Vladimir Putin’s portrayal in the Western media often resembles that of a comic book villain. The Russian President tends to be characterised as a threatening Machiavellian tactician who, driven by extreme nationalist fervour, is seeking to restore Russia’s status as an empire and a great power. Writing in The Guardian, Anthony Julius claims, “the threat of Russian imperialism is real, and the armoury at Putin’s disposal formidable… Putin is a master tactician – able to deploy the right weapon at the right time.”[1] The Sydney Morning Herald’s Peter Hartcher adopts a similar tone stating that “he wants conquest… If Putin ever seems to offer a concession, it’s either a tactic or a ruse.”[2]

The basis for Putin’s notoriety hardly needs to be restated here – of chief importance is his decision to annex the Crimean Peninsular in February 2014 and his subsequent orchestration of a war by proxy in Eastern Ukraine. Not only are these events commonly taken as evidence that Putin has territorial ambitions, but some have argued that they’re merely the prelude to the Russian President’s imperialist grand strategy. The Economist issued us with a dire warning:

“Nearly a quarter-century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West faces a greater threat from the East than at any point during the cold war.”[3]

David Blair’s unsubtle comparison of Putin with Hitler in The British Daily Telegraph reflects the extent to which the popular narrative has framed the Russian President as a formidable and calculating threat. Blair writes that the crisis in Ukraine “was never about Ukraine alone…”[4]

Vladimir Putin is a brutal autocrat and the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine undoubtedly constitute a gross violation of international law. However, the popular characterisation of Putin’s grand strategy as imperialist is erroneous. Russia’s primary foreign policy objective regarding the Ukraine has been to prevent the country joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the world’s most formidable military alliance, which Russia justifiably regards as dire threat to its security. In a Foreign Affairs article entitled, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault”, John Mearsheimer explains that “[Russian leaders] would not stand by while their strategically important neighbour turned into a Western bastion.”[5] Within the Australian media, Tom Switzer has been a rare voice of thoughtful moderation on Russia, observing that Putin has been, “protecting legitimate security interests”, and that his, “objectives are limited.”[6]

It is vitally important that the West understands that Russia’s conduct in the Ukraine is a rational response to the strategic pressure that has been placed on the country by an encroaching military alliance, NATO. The Kremlin’s foreign policies conform to the expectations of defensive realism. A defensive realist foreign policy prioritises state security, which is maximised when a stable balance of power is established in the international system.[7] Defensive realists advise against imperialism and aggression, but they do advocate power projection by threatened states to the extent that is necessary to restore the international system to a stable state of equilibrium.[8] As Robert Person argues, Putin has been pursuing a defensive realist strategy because his, “ultimate objective is to maximize his security, not his power.”[9] NATO’s hubristic expansion has destroyed the balance of power that existed in Europe during the Cold War and engendered feelings of insecurity and vulnerability in the minds of Russia’s leaders. These attitudes are rooted in a rational conception of the international as a realm in which the threat of war is constant and each state must take responsibility for its own survival.

To say this is not to condone the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine on an ethical level. But the righteous condemnations of Russia in the Western media have only served to obscure the origins of the Ukraine crisis and potential strategies for mediating it. If peace and stability are to be re-established in Eastern Europe, then it is vital that we look past the scaremongering and hyperbole, and re-examine the origins of Russia-NATO antagonism.

New Russia, Same Old NATO Mentality: A Lost Opportunity for Détente

NATO was founded in 1948 to balance the power of the USSR and its communist allies in Eastern Europe. The organisation’s founding members were the United States (US), Canada and ten Western European nations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed that the nascent Russian state would soon be integrated into the US-led world order. NATO appeared obsolete and some predicted that it would be disbanded.[10] So how did we get to a situation where Russia and NATO are once again at loggerheads?

To understand the re-emergence of NATO-Russia antipathy, we have to return to the final years of the Soviet Union and a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and then US Secretary of State, James Baker. On February 9, 1990 in the Kremlin’s St. Catherine’s Hall, Gorbachev made a stunning concession to Baker, agreeing to allow East Germany’s incorporation into NATO. [11] The Soviet leader pledged to withdraw 380,000 troops from East Germany and approved the reunified, remilitarised Germany’s incorporation into a hostile military alliance. In return for his cooperation, Baker promised Gorbachev that, “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.”[12] But by 1993, the Clinton administration had already embarked on plans to renege on Baker’s promise and extend NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.[13] Whilst Baker’s promise was not legally binding, NATO’s willingness to disregard Russia’s preferences and take advantage of the country’s weakness would set the tone for future interactions between the two entities.

