By Richard Vogt

Nowhere in modern international relations is there
a problem quite like North Korea (DPRK), arguably the last relic of the Cold War era. While some see the DPRK as a rogue state, unpredictable and willing to self-destruct rather than engage with the new world order, others have argued that it has reason to be cautious and even paranoid – nestled as it is beside key US
allies Japan and South Korea (ROK), at the doorstep
of what it considers the communist traitors of Russia and China. Held together by a militant strain of juche,1 a nationalist ideology of self-reliance, the DPRK has turned increasingly to nuclear weapons for its survival in the face of a collapsed second world and an expansive global first world.2

This paper aims to explain the broader motives of those engaged in the six-party talks (6PT). For brevity, minimal attention will be paid to US allies Japan and the ROK. Despite attempting to arrive at a peaceful détente, the parties have been unable to reach a settlement due to their different national objectives and widespread mistrust. While bilateral and trilateral dialogue has achieved some material gains, the brief emergence of multilateral engagement under the aegis of the 6PT in the end proved too global a platform
for the DRPK. Having successfully exploited the talks to massage concessions while periodically releasing tension by controlled military action toward the ROK, the 6PT has no relevance in the current climate – an assertive China and Japan, a US in retreat, and a re-engaged Russia. The ROK has been hoping for soft diplomacy ever since the 1998 election of Kim Dae- jung, rather than the default setting of estrangement and aggression – though these tactics are considered unwise by propping up a regime that has for far too long been cheating the expectations of the international community invested in the 6PT.3

Viewed within a broader context that includes
the original Armistice, the Cold War, the Agreed Framework (AF) of 1994,4 and the transition between three Kim administrations, there is remarkably little discussion of the fact that the 6PT were bound to break down. The 6PT began in earnest when the DPRK removed itself from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. The self-imposed isolation of North Korea has been puzzled over by scholars since the 1990s. In 2002 it was also declared part of the ‘axis of evil’.5 Such securitised rhetoric did little to enhance understanding of its tactics and willingness to flout international norms. Negotiations have forever been crisis management, viewed by DPRK through the lens of survival, and for the rest through the lens of security.6 Set alongside vastly different approaches by subsequent Washington administrations, prevaricating between engagement and isolation, it is that talks got so far before Pyongyang walked away in 2009. The 6PT had six rounds of negotiations during 2003-2007, and were effectively considered ‘dead’ in April 2009 when the DPRK was targeted with United Nations sanctions following its first nuclear test.7 To date there have been four separate UN Security Council Resolutions passed in condemnation of DPRK nuclear activity, the latter two supported by both Russia and China.8

What is curious about these talks, as opposed to the original AF, was that they were a multilateral forum that emerged under a Republican government, while the Democratic Clinton administration had some success negotiating bilaterally. The Bush administration had a chaotic approach to foreign policy, concentrating on the Middle East and global terrorism. The DPRK fit this latter agenda inasmuch as it was suspected of being an interstate supplier of nuclear arms and armaments. The only real ‘breakthrough’ during the 6PT was the Joint Statement of the fourth round, which did little other than restate the original AF of eleven years prior, and is sometimes cynically referred to as AF+.9 By relying upon China to host these talks it gave Beijing not only increased leverage but also the chance to dictate the frame of reference, thereby weakening any real chance of international coercion of the DPRK.

In contrast with American foreign policy prevarication and “infighting between hawks and doves”,10 Pyongyang’s behaviour has remained remarkably consistent, at least until Jong-Un. North Korea needs the threat of nuclear capability as a deterrent to gain concessions from the West. This is twofold: to secure both regime survival and to mitigate the US presence below the 38th parallel and in Japan. This is why the 6PT collapsed – the major players had fundamentally different agendas. The US sought to denuclearise Pyongyang, while North Korea wanted to maintain nuclear capability to resist US efforts to overthrow the communist monarchy. Similarly to North Korea, the four other states involved view the talks as regional in nature. The US, geographically isolated from the peninsula, has never really accepted the ‘odd man in’ position it holds and is unwilling to make subsequent concessions. In a sense, Pyongyang has been socialised by the Cold War into believing the nuclear option is both a plausible and acceptable leveraging option. This use of such asymmetrical bargaining has dictated its 6PT tactics, with predictable engagement and withdrawal in order to gain maximum concessions from the US.

