored by role models in the healthcare sector.

Finally, secondary schools, universities, TAFEs and other key stakeholders should pledge to implement scholarships for Indigenous youth to gain qualifications that will enable them to work in healthcare both within

their own communities and in the sector more broadly. A national operationalisation of this initiative would complement existing schemes such as the South Australian Aboriginal Health Scholarship, while also striving to actively encourage Indigenous students to complete secondary school.[47] Over time, increasing the Indigenous healthcare workforce will engage more Indigenous mothers with safe, respectful antenatal care, thus reducing the overall prevalence of maternal and infant health problems.[48]

Conclusion

Historically, Australians who belong to the lower level of social stratification experience exponentially worse health outcomes. This unfortunate reality should compel the Australian Government to devise and implement robust, evidence-based policy that rectifies the human rights failings and socioeconomic disadvantages faced by Indigenous mothers and infants. The ultimate success of these strategies is dependent on the accuracy of ABS data on Indigenous Australians in tandem with the maintenance of respectful partnerships and ongoing consultation with Indigenous communities to develop and implement culturally sensitive maternal-infant healthcare.

44   Reibel, T., Morrison, L., Griffin, D., Chapman, L., & Woods, H. (2015).

45   Bertilone, C., & McEvoy, S. (2015). Success in Closing the Gap: Favourable neonatal outcomes in a metropolitan Aboriginal Maternity Group Practice Program. The Medical journal of Australia, 203(6), 262-262.

46   Kildea, S., Kruske, S., Barclay, L., & Tracy, S. (2010).

47   Maternity Services Inter-Jurisdictional Committee (MSIJC). (2014).

48   Ibid.

Communicating and Confronting ISIS: Variations in the Construction of Political Ideologies in Traditional and Non-Traditional Media Outlets

*Article by **Jessica Herne***

Jessica Herne is a third-year Arts student at the University of Melbourne, majoring in Politics and International Studies, and Media and Communications, with a Diploma in Global Issues.

The media have long been considered a crucial actor in the construction and dissemination of political ideologies. Media outlets create a space for public discussion, impacting political discourses both nationally and globally. This is particularly true when it comes to terrorist organisations; as for these groups the media represent the primary avenue for disseminating the ideology behind their violent actions.[1] Since its appearance on the international stage in 2014,[2] the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been the focus of much media attention. Examination of ISIS' presence and representation in both traditional and non-traditional media reveals the different audiences and the different levels of agency that these mediums provide to radical non-state actors. The following analysis compares how these representations are formed across traditional media – primarily newspapers and television – and non-traditional media – primarily social media, examining how the logics, structures and audiences of these forms affect the construction of ISIS' ideology. While traditional media remains a 'battleground' in which institutional forces seek to limit the dissemination of ISIS' political message, non-traditional media allows ISIS a space where it is able to more freely construct its supporters and targets a self-representation in line with its politico-religious messages.

Media Logic and Structures

Both traditional and non-traditional media outlets provide coverage of radical political ideologies that facilitate the dissemination of these actor's values and ideology. For example, coverage of politically violent incidents often includes analysis of the perpetrator's ideas and intent. On one level, conveying this information can be seen as a journalistic duty;[3] however, critiques of such coverage highlight the media's apparent readiness to reward terrorist behaviour through publicity.[4] Even political leaders acknowledge that 'publicity is the oxygen of terrorism'.[5] Such representation allows ISIS to communicate the ideology behind their actions, and thus encourage the perpetuation of their ideologies and activities. The audio-visual elements of both traditional and non-traditional media comprise a key mechanism that facilitates the distribution of political messages of non-state actors such as ISIS to the public. Images

