INTRODUCTION

Recent seismic political events driven by a range of populist forces have made “fake news” an increasingly prominent topic of public discussion. Though “fake news” is not a new phenomenon, its heightened prevalence in the era of the Internet and its dissemination via coordinated disinformation campaigns by external actors demonstrates its ability to undermine the sovereignty of democratic states. In present-day, “fake news” is becoming increasingly effective in undermining the quality of public discourse and electoral decision-making within liberal democracies. This poses a conundrum for liberal democratic governments seeking to address these threats through the enactment of policies potentially at odds with fundamental freedoms enjoyed within their political systems, particularly concerning freedom of the press and individual speech and expression.

Undoubtedly, the modern day manifestation of “fake news” poses one of the greatest threats to liberal democracies ever seen. The potentially destructive effects of such disinformation tactics is well illustrated in Germany’s infamous “Lisa case”, which saw items of “fake news” prompt hundreds of anti-immigration protestors to rally outside the German Chancellery office. In order to prevent the frequent recurrence of such events, it is critical that liberal democracies take urgent action to comprehensively defend from “fake news”.

DEFINING “FAKE NEWS”

“Fake news” has in the past encompassed a broad range of items. Among these include satirical and parodied news entertainment such as The Onion and The Daily Show, neither of which are the focus of current public scrutiny regarding “fake news”.^[1] “Fake news” should also be differentiated from unintentional “misinformation”, which refers to incorrect information unintentionally created and distributed.^[2]

The “fake news” causing such a panic in democracies across the international community, and of focus in this essay, is the deliberate production and dissemination of false information and facts under a “veneer of authenticity”^[3] and objectivity. The principal purpose of “fake news” is to promote a favoured individual, organisation or ideology, and to “discredit” all others.^[4]

It is important to here note that the phrase “fake news” has also been utilised by leaders to unjustly attack reputable media organisations perceived as being overly critical – most prominently by US President Donald Trump.^[5] Although this is undoubtedly a cause for concern, the focus of the discussion in this article is the “fake news” which is being produced by foreign individuals and organisations to achieve a specific political objective in another nation.

CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF FAKE NEWS

What is fundamentally unique about “fake news” in its current form, is the comparative ease with which it is created and distributed, and thus the high likelihood of it becoming viral.^[6] The Internet and social media have enabled individuals and organisations to bypass the cumbersome processes and logistical restrictions of printing, transportation and physical dissemination.^[7]

This issue is becoming extremely problematic, as an increasing number of adults receive their news from social media. A 2017 Pew Research Poll found that two-thirds of American adults receive their news, with varying regularity, from social media.^[8] These figures are also reflected in Australia, with 52.2% of Australians using social media (in addition to other outlets) as a source of news, with 18% considering it their main source.^[9] At the same time, “fake news” has become increasingly pervasive through social media, with approximately 41.8% of visits to “fake news” sites in the United States in 2016 originating from social media.^[10] This is in direct contrast to the source of visits to the top 690 US news websites, which only received a share of approximately 10.1% of visits originating from social media, with 48.7% of visits coming via direct browsing of the websites of those news outlets.^[11] This, as well as the ever-increasing use of social media as a news source, ensures that social media outlets are conducive to facilitating the spread of “fake news”.^[12]

Individuals can often reach an equivalent or higher readership compared to major news outlets without the arbiter of third parties, as barriers to entry in the media industry have dropped precipitously.^[13] Silverman’s analysis in the aftermath of the 2016 US Presidential election demonstrates this, with the top-performing fake election news stories on Facebook generating more engagement than the top stories from major news outlets in the three months leading up to polling day.^[14]

The era of social media has also facilitated a “bandwagon effect”, where the perceived legitimacy of a news item or individual is enhanced by the amount of likes, comments, shares and followers attached.^[15] The use of automated bots insidiously amplifies messages to create the illusion of something being more popular than it actually is, thus adding a veneer of credibility.^[16] A notable example of this is US President Donald Trump, whose Twitter following of over 30 million people is estimated to be only 51% authentic.^[17] Another notorious example concerns a network of over 13,000 botnet accounts used to spread false and hyper-partisan information in the immediate lead-up to the referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union.^[18] These examples further serve to demonstrate the ease of dissemination of contemporary incarnations of “fake news”, and why its spread must be effectively countered.