Whilst Russia and China have become increasingly vocal in their declining support for North Korea’s actions,11 the US has played a bizarre version of game theory. Classic game theory, as applied during the
Cold War, holds that mutual deterrence is the best
way to assure both oneself and one’s enemy of relative safety. By possessing similar levels of nuclear strike capability, and therefore a common vulnerability to catastrophic, guaranteed nuclear retaliation, the chance of either side using nuclear weapons is minimised.
With nuclear weapons the measure of equality is far
less stringent than conventional warfare due to the
scale of devastation possible. What the US never fully appreciated was the imbalance in the Korean situation. Having threatened China with nuclear weapons in aide of Taiwan in the 1950s and by furthermore stationing large numbers of troops in South Korea ever since the 1953 Armistice, the US seems unaware of the signal it has been sending Pyongyang. Whilst under the security umbrella of Moscow this signal was minimised, but
with the collapse of the USSR, and its inability to assure North Korea of its future, Kim Il-Song’s administration naturally felt exposed to both the Western alliance and its retreating allies in China and Russia. The US had utilised South Korea, as well as Japan, in its containment strategy against both major powers. There is little wonder that the Kim regimes would still believe this to be the case ever since the armistice, which, crucially, is not a peace treaty. It is in this context that Pyongyang sought to acquire nuclear weapons as the only dependable deterrent in its security policy.12 The need for nuclear capability was learned during the Cold War era, and was to be exploited as much for diplomatic leverage as for realistic self-defence. In a sense, the armistice is a legislated version of game theory, and indeed there has never been a normalisation of diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea.

American motives should not be discussed in isolation; indeed, they are visible within the context of other parties involved. Besides the relationship between North Korea and the US, who managed to reach a substantive agreement in 1994, China currently presents the central diplomatic obstacle, even prior to the collapse of talks in 2007. More specifically, the problem has been Beijing’s willingness to prevaricate between self-interest and regional stability.13 China has long seen Pyongyang as a buffer against the US presence in North East Asia, most prominently in South Korea and Japan. Taiwan,
in this respect, is notably absent ever since Washington adopted the realist policy of abandoning its alliance in favour of formally recognising Beijing in 1972. The 6PT have been used by a rising China as leverage, to pursue stability in the Korean peninsula as much as to project power symbolically and pragmatically amid global negotiations. Secondary to these concerns, there is also the challenge of mass refugee flows into North-Eastern China if the North Korean regime were to collapse.

To single China out for its strategic self-interest, however, is both naive and perilously close to the contemporary Western myopia regarding the rise
of China. There has been no shortage of Western newspaper columns attacking China’s implicit support of the Kim regimes. China has demonstrated no desire to accommodate American ambitions of regime change in North Korea. Stability has always been Beijing’s preferred default position during the 6PT, even after Kim Jong-Un’s recent vexatious behaviour. China has been big on multilateral rhetoric of peace and denuclearisation, yet slow to discipline Pyongyang for clear breaches of its commitments.

As the main influence and protector of the regime in Pyongyang, China could rightly be seen to possess extra responsibility in needing to coerce and coach
its communist ally in the rules of global multilateral diplomacy. It has failed to do this, until the accession of Jong-Un and a series of increasingly defensive activities from Pyongyang, possibly intended to provoke China into a wedge.14 The most charitable assessment of Jong-Un’s tactics is that North Korea is attempting to force Beijing to ultimately side with either Pyongyang or Washington. China in turn is exploiting its own leverage to coerce Pyongyang into refraining from overt aggression, using tangible measures such as sanctions and the withdrawal of bilateral banking transactions following the nuclear test of February 2013.15 There is now sufficient reason to believe Jong-Un lacks the strategic nous of his father and grandfather, who
were both willing to play the long game of the 6PT, periodically relinquishing pride for aid, in order to fund the grand strategy of survival.16

In contrast to the predictability of China, Russia – with evolving relational complexity in the region – has created a more dynamic environment under which future talks would recommence. Even though Russia and South Korea are attempting to engage Pyongyang through the Rajin-khasan railway and a proposed cross-peninsula pipeline,17 these are ultimately self- interested ventures and have little to do with potential effects on the 6PT. Whilst the European Union was created from such commercial interests, the political atmosphere in North East Asia is significantly different, and a North-Asia version of the European Coal and Steel Community will not lead to peace. Furthermore, considering current US-Russia tensions over Crimea, such successfully negotiated ventures would arguably cause Russia to adopt a stance similar to China’s when the 6PT first emerged in 2003.