have been found to have a longer lasting impact on audiences than text, particularly in regards to conveying incidents of violence.[6] The use of exceptionally visual violence has been a distinguishing trait of ISIS' approach to media.[7] This violence distinguishes ISIS from other jihadist groups operating in the region. It also serves to reinforce ISIS' extreme religious rhetoric against the kufah, or the unfaithful, a categorisation that it extends to include any Muslims who do not support its actions.[8] Furthermore, Neumann argues that the escalation of visual violence perpetrated by ISIS in the media can be attributed to media saturation, as terrorists are prompted to engage in even more vicious acts of violence in order to reach a desensitised audience.[9] These violent images are able to proliferate through both forms of media as they feed into media logic and values by being shocking and suspenseful: 'violence, and unusual violence, is in essence newsworthy'.[10] For traditional media, this results in high ratings; for non-traditional media, the shock value translates into increased virility.[11] In this way, the diffusion of political ideologies across both traditional and non-traditional media is determined, in part, by the application of particular media logics and structures.

There has been a shift in distribution patterns between traditional media and non-traditional media. The former operates largely as a one-way transmitter of information while the latter offers more networked forms of idea construction in participatory spaces.[12] Similarly, non-state actors, such as ISIS, are increasingly moving to network, rather than hierarchical, organisational structures.[13] This is reflected in ISIS' approach to communications. For example, the Dawn of Glad Tidings application allows ISIS' social media content generators to post tweets on behalf of assenting users, amplifying their reach while staggering messages to

1   Nacos, Brigitte (2012) Terrorism and Counterterrorism (4th ed.) Routledge: London.

2   Zhang, Xu and Hellmueller, Lee (2016) "Transnational Media Coverage of the ISIS Threat: A Global Perspective?" in International Journal of Communication, Vol. 10, 766.

3   Marlin, Randal (2014) "Media-Related Strategies and 'War on Terrorism'", in Eid, Mahmoud (ed.) Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: the Age of Terroredia. Hershey: IGI Global, 124.

4   Nacos, Brigitte (2012) Terrorism and Counterterrorism (4th ed.). Routledge: London, 262.

5   Cheong, Pauline Hope (2014) "New Media and Terrorism", in Eid, Mahmoud (ed.) Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: the Age of Terroredia. Hershey: IGI Global, 193.

6   Nacos, Brigitte (2012) Terrorism and Counterterrorism (4th ed.). Routledge: London, 262.

7   Greene, Kyle (2015) 'ISIS: Trends in Terrorist Media and Propaganda,' International Studies Capstones Research Papers, accessed at <http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/international_studies_capstones/>.

8   Ibid.

9   Neumann, Peter (2009) 'Old and New Terrorism,' in Social Europe Journal: The Journal of the European Left, Vol. 4, No. 3, 42.

10   Nacos, Brigitte (2012) Terrorism and Counterterrorism (4th ed.). Routledge: London, 271.

11   Elliot, Chris. (2016) "Coverage of ISIS Videos should be news, not propaganda", The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/11/coverage-of-isis-videos-should-be-about-news-not-propaganda>, viewed May 30 2016.

12   Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War", in WIRED, <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

13   Neumann, Peter (2009) 'Old and New Terrorism,' in Social Europe Journal: The Journal of the European Left, Vol. 4, No. 3, 42.

avoid detection by Twitter's anti-spam programs.[14] When users are detected and suspended, they quickly re-register and use promotion by ISIS node twitters in order to regain their followers and reach.[15] The impact of this strategy was demonstrated when the organisation was able to generate 40,000 tweets on the day of its invasion of Mosul, in a form of 'psychological warfare'.[16] This 'crowd-sourcing' of jihadist political content on non-traditional media has allowed ISIS' ideology to 'permeate our cultural atmosphere to an outsize degree' that could not be independently achieved on traditional media.[17]

In order to take advantage of this ease of proliferation, ISIS has dedicated considerable resources to producing content with high production values that supports its ideology. ISIS-controlled production companies such as Al-Furqaan Foundation and Al-Hayat Media Center generate video content that furthers the media construction of the martyred ISIS jihadist in a manner favourable to ISIS.[18] While these videos are created primarily for distribution via non-traditional media outlets, online content is frequently featured in traditional media, showing that the two forms of media do not exist in isolation.[19] Their production structures are connected, and share a common logic that facilitates self-construction of political ideologies through violent imagery.