THE HEIGHTENED VULNERABILITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

Liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to the negative consequences of “fake news”. Ironically, it is the same freedom afforded by the Internet to ordinary citizens of thriving democracies, which has in turn helped facilitate the damage and harm experienced by these democracies.^[19]

A state’s ability to govern itself and conduct its own affairs without foreign interference is a central feature of state sovereignty.^[20] In this context, a state’s sovereignty can be compromised through successful disinformation campaigns by other countries, which are eager to exploit the openness of the Internet and the press freedoms featured within liberal democracies to achieve certain political outcomes. Such action can consequently obfuscate the internal political debate of a nation, which in turn can affect the composition of a government following a general election. The harm caused to liberal democracies through this interference ultimately undermines the basis of the electoral process, as the effective functioning of democracy depends on the ability of voters to base their political judgements on real facts.^[21]

THE INFLUENCE OF FAKE NEWS – THE CASE OF ‘LISA’

The havoc wreaked by “fake news” has been most notoriously demonstrated through Russian-driven disinformation campaigns seeking to sow divisions within states. This has been demonstrated by the use of “fake news” to create discord in Germany around the country’s controversial and divisive immigration issue.^[22]

Germany has been the subject of an increased proliferation of “fake news” concerning its liberal immigration policy. This was effectively illustrated in the infamous “Lisa case” in January of 2016, when a 13-year-old girl from Berlin’s Russian-German community fabricated a story of being sexually assaulted by three Middle Eastern migrants.^[23] Despite statements by the Berlin State Prosecutor’s Office and the local police affirming the allegations as false, Russian state-controlled news stations, including Channel One and Sputnik, ran news reports presenting Lisa’s story as true, whilst also accusing the police of a cover up. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also questioned the official police statements.^[24]

The aim of these “fake news” reports was to inflame pre-existing tensions surrounding Chancellor Merkel’s “open border immigration policy.”^[25] Despite constant police statements to the contrary and fact-checking from numerous mainstream media outlets in Germany, the false story quickly gained traction through social media via reposting from humans as well as automated bots. All of this culminated in approximately 700 people protesting the non-existent matter, as well as Germany’s immigration policy, outside of Angela Merkel’s Chancellery office.^[26]

The “Lisa case” clearly illustrates the far-reaching consequences of “fake news” within a liberal democracy and its ability to seamlessly exploit its vulnerabilities.^[27] This case highlighted how an external news agency or individual can exploit the freedom of the press afforded to it by a democracy, in order to spread malicious lies and sow discord within a liberal democratic state.^[28]

Even more significant was that the fake stories concerning “Lisa” were able to transcend mere online commentary and spur hundreds of ordinary citizens into physical action in the form of a raucous protest – such is the power of “fake news” in the context of a highly controversial subject.^[29] The danger posed by “fake news” cannot be underestimated: if the proliferation of online “fake news” stories can manipulate individuals to take protest, it is just as likely that such tactics can be utilised to manipulate individuals to engage in violent acts.^[30]

The spreading of the “Lisa” story also served an ulterior purpose for the Russian state and demonstrated the susceptibility of liberal democracies to disinformation tactics employed by external actors. The head of Germany’s domestic security agency Hans-Georg Maassen noted that the Kremlin utilises disinformation tactics in order to influence public opinion, as well as any incidental decision-making processes influenced by the public opinion.^[31] This includes the electoral process, where such falsehoods can be utilised to achieve a specific political outcome. False stories, especially in relation to the sensitive topic of immigration, have tended to benefit the anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in Germany, who have a decidedly pro-Russian foreign policy platform.^[32] The “Lisa case” undoubtedly had an impact on the electoral success of AfD, who won an unprecedented 14% of the popular vote in the regional elections in Berlin in September 2016, with most of the party’s support coming from the Russian-speaking neighbourhoods in Berlin’s East.^[33]

These developments demonstrate a clear threat to some of the core tenets of liberal democracy. This utilisation of “fake news” within liberal democracies deliberately obfuscates political debate and informed electoral decision making at the ballot box.^[34] If democratically elected governments within liberal democracies are supposed to represent the will of the majority, and that majority is influenced by a campaign of disinformation by a foreign actor, it is likely to bring into question the authenticity of the public’s voice, with fears that their views are more akin to the will of the external actor.^[35] Additionally, as seen with Germany and the AfD, certain “fake news” stories can drum up support for political parties who promote policies that are antithetical to core liberal democratic principles – including the restriction of religious freedom as well as the removal of rights and protections for minority groups.^[36]

