There is a Kurdish proverb that says “the Kurds have no friends but the mountains.” This saying refers to the suppression the Kurdish diaspora has experienced under consecutive governments in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. However, in 2013 this idea was challenged. The previously diplomatically isolated Syrian Kurds began to form relationships with regional and international powers in the chaos of the Syrian Civil War. The momentum the Syrian Kurds gained in the initial years of the Civil War allowed for the establishment of an autonomous Federation. Yet these successes appear to be coming to an end as Turkey re-focuses its Syrian Policy, forcing away the Kurds previous allies.

The Kurdish people live in a mountainous region, which spreads across the borders of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey: with the largest contingent living in Turkey and the smallest in Syria. Yet in Syria the Kurds constitute one of the largest minority groups. Despite their size President Bashar al-Assad’s government has constantly violated their human rights.[1] When the Arab Spring began Assad targeted Kurdish politicians, concerned of the threat this group could pose.[2] His concern was vindicated as the Kurdish militias, the Peoples Protection Units (YPG) and female only Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), quickly established themselves as proficient fighters, currently numbering at an estimated 60,000.

By 2013 the Kurds claimed to be in charge of an autonomous region called Rojava, which stretches across the northern border of Syria. By 2015 they established a new fighting force, the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF), made up of a loose, multi-ethnic and multi-religious coalition. The ability to establish both Rojava and the SDF was in large part due to the support the Syrian Kurds received from international powers. The US began to provide aid and small arms to the Kurds, in a policy aimed at countering ISIS and preventing regime control of northern Syria.[3] This support also extended to include the use of US air power, training, and reports of providing heavy weapons.[4] The US has fought alongside the SDF on numerous occasions, most notably in the Raqqa offensive against ISIS, in which US soldiers wore Kurdish symbols on their uniforms.[5]

There have also been efforts to formalise diplomatic ties between Rojava and European states. In 2016 the YPG set up Syrian Kurdistan’s Representative Offices in Berlin, Prague and Stockholm, to act as pseudo-Embassies. This is the first time in modern history that the Syrian Kurds have gained autonomous political representation internationally. Moreover, Rojava has not only been seeking and receiving support from the west, but have extended their alliances to other actors, opening their first office in Moscow.

Russia has been providing support to the Rojavan Kurds, despite their adversaries doing the same. The SDF has coordinated with Russian air support to take regions of Aleppo and Afrin from jihadi militias.[6] Russia also promoted the inclusion of the Kurds in the Geneva Peace Talks and has been able to mediate talks between the Assad Regime and the Kurds, resulting in tacit truces even in areas such as war torn as Aleppo.[