Audiences

The transmission of political content through the media impacts different audiences in particular ways and on different scales. Although non-traditional media is often described as the more borderless form, both traditional and non-traditional media offer a great capacity to connect message to audience on a global scale. Mass media continue to allow terrorists to

reach large audiences.[20] This is particularly true in a globalised news environment, where content on major news networks can be proliferated globally as well as nationally, creating a centralised dialogue across borders.[21] Traditional news also remains able to access areas and audiences that non-traditional media cannot, for example in countries such as Pakistan where Internet saturation remains low.[22] Where there is Internet access, however, non-traditional media presents its own possibilities for the dissemination of ISIS' ideology. Content can be generated for, and distributed to, specific audiences with variations in the ideological representation to generate targeted effects.[23] This narrowcasting approach can be seen in ISIS' hijacking of World Cup hash-tags on Twitter, showing content designed to intimidate and threaten Western audiences.[24] Users are also able to control their own access of information, with American supporters of ISIS able to gain English translations of Arabic pro-ISIS content via social media.[25] Therefore, traditional media conveys ISIS to mass audiences, while non-traditional media presents more individualised representations to those who are online.

Social media and online forums create a place of 'social liminality' that facilitates the formation of radical ideology.[26] By constructing an environment in which jihadist views are artificially amplified while simultaneously detached from the real world, it encourages the normalisation of attitudes outside of social norms.[27] Analysis of various case studies demonstrates the frequency with which social media plays a role in the radicalisation of individuals in Western countries who are otherwise isolated from Islamic jihadist ideology.[28] ISIS recruitment targets are

14 Berger, J. M. (2014) "How ISIS Games Twitter", The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter- social-media- strategy/372856/>, viewed May 30 2016.

15 Vidino, Lorenzo & Hughes, Seamus (2015) "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa", <www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/2828>, viewed 30 May 2016.

16 Cohen, Jared. (2015) "Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online", in Burns, Nicholas and Price, Jonathan (eds.) Blind Spot: America's Response to Radicalism in the Middle East. Aspen Institute: Washington, D.C., 128.

17 Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," WIRED, <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

18 Cohen, Jared. (2015) "Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online", in Burns, Nicholas and Price, Jonathan (eds.) Blind Spot: America's Response to Radicalism in the Middle East. Aspen Institute: Washington, D.C., 128.

19 Lewis, James (2005) "The Internet and Terrorism", in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 99, 113.

20 Hassan, Kiran (2014) "The Role of Private Electronic Media in Radicalizing Pakistan", in The Round Table, Vol. 103, No. 1, 65.

21 Zhang, Xu and Hellmueller, Lee (2016) "Transnational Media Coverage of the ISIS Threat: A Global Perspective?" in International Journal of Communication, Vol. 10, 767.

22 Hassan, Kiran (2014) "The Role of Private Electronic Media in Radicalizing Pakistan" in The Round Table, Vol. 103, No. 1, 66.

23 Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," WIRED, <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

24 Farwell, James. (2014) "The Media Strategy of ISIS", in Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 56, No. 6, 55.

25 Vidino, Lorenzo & Hughes, Seamus (2015) "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa", <www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/2828>, viewed 30 May 2016.

26 Halverson, Jeffry and Way, Amy (2012) "The curious case of Colleen LaRose: Social margins, new media, and online radicalization", in Media, War & Conflict, Vol. 5, No. 2, 142.

27 Stevens, Tim and Neumann, P. (2009) "Countering Online Radicalization: A Strategy for Action", International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, accessed at <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1236768491ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf>, viewed May 29 2016.