Furthermore, such disinformation also represents a threat to the social stability necessary within all liberal democracies, with “fake news” unpicking the fabric of social unity.^[37] Austin, as noted by Zappone, argues that Western liberal democracies are involved in an information war, and the tactics utilised by external forces have a corrosive power upon a population’s ability to discern false information from true information and to discern what might be right from wrong.^[38] Austin warns that debate within liberal democracies will be negatively affected by continued dissemination of “fake news”, with citizens becoming increasingly unable to determine reality from falsehoods – consequently magnifying voter apathy.^[39]

CONFRONTING FAKE NEWS

The clear and present danger posed by “fake news” towards liberal democracies has highlighted the urgent need for solutions to effectively counter this threat. Sussex, as cited in Zappone, argues that this will involve a re-evaluation of the way in which liberal democracies perceive the Internet.^[40] He argues that liberal democracies perceive the Internet as being governed by peacetime norms which is problematic, as states which use the Internet in a subversive manner (including Russia and China) see the internet as a place without norms^[41], and are therefore involved in information wars.^[42]

The types of solutions that are now being seriously considered by governments, experts and scholars alike range from educational to regulatory in their respective natures. On the educational side, potential policies raised include encouraging greater media literacy in citizen populations. This has ranged from broad education campaigns informing citizens of the tell-tale signs of “fake news”, to an increased emphasis upon media literacy skills for primary^[43], secondary and tertiary students.^[44] It is argued that such an approach would be a better long-term strategy to prevent individuals from becoming susceptible to disinformation campaigns.^[45]

Additional solutions related to education include the increased utilisation of fact-checking services, which assist citizens who have neither the time nor effort to discern whether a news item is true or false. Examples of this include German government funded fact-checkers working with Facebook^[46] and the EU’s East Stratcom team designed to counter disinformation coming from Russia.^[47]

However, these educational solutions remain largely ineffective, as there are only limited resources available to combat the vast amount of “fake news” being endlessly produced. The EU’s East Stratcom team has a budget of only €1 million per year between 2018 and 2020.^[48]

Regulation of social media companies has also been at the forefront of recent efforts by governments to better identify and counter “fake news”, given how a litany of social media platforms have been exploited with such success.^[49] There is growing pressure for social media companies to do more to address “fake news” on their platforms.

There has been some self-regulation in this respect, with Google and Facebook adopting policies attempting to target “fake news” – albeit only after significant pressure from the government and broader public.^[50] Google has removed some of the financial incentives that had existed for sites to drive up Internet traffic based on outrageous clickbait headlines. Its new AdSense policy prevents certain “fake news” sites from being able to earn money from Google ads.^[51] These regulated sites are those Google deems as “misrepresenting, misstating or concealing information about the publisher, publisher’s content or the primary purpose of the site.” In addition, Facebook brought in changes to its Audience Network Policy to address similar matters.^[52] However, these measures only address “fake news” driven by financial incentives, and may not necessarily deter those who are creating and disseminating “fake news” for purely political or ideological motives.^[53]

More substantive action has been the move by Alphabet, Google’s parent company, to “de-rank” Russian news sites RT and Sputnik – both of which have acquired a notoriety for spreading propaganda and false information.^[54] This coincided with both outlets being required to register as foreign agents under the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act administered by the US Department of Justice.^[55] However, such actions are prone to retaliation, as demonstrated by Russia’s Ministry of Justice naming news outlets including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe as foreign agents.^[56]

The utilisation of legislative options has also been proposed as a means through which to address the prevalence of “fake news”. There are, quite rightly, concerns about the potentially detrimental effects of such action upon the freedom of expression in nations; including such legislation being used by political figures to censor reputable media organisations as well. The passing of legislation in July this year in Germany, under which lawmakers could impose fines of up to €50 million upon social media firms for failing to remove content such as defamatory and hate-inducing posts within seven days, is one example of government regulation targeting the spread of “fake news” on social media (if somewhat indirectly).^[57] However, this law has come under criticism for violating freedom of expression.^[58]