In 1994, Russia began trying to marginalise NATO by promoting the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)[14] as the continent’s preeminent collective security body. Russia pushed for the deployment of CSCE peacekeepers within the post-Communist world and even allowed a CSCE force to be sent into Chechnya in 1995.[15] Though these actions did to an extent empower the CSCE, the organisation soon became subordinated to NATO when addressing large-scale issues of European security.

During the latter stages of the Bosnian War in 1994-5, NATO carried out airstrikes against Russia’s allies, the Serbs, in spite of Russian protestations.[16] At the conclusion of the conflict, NATO insisted that it, rather than the UN, be charged with the implementation of the Dayton Accords. In 1999, NATO again intervened in Serbia, bombing the country for 78 days until Belgrade was forced to grant de facto independence to Kosovo.[17] NATO’s war, which it dubiously justified as a humanitarian intervention, undoubtedly had much more to do with asserting the alliance’s preeminence in Eastern Europe than assisting Serbia’s oppressed Kosovar Albanian minority.[18] NATO’s wanton use of force so close to Russia’s border alarmed the Kremlin, with Russia’s Foreign minister Igor Ivanov warning NATO’s actions risked ushering in a new Cold War.[19]

In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were also incorporated into NATO, as the alliance moved ahead with plans to admit the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.[20] Whilst NATO has justified its expansion as a means for promoting freedom, democracy and human rights,[21] the alliance’s enlargement had the effect of entrenching a formidable Western military presence in Central Europe.

Realising that NATO enlargement would antagonise Russia, the distinguished American diplomat George Kennan opposed the strategy from the beginning. As the chief architect of the Marshall Plan and one of the original advocates for US containment of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of WWII, Kennan was nothing if not tough on Russia.[22] But in 1997 he wrote “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the post cold-war era”[23] such a move might “impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”[24] In a prescient 1998 interview Kennan explained that such a decision “shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are – but this is just wrong.”[25]

The Arrival of Putin: Conciliation Fails Amid NATO Provocations

When Vladimir Putin came to power in January 2000, relations between Russia and NATO were at a very low ebb. Yet far from exhibiting any anti-Western tendencies, Putin initially attempted to facilitate rapprochement between Russia and the West. Putin characterised NATO as a minimal threat to Russia’s security, and even went as far as to suggest that Russia may still consider joining the alliance in the right circumstances.[26] NATO responded with a conciliatory gesture of its own, establishing the NATO-Russia Council in November 2001.[27] However, Putin’s overtures failed to dampen the alliance’s expansionist zeal.

From 2003 to 2005 the West extended its influence further into Eastern Europe by aiding revolutions against pro-Russian regimes in Georgia and the Ukraine. Between 1993 and 2003, $700 million in US aid and $420 million European Union (EU) aid was directed into Georgia.[28] Most of this money was channeled through Western NGOs and was used toward electoral and judicial reform and citizen mobilisation.

Vote rigging by Georgia’s pro-Russian government in 2003 sparked widespread protests against the incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze. Western NGOs played a key role in financing opposition parties and organising demonstrations.[29] When popular pressure forced Shevardnadze to resign, he was succeeded by the pro-NATO Mikhail Saakashvili. Voter fraud orchestrated by the Ukraine’s pro-Russian President, Victor Yanukovich, in 2004 sparked similar protests in the Ukraine. Again, state-funded Western NGOs played a central role in mobilising anti-government demonstrators. Protestors were entertained with rock music, provided with free food and tent accommodation and even paid small amounts of money for attending rallies.[30] When popular pressure prompted Ukraine’s Supreme Court to annul the election result and order a revote, the Western-backed Victor Yushchenko was elected President.

In March 2004 NATO accepted seven new member states including the three Baltic states. For the first time, NATO was right on Russia’s border.[31] Twelve hundred miles had separated Saint Petersburg from NATO during the Cold War, but that distance had been reduced to less than one hundred miles. Later that year Georgia and the Ukraine signed Individual Partnership Action Plans, and joint NATO-Ukraine military exercises in Crimea soon followed.[32]

Whilst Putin downplayed the importance of these events, others in his administration expressed much alarm. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned “we cannot, of course, watch impartially the military structure of the alliance moving ever closer to our borders.”[33] It was quite reasonable for the Kremlin to view NATO’s incorporation of the Baltic States as an outright threat. Unlike the existing NATO members and former Warsaw Pact states, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was designed to prevent any country from amassing the weaponry required to launch an offensive war, didn’t bind the Baltic nations.[34] NATO now held the legal right to deploy an unlimited quantity of troops and military hardware in the Baltic.[35] Plans were made for the Baltic states to accede to an adapted CFE treaty, but a series of diplomatic stalemates resulted in the US and its NATO allies refusing to ratify the new agreement.[36]

In 2007, the Bush Administration announced plans to construct a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe.[37] The pretext for this decision was that it was necessary to protect Europe from an Iranian nuclear attack. However, Moscow quickly realised that the shield would have the potential to undermine and perhaps even neutralise Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Putin suggested an alternative, namely the construction of a joint Russia-US radar warning system in Azerbaijan, but the US rejected this proposal.[38] At this point, Putin was forced to abandon his conciliatory approach. In his 2007 State of the Nation Address, the Russian President characterised NATO as, “a real threat”.[39] Russia formally suspended its observance of its CFE treaty obligations a month later.