28 Vidino, Lorenzo & Hughes, Seamus (2015) "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa", <www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/2828>, viewed 30 May 2016.

often young people, who are particularly comfortable in these spaces.[29] The use of a first-person perspective in videos produced by Al-Hayat Media Center mimics the self-representation practices of younger generations in order to create a connection between the viewer and the martyr.[30] These social media recruitment practices have overcome many counter-terrorist initiatives, and are extremely difficult for opposing actors to 'counter with traditional forms of communication'.[31] For ISIS, then, the primary audience of non-traditional media is young potential supporters, who can be radicalised through personalised interaction with ideological advocates.

Institutional Gate-Keeping

A central part of ISIS' ideology is the formation of the caliphate in the modern day. This accelerates the ideology of groups such as Al Qaeda, whose leaders saw the construction of a caliphate as a distant goal rather than one that would manifest directly in the present.[32] ISIS-generated social media content 'emphasise[s] [the caliphate's] alleged utopian aspects, particularly the freedom of any trace of religious prosecution'.[33] Positive portrayals of infrastructure projects and state-building efforts in social media stand in direct contrast to articles from traditional media outlets like the BBC, which chronicle instances of water poisoning. For example, an article containing testimonies from residents of the ISIS-controlled Mosul also states that 'not one house owned by a Christian in Mosul was not taken over and looted by IS members'.[34] The representation of the caliphate demonstrates how traditional media offers institutional resistance to revolutionary and violent political ideologies. This results in more critical constructions of ISIS that align more strongly with the perspectives and aims of Western governments: 'the fight against terrorism [is represented] as a fearful battle against crime'.[35] Zhang and Hellmueller's content analysis of CNN and Al Jazeera support this; where government sources

contributed most significantly to coverage of ISIS.[36] Additionally, traditional news organisations typically respond to major actions by terrorist groups with endorsement of government policy, in order to avoid a public perception of being 'soft on terrorism'.[37] In this way, the representation of the Caliphate constitutes an institutional effort to oppose pro-ISIS interpretations of the group's ideology.

Through guidelines for the reporting of terrorist incidents, traditional media also limits ISIS' ability to construct its ideology via media sources.[38] For example, in his defense of The Guardian's coverage of an ISIS hostage-killing video, Elliot details the Guardian's policy of 'avoid[ing] pictures that glamorise the perpetrator … [and] only use[ing] a closely cropped still picture of the hostage'.[39] This is designed to mitigate the potential harm experienced by audiences, and to limit the extent to which coverage perpetuates the actor's messages. The resistance to non-critical expressions of ISIS ideology, despite the financial imperatives of media logic encouraging the use of shock content, can be understood through ISIS' role as a disruptive element: it is a 'religion of revolution' that accordingly presents itself 'in opposition to the dominant social faction'.[40] Traditional media organisations, as elements of this dominant faction, thus view ISIS as an existential threat, and respond accordingly in their coverage.

This resistance is not found on non-traditional media, as structural factors mean that there is no overarching institutional accountability as found in traditional media. Instead, non-traditional media offers increased capacity for jihadists to provide a more direct representation of their ideology, rather than passing through the gate-keeping processes of traditional media. The Internet challenges hierarchies of media power, and provides 'opportunit[ies] for lay persons to consume, construct and share stories about terrorist events'.[41] The Internet and its various sites offer 'accessibility, [low] cost[,] …

29 Mullen, Jethro (2015) "What is ISIS' appeal for young people?" CNN, accessed at <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/>.

30 Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," WIRED, <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

31 Cheong, P. H. (2014) "New Media and Terrorism", in Eid, Mahmoud (ed.) Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: the Age of Terroredia, 184-196.

32 Wood, Graeme (2015) "What ISIS Really Wants" in The Atlantic, accessed at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.

33 Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," WIRED, <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

34 BBC (2014) "Mosul diaries: Poisoned by water", BBC News, accessed at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29600573>, viewed May 25 2016.

35 Cheong, P. H. (2014) "New Media and Terrorism", In M. Eid (ed.) Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: the Age of Terroredia. Hershey: IGI Global, 188.