Sussex, as Zappone notes, has alternatively suggested that states may eventually need to “re-nationalise” their Internet to prevent foreign subversion of internal democratic practices through the spread of fake news.^[59] Sussex’s concept of “re-nationalisation” involves greater government intervention with respect to the control and promotion of ideas and information online within a nation.^[60] Thus, governments would increasingly intervene online to ward off cyber security threats from abroad, as well as further promoting its own values and ideas within its own backyard.^[61] This would inevitably result in the restriction of the free flow of information online, which has been a hallmark for liberal democracies worldwide and therefore represents a total reversal of what the Internet has come to represent in these states.

As draconian as the aforementioned solutions may be, if disinformation campaigns continue to debase democratic discourse, then such practices may be the only effective solutions left to uphold the integrity of internal electoral processes. Adopting tougher legislative approaches would certainly not result in states ceasing to be liberal democracies.^[62] Legislation within numerous liberal democracies already censor and regulate various forms and mediums of expression for utilitarian policy reasons, including for the purpose of upholding the quality of discourse.^[63] Notable examples include hate speech, defamation and broadcasting political advertisements. Rather than telling people how to think, such actions would merely reinforce the importance of ensuring the integrity of public communication.^[64]

CONCLUSION

The spread of fake news poses a substantial threat to the sovereignty and core values of liberal democracies, primarily concerning the quality of public discourse and its influence upon its electoral processes. This is most clearly demonstrated through the disinformation campaigns sanctioned by the Russian government against Western liberal democracies, which seek to assist in the fulfilment of various political aims. Nonetheless, the rise in “fake news” has put forward a conundrum for liberal democracies. Either they must cede to some forms of censorship for the common good, or seek to maintain its values as they continue to be subverted by external actors. Ultimately, in order to prevent itself from being damaged by a sea of disinformation, it is necessary for liberal democracies to seriously consider the former.

By Zia Khan

References:

^[1] Tandoc, Edson et. al. (2017), “Defining Fake News” in Digital Journalism, Vol. 5, No. 10, 1, p .7.

^[2] Francine, Jaomiasa (2016), ‘European Union in the age of misleading communications: Insight on disinformation and propaganda’ in Romanian Journal of Journalism and Communication, Volume 11, No. 4, 36, p. 39.

^[3] Tandoc, Edson et. al. (2017), “Defining Fake News” in Digital Journalism, Vol. 5, No. 10, 1, p .7.

^[4] Ibid, p. 2.

^[5] Koziol, Michael (2017) ‘Fake News’? Malcolm Turnbull should, and does, know better, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/fake-news-malcolm-turnbull-should-and-does-know-better-20170627-gwz7sk.html [date of visit 8 December 2017].

^[6] Bhaskaran, Harikrishnan, et. al. (2017), Contextualising Fake News in Post-Truth Era: Journalism Education in India, Vol. 27, No. 1, 41, p. 42.

^[7] Harding, Phil (2017), ‘Remember that Facts are sacred’ in The British Journalism Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, 17, p. 17.

^[8] Shearer, Elisa and Gottfried, Jeffrey (2017), News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ [Date of visit 20 November 2017].

^[9] News & Media Research Centre (2016), Digital News Report: Australia 2016, Canberra, p. 15.

^[10] Allcott, Hunt and Gentzkow, Matthew (2017), ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’ in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 2, 211, p. 222.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Allcott, Hunt and Gentzkow, Matthew (2017), ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’ in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 2, 211, p. 215.

^[13] Ibid, p. 214.

^[14] Silverman, Craig (2016) This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News On Facebook, https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term¼.lg3jNV6k0#.hr0DxG49r cited in Spohr, Dominic (2017) “Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and selective exposure on social media” in Business Information Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, 150, 155.

^[15] Thorson, Emily (2008), ‘Changing Patterns of News Consumption and Participation’, Information, Communication and Society, Vol. 11, No. 4, 473, p. 481.

^[16] Tandoc, Edson et. al. (2017), “Defining Fake News” in Digital Journalism, Vol. 5, No. 10, 1, p. 8.

^[17] Bort, Ryan (2017), Nearly Half of Donald Trump’s Twitter Followers are Fake Accounts and Bots, http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-twitter-followers-fake-617873 [date of visit 27 November, 2017].