At a summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO released a statement affirming that Georgia and the Ukraine would be offered membership.[40] US pressure was the chief driver of this decision, as several Western European alliance members expressed opposition to the plan.[41]

This was NATO’s most threatening and provocative move towards Russia yet. Ukraine, as the biggest country is Europe, constitutes an important strategic buffer between Russia and NATO. Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany all invaded Russia through southeastern Europe and consequently, the Kremlin is extremely reticent to allow the armies of those countries to once again be stationed there. Georgia borders Russia’s volatile Caucasus region, already rife with minority nationalism and secessionist sentiment. Furthermore, both Georgia and the Ukraine are proximate to Russia’s Volga region, its agricultural heartland and its access point for Caspian Sea oil. The Kremlin cannot and will not risk its control over these assets being compromised.

The Fight over Georgia and the Ukraine: Russia’s Militarist Turn

It was only a matter of time before tension between Russia and NATO over the status of Georgia and the Ukraine spilled over into conflict. After winning wars of secession against Georgia in the early 1990s, the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had enjoyed de facto independence from Tbilisi.[42] Both had been reliant on Russia for strategic and financial support, though Russia still formally recognised them as part of Georgia. In May of 2008, when Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili requested that Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia be withdrawn and replaced by either EU or NATO forces, Russia responded by increasing the size of its force.[43] In June, Georgia detained Russian peacekeepers stationed in Abkhazia. Then on August 7 Georgia launched an attack on South Ossetia, killing numerous civilians and 12 Russian soldiers.[44] A day later, Russia sent ground troops into the secessionist territories and began bombing Georgian military and industrial targets. After five days of fighting, Moscow forced Tbilisi to agree to a ceasefire on Russian terms. Russia formally recognised the two breakaway polities as sovereign nations and announced that a force of 7,600 would remain in the territories indefinitely for their “protection”.[45]

Russia’s strong-arming of Georgia was the Kremlin’s way of signaling to NATO that it would not tolerate any further expansion of the alliance. Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev evoked a siege mentality, stating that “we do not have any illusion of partnership [with NATO]… Naturally we are not happy with being surrounded by military bases.”[46]

Russia’s war succeeded, as NATO’s plans to extend membership to Georgia were put on an indefinite hold. The alliance could hardly incorporate Georgia when Tbilisi had no sovereignty over 20 percent of its territory. Nonetheless, the West continued to put geostrategic pressure on Russia. NATO suspended the Russia-NATO Council, established a permanent military presence in the Baltic and, in December 2009, refused a Russian proposal to replace the CFE treaty.[47] In 2010 the US relocated a Patriot missile battery from Germany to Poland and, in 2012, opened phase one of its European Missile Defence Shield.[48]

With tensions high and the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership still unresolved, another conflict always seemed likely. Ukrainian society is deeply divided between pro-Russian and pro-Western segments, and voting in the country tends to follow this division.[49] The Westernisation of Ukraine had been stalled by the election of the pro-Russian Victor Yanukovich in 2010. On 25 November 2013, Yanukovich delayed his decision to sign an Association Agreement with the EU which would have forced the Ukraine to sever all economic ties with Russia. Instead, Yanukovich signed a deal with Russia whereby the Kremlin would buy $15 billion of Ukrainian bonds and cut its gas prices to the country by one third.[50] This decision angered pro-Western Ukrainians, who took to the streets in protest.