The US would be wise to reconvene bilaterally (or
even trilaterally under the guidance of either China or the UN), and avoid the particular power dynamics of multilateral bargaining, which complicate the aims of both major parties: stability and survival. The US has arguably lost its chance to denuclearise the peninsula; the next best option is to attempt to placate and socialise Pyongyang into the community of nuclear states, rather than to create a situation in which the regime would be willing to consider aggressive behaviour due to paranoia or imminent threat from the South. North Korean citizens’ growing access to global information is both
a blessing and a curse,18 the downside being that such openness is causing the regime to resort to harsher tactics in order to secure its survival. Paradoxically, the effects of globalisation north of the 38th parallel may inhibit a successful nuclear détente by reinforcing the Kim administration’s most paranoid policy settings.

The continuation of Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy remains the trigger of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula, potentially encouraging Japan to seek security outside the US alliance. Preparations for a new, fourth round of North Korean nuclear tests not only exacerbate current diplomatic tension but further strain the rhetoric of unconditionality: Pyongyang is keen to recommence talks with the US, yet Washington refuses to do so without conditions. During the early rounds of the 6PT there was minimal activity at Yongbyon, North Korea’s main nuclear facility. Since Jong-Un’s ascension to power this has been replaced by a willingness to flaunt its nuclear capabilities, and an increase in activity, recently culminating in threats during President Obama’s visit to Seoul. Years of aggressive behaviour, without substantive retaliation, has taught Pyongyang that this behaviour works. Game theory on the peninsula is alive and well. This would be difficult enough if it were just the US and North Korea. However, the multilateral aspect of the 6PT then transforms into a kind of diplomatic prisoners’ dilemma, in which the variable motives of those involved needs to be countenanced and second-guessed by all in order to decide their own strategy. With bilateral negotiation the equation would only amount

to North Korea demanding concessions and the US deciding which ones it is willing to concede. With six key regional states involved, the permutations become too difficult to calculate and the talks become less about the original intent of denuclearising Pyongyang and more about regional grievances. This is what the US has never fully appreciated from its hegemonic position. In some senses, Washington still believes it is about global nuclear capabilities and the threat of proliferation to rogue states. While the peninsula is mired in Cold War psychology, the US is captive to a post-9/11 mentality.

No shortage of opinion exists as to what is needed to restart the 6PT. There is, however, a decided lack of critical analysis as to whether such talks are likely to make a significant impact on the denuclearisation of the peninsula. When assessments do appear they are generally accompanied by the assumption that more parties should be involved.19 Considering the above, the chances of the 6PT reconvening in a manner similar to the way in which they were first held are slim. The global context has changed – there have
been three different rulers in Pyongyang, the US is about to embark on a new presidential cycle, China and Russia are exerting themselves geopolitically and challenging customary international law, and South Korean nationalism is ascendant. The ongoing deadlock of the 6PT discourse has made it harder for either state to make the first concessions. While Pyongyang seeks re-engagement, and China is equally willing to broker the terms under which this is possible, the US has unequivocally stated that the Kim dynasty’s stalling tactics must end. Having gained interim years in which to further develop and test its nuclear potential, while periodically returning to talks in order to accept aid (further fuelling its power in future negotiations), the current Obama administration has finally drawn a line. In Washington’s eyes, the caveats of the past proffered by Pyongyang are over; only through direct negotiations will there be a chance of progress.

Equally important is the need for both major parties
to accept the differing aims of the other. In a world of excess and transparent information, true game theory no longer exists. The Kim regime seems willing to bet that its relative inscrutability will gain it some power in the current military imbalance, though its need to ensure
its survival is of equal significance. With a prevaricating China being overplayed in strategic circles – it needs North Korea as a bulwark nearly as much as Pyongyang needs it economically – the status quo will continue for some time yet. Only a major shift in Washington will make change possible, failing an unforeseen collapse
in the economic ability of Pyongyang to sustain its population. One cannot feel overly confident that this is likely in the short-term future, and as such, the 6PT are to be seen as an anomaly in US-North Korean relations. The talks should be abandoned altogether in the search for a new context under which to engage the DPRK, a framework which is not compromised by the regional dynamics of China, Russia, Japan and the ROK.

Richard Vogt is a Master of International Relations student at Macquarie University with an interest in Asia and the Pacific.

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