^[18] Bastos, Marcos and Mercea, Dan (2017), ‘The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated Hyperpartisan News’, Social Science Computer Review, Vo. 20, No. 10, p. 1.

^[19] Persily, Nathaniel (2017), ‘Can Democracy Survive the Internet?’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 2, 61, p. 71.

^[20] Conversi, Daniele (2016), ‘Sovereignty in a Changing World: From Westphalia to Food Sovereignty’ Globalizations, Vol. 13, No. 4, 484, p. 485.

^[21] Luckhurst, Tim (2017), “Give me the press barons any day” in The British Journalism Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 31.

^[22] Juhasz, A. and. Szicherle, P (2017) The political effects of migration-related fake news, disinformation and conspiracy theories in Europe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Budapest, p. 4.

^[23] Ibid, p. 20.

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] Rutenberg, Jim (2017) RT, Sputnik and Russia’s New Theory of War, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theory-of-war.html [date of visit 19 November 2017].

^[26] McGuiness, Damien (2016) Russia steps into Berlin ‘rape’ storm claiming German cover-up, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-35413134 [date of visit 19 November 2017].

^[27] Wood, Patrick (2017) Fake news, hacking threat to democracy now on ‘unseen scale’, report says, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-29/fake-news,-hacking-threat-to-democracy-now-on-unseen-scale/8567834 [date of visit 10 December 2017].

^[28] Rutenberg, Jim (2017) RT, Sputnik and Russia’s New Theory of War, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theory-of-war.html [date of visit 19 November 2017].

^[29] McGuiness, Damien (2016) Russia steps into Berlin ‘rape’ storm claiming German cover-up, http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-35413134 [date of visit 19 November 2017].

^[30] Wright, Lucas (2016) The Dangerous Side of Fake News: Rumors That Inspire Violence, https://dangerousspeech.org/2016122the-dangerous-side-of-fake-news-rumors-that-inspire-violence/ [date of visit 10 December 2017].

^[31] Juhasz, A. and. Szicherle, P (2017) The political effects of migration-related fake news, disinformation and conspiracy theories in Europe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Budapest, p. 21.

^[32] Leisegang, Daniel (2017) “No country for free speech?: An old libel law and a new one aimed at social media are two threats to free expression in Germany” in Index on Censorship, Vol. 46, No. 2, 76, p. 77.

^[33] Shuster, Simon (2017) How Russian Voters Fuelled the Rise of Germany’s Far-Right, http://time.com/4955503/germany-elections-2017-far-right-russia-angela-merkel/ [date of visit 25 November 2017].

^[34] Gray, Richard (2017), Lies, propaganda and fake news: A challenge for our age, http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170301-lies-propaganda-and-fake-news-a-grand-challenge-of-our-age [date of visit 10 December 2017].

^[35] Persily, Nathaniel (2017), ‘Can Democracy Survive the Internet?’ in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 2, 61, p. 70.

^[36] NATO Review Magazine (2016) The “Lisa case”: Germany as a target of Russian Disinformation, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm [date of visit 24 November 2017].

^[37] Zappone, Chris (2016), Donald Trump-Vladimir Putin: Russia’s Information War meets the US Election, http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-election/trumpputin-russias-information-war-meets-the-us-election-20160609-gpf4sm.html, [date of visit 14 November 2017].

^[38] Zappone, Chris (2016) Who Controls our News? Welcome to the era of Russian and Chinese information war, http://www.smh.com.au/world/who-controls-our-news-welcome-to-the-era-of-russian-and-chinese-information-war-20160907-grapkr.html [date of visit 17 November 2017].

^[39] Ibid.

^[40] Zappone, Chris (2016) Who Controls our News? Welcome to the era of Russian and Chinese information war, http://www.smh.com.au/world/who-controls-our-news-welcome-to-the-era-of-russian-and-chinese-information-war-20160907-grapkr.html [date of visit 17 November 2017].

^[41] Ibid.

^[42] Deeks, Ashley et. al., (2017), Addressing Russian Influence: What can we Learn from US Cold War Counter-Propaganda Efforts, https://www.lawfareblog.com/addressing-russian-influence-what-can-we-learn-us-cold-war-counter-propaganda-efforts [date of visit 28 October 2017].