As civil unrest grew, police began to crack down violently on demonstrators.[51] On the 21 February 2014, after three months of protests, Yanukovich fled to Russia and, in what can only be described as a coup, a new pro-Western government took power in Kiev.[52] The full extent of US involvement in the coup is at this stage unknown, but a leaked conversation between US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Victoria Nuland and US Ambassador to the Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt suggests it could have been substantial. During the conversation, Nuland expressed her support for regime change in Ukraine and her desire to see Arseniy Yatsenyuk become the country’s new Prime Minister – which he did.[53]

Russian troops moved into the Crimean Peninsular on 22 February. Putin chose to take Crimea primarily because it contains the strategically important Black Sea port of Sevastopol, which Russia had been leasing from the Ukraine since the end of the Cold War.[54] The annexation of Crimea was a warning that Moscow would not tolerate the Ukraine slipping out of its orbit. On the day of the Crimean annexation, Putin warned NATO not to “make itself at home in our backyard or in our historical territory.”[55] Russia then orchestrated a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, arming pro-Russian rebels and probably also deploying several hundred Special Forces soldiers in Eastern Ukraine to aid them.[56] In May, Ukraine elected a pro-Western government that renounced the country’s non-aligned status and signaled its desire to join NATO.[57]

Russia’s militarist tactics were once again successful in stalling NATO’s advance. In March 2016, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker affirmed that the Ukraine would not gain NATO membership within the next two decades.[58] However, since 2014, NATO and the Ukraine have conducted numerous joint military exercises and NATO has committed $5.4 million to assist with the modernisation of Ukraine’s army.[59] The alliance has also increased its troop presence in the Baltic and conducted a military parade in Estonia less than a kilometer from Russian territory.[60] In 2016, the US completed phase two of its missile defence shield, opening a weapons system in Romania and announcing that a similar system will be opened in Poland in 2018.[61] Russia, meanwhile, has ensured that Eastern Ukraine remains in a state of frozen conflict and has effectively consolidated its control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[62]

Russia and NATO: Where to Next?

Winston Churchill once famously remarked that Russia is, “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”[63] However, since the end of the Cold War at least, the Russian mindset has been remarkably easy to understand.

Russia regards NATO, the world’s most powerful military alliance, as a dire threat the its security. Russia’s goal of trying to halt NATO’s eastward march is rooted in a defensive realist view of international politics. The Kremlin is attempting to safeguard its security; it is not looking to reclaim lost status or recapture an empire. Analysts such as Derk Eppink have contended that, “Putin’s mind-set is largely rooted in the 19th century. Politics [for him] is about power.”[64] Those who dismiss this worldview as outdated would do well to remember that Russia was almost destroyed twice in twentieth century by invasions through Eastern Europe. At least twenty-seven million Russians were killed during WWII, roughly one third of the war’s overall death toll.[65] It should hardly be surprising that a sense of vulnerability still pervades Russian strategic thinking today.

It is also worth noting that the US’ worldview is not significantly different to that of Russia. The US has pursued the Monroe Doctrine for almost two centuries, often employing violence and subverting democracy to prevent foreign powers from establishing a presence in the Americas.[66] As John Mearsheimer explains, “this is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory… Imagine the American outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico.”[67]

As the Ukraine continues to suffer through a protracted civil war, what can be done to ameliorate the tension between Russia and NATO and restore stability in Eastern Europe? Stephen Walt proposes that NATO should strike a deal with Ukraine and Russia that enshrines the status of the Ukraine as a non-aligned buffer state.[68] Striking a similar deal regarding Georgia would also be prudent. Furthermore, NATO should support the incumbent government in Ukraine, whilst at the same time discouraging it from adopting a provocative stance towards Russia.

Crimea will never be returned to the Ukraine, but NATO may be able to help the Ukraine regain sovereignty over its war torn eastern provinces by encouraging Kiev to cooperate with Moscow. Additionally, the US should discontinue its plans to expand its missile defence shield in Europe. This is a misguided policy that incentivises Russia to increase its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and risks sparking another nuclear arms race. Paradoxically, Europe is safer without the shield.

Finally, NATO should propose a replacement to the CFE treaty and guarantee that its nuclear arsenal will move no closer to Russia’s borders. In return for these assurances, Russia may be willing to downsize its nuclear armoury in Kaliningrad or even make concessions on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

With neither side having shown much interest in diplomacy so far, it is hard to know how much can be achieved through negotiation. But the dangers entailed by the current standoff are alarming. Russia and NATO control the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear weapons and whilst the likelihood of an all out war is low, this risk cannot be ignored. Russia and NATO are never going to see eye to eye on some issues, but tensions cannot be allowed to escalate any further. Western leaders are loathed to make any concessions to Russia, but peace can only be re-established in Eastern Europe through compromise.

By Alexander Thalis

Wikimedia/Kremlin.ru

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[46] Quoted in: Ratti, Luca (2013) “Resetting NATO-Russia Relations: A Realist Appraisal Two Decades after the USSR”, in Journal of Slavic Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 144.

[47] Ratti, Luca (2013) “Resetting NATO-Russia Relations: A Realist Appraisal Two Decades after the USSR”, in Journal of Slavic Military Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 146

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