
# South China Sea: The Strategic Implications of China's Artificial Islands


Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer
Australian Institute of International Affairs (NSW),
The Glover Cottages,
Sydney, September 15, 2015

### Outline

- Drivers of Chinese assertiveness:
  - Nationalism
  - Fisheries
  - Hydrocarbons
  - Strategic Imperatives
- China's Artificial Islands
- Implications for Australia



#### 1. Chinese Nationalism




- Elite nationalism
- Great Dream of National Revitalisation
- Great national rejuvenation
- Mass nationalism anti-Japanese
- Chauvinism aggressive patriotism/impunity
- Hactivism

#### Domestic Actors

- Fishing industry
- Oil industry
  - China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
- Provincial governments
- Maritime Enforcement Agencies
  - Coast Guard, State Oceanographic Administration
- People's Liberation Army Navy

# 2015 Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Comparison



# China's Position Paper on the South China Sea (2014)


• 'Chinese activities in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago. China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources of the South China Sea Islands and the first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them'.


# 2. China's Fishing Industry - the 'third maritime arm'



## Hainan Baosha 001








# China's 'National Mobile Territory'




# 4. Strategic Imperatives

- U.S. Rebalancing is Containment
- Counter-intervention strategy
- Protection of Sea Lines of Communication
- Power Projection
  - Naval Bases Hainan and Woody Islands
  - Artificial Islands forward operating bases






#### FIGURE 2. EMERGING CHINESE ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITI



# Protection of Major Shipping Routes



# Power Projection – Naval Bases




# Woody Island, Paracels






Sansha raised to prefecturelevel city in July 2012 with continuing responsibility over Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands

#### 5. China's Artificial Islands – Not Land Reclamation



## China is Only Catching Up


Timeline of Infrastructure and Capability Improvements on Spratly Outposts




## What about 'self-restraint'?

- In November 2002 China and the ASEAN states agreed to:
- 'exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability [in the South China Sea].'
  - Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)











# Mischief Reef Airfield



Total reclaimed Area: Approx 10.9 Hectares

Primary Building: Approx 4,128 sqm floor area; 6-stories

Port Facility: 1 Jetty, 1 Permanent Pier (can accommodate a 130m ship)

Distance to Palawan: 194 NM Distance to China: 577 NM





MABINI (Johnson) REEF (PHOTO TAKEN: 09 May 2015)



CALDERON (Cuarteron) REEF (PHOTO TAKEN: 07 May 2015)




(PHOTO TAKEN: 05 May 2015)





#### Relative Size Comparison of Spratly Features With Airfields of Various Claimants



# What is the purpose?


#### **China Says**

- Improve living conditions
- Meteorological data
- Scientific research
- Search and rescue
- Shelter for fishing boats
- Base for oil exploration
- Support Coast Guard
- Military defence

#### **Analysts Say**

- Forward Operating Bases
- Fuel storage
- Piers for naval combatants
- Military aircraft
- Long-range radar
- Advanced anti-aircraft missile systems
- Air Defence Identification
   Zone

# 6. Implications for Australia




Major sealanes likely to be disrupted in any dispute with China.

## Malaysia's Luconia Shoals -Permanent Chinese Presence





# PLAN Exercise in South China Sea Early 2014



# South China Sea: The Strategic Implications of China's Artificial Islands

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