36 Zhang, Xu and Hellmueller, Lee (2016) "Transnational Media Coverage of the ISIS Threat: A Global Perspective?" in International Journal of Communication, Vol. 10, 779.

37 Marlin, Randal (2014) "Media-Related Strategies and 'War on Terrorism'", in Eid, Mahmoud (ed.) Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: the Age of Terroredia. Hershey: IGI Global, 129.

38 Nacos, Brigitte (2012) Terrorism and Counterterrorism (4th ed.). Routledge: London, 272.

39 Elliot, Chris. (2016) "Coverage of ISIS Videos should be news, not propaganda", The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/11/coverage-of-isis-videos-should-be-about-news-not-propaganda>, viewed May 25 2016.

40 Lincoln in Halverson, Jeffry and Way, Amy (2012) "The curious case of Colleen LaRose: Social margins, new media, and online radicalization", in Media, War & Conflict, Vol. 5, No. 2, 141.

41 Cheong, Pauline Hope (2014) "New Media and Terrorism", In Eid, Mahmoud (ed.) Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: the Age of Terroredia. Hershey: IGI Global, 185.

anonymity and lack of censorship'[42] The impact of this low-barrier entry can be seen in the widespread nature of ISIS' social media operations, with an estimated 38 unique items of content produced each day.[43] ISIS has proliferated its activities across a variety of social media platforms, as well as messaging applications, forums and an online magazine.[44] Twitter, in particular, is viewed as the main hub of American ISIS supporter activity.[45] What institutional resistance there is, largely from Internet Service Providers, is countered by the ephemeral nature of most ISIS content.[46] Websites can exist undetected on unrelated servers and, when discovered, relocate with relative ease.[47] In addition to allowing ISIS to self-represent through the circumvention of traditional gatekeepers, these

technical activities take on a political dimension. They act as a signifier of ISIS' resilience and strength and its capacity to subvert the Western values of transparency and openness of political communication epitomised by social media.[48]

Conclusion

Traditional news and non-traditional news operate on similar media logics. The violent imagery used by ISIS in order to convey its political message targets this logic in order to gain publicity, and to present itself as powerful and threatening to both Western audiences and Middle Eastern audiences alike. Where these two media forms differ is in the way their overall structure influences the construction and dissemination of this message. In traditional media, a broad message of fear is translated to mass audiences, but the institutional forces of the media outlets also offer resistance, undermining utopian images of the ISIS caliphate. In non-traditional media, narrowcasting and manipulation of technical structures empower ISIS to act against specific audiences and appeal to potential supporters. ISIS' ideology is more effectively translated and proliferated through non-traditional media due to a lack of overarching resistance found in traditional media.

42 Awan, Akil (2007) '"Virtual jihadist media: Function, legitimacy and radicalizing efficacy", in European Journal of Cultural Studies, Vol 10, 389.

43 Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," in WIRED, <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

44 Ibid.

45 Vidino, Lorenzo & Hughes, Seamus (2015) "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa", <www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/2828>, viewed 30 May 2016.

46 Lewis, James (2005) "The Internet and Terrorism", in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 99, 113.

47 Ibid.

48 Koerner, Brendan (2016) "Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War," <http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/>, visited May 24 2016.

Australian Institute of International Affairs
Promoting understanding of international issues

GET PUBLISHED...
Now calling for submissions

Quarterly Access provides an opportunity for students and young professionals to publish quality in-depth articles on global issues of importance.

Quarterly Access helps inform and foster debate amongst a new generation of leaders.

Want to read more? Contribute? Browse past issues?

Register for a free PDF subscription and find author guidelines for future submissions:
www.internationalaffairs.org.au/publications/quarterly-access

For all enquiries including for printed copies email **quarterlyaccess@gmail.com**

QUARTERLY ACCESS

YOUR KEY TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN AUSTRALIA & THE PACIFIC