^[43] Brunhuber, Kim (2017) In the Trump era of fake news, more US schools focusing on media literacy, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/in-the-trump-era-of-fake-news-more-u-s-schools-focusing-on-media-literacy-1.4275693 [date of visit 8 December 2017].

^[44] Rosenwald, Michael (2017) Making media literacy great again, https://www.cjr.org/special_report/media-literacy-trump-fake-news.php [date of visit 8 December 2017].

^[45] Douglas, Jonathan (2017) Fake News: Improved critical literacy skills are key to telling fact from fiction, https://www.theguardian.com/teacher-network/2017/oct/17/fake-news-improved-critical-literacy-skills-teaching-young-people [date of visit 8 December 2017].

^[46] Shuster, Simon (2017) Russia has launched a fake news war on Germany. Now Germany is fighting back, http://time.com/4889471/germany-election-russia-fake-news-angela-merkel/ [date of visit 22 November 2017].

^[47] Boffey, Daniel and Rankin, Jennifer (2017) EU escalates its campaign against Russian Propaganda, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/eu-escalates-campaign-russian-propaganda [date of visit 26 November 2017].

^[48] Rankin, Jennifer (2017) EU anti-propaganda unit gets €1m a year to counter Russian fake news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/25/eu-anti-propaganda-unit-gets-1m-a-year-to-counter-russian-fake-news [date of visit 25 November 2017].

^[49] Allcott, Hunt and Gentzkow, Matthew (2017), ‘Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election’ in Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31, No. 2, 211.

^[50] Persily, Nathaniel (2017), ‘Can Democracy Survive the Internet?’ in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 2, 61, p. 73.

^[51] Wingfield, Nick et. al. (2016) Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake News Websites, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google-will-ban-websites-that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html [date of visit 16 November 2017].

^[52] Persily, Nathaniel (2017), ‘Can Democracy Survive the Internet?’ in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 2, 61, p. 73.

^[53] Tandoc, Edson et. al. (2017), “Defining Fake News” in Digital Journalism, Vol. 5, No. 10, 1, p .8.

^[54] Hern, Alex (2017) Google plans to ‘de-rank’ Russia Today and Sputnik to combat misinformation, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/21/google-de-rank-russia-today-sputnik-combat-misinformation-alphabet-chief-executive-eric-schmidt, [date of visit 22 November 2017].

^[55] Wilson, Megan (2017) Russian news outlet Sputnik registers with DOJ as foreign agent, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/360912-russian-news-outlet-sputnik-registers-with-doj-as [date of visit 8 December 2017].

^[56] Lowe, Thomas (2017) Russia bans ‘foreign agent’ journalists from entering national parliament building, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-08/russian-parliament-bans-foreign-agent-journalists-from-building/9239114 [date of visit 8 December 2017].

^[57] Cerulus, Laurens, (2017) Germany’s anti-fake news lab yields mixed results, https://www.politico.eu/article/fake-news-germany-elections-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-correctiv/ [date of visit 20 November 2017].

^[58] Leisegang, Daniel (2017), “No country for free speech?: An old libel law and a new one aimed at social media are two threats to free expression in Germany” in Index on Censorship, Volume 46, No. 2, 76, p. 77.

^[59] Zappone, Chris (2016) Who Controls our News? Welcome to the era of Russian and Chinese information war, http://www.smh.com.au/world/who-controls-our-news-welcome-to-the-era-of-russian-and-chinese-information-war-20160907-grapkr.html [date of visit 17 November 2017].

^[60] Ibid.

^[61] Ibid.

^[62] Magarian, Gregory (2006), “The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’ Free Speech Jurisprudence” in Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 4, 2201, p. 2208.

^[63] Diggins, John (2005), “Sidney Hook, Robert Nozick, and the Paradoxes of Freedom” in Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 22, No. 1, 200, pp. 215-216.

^[64] Hook, Sidney (1953) Heresy, Yes – Conspiracy, No, John Day Company, New York cited in Zappone, Chris (2017) The radical right is using ‘free speech’ to help them destroy democracy, http://www.smh.com.au/world/when-free-speech-becomes-a-shield-for-planned-chaos-20171205-gzyyww.html, [date of visit 10 December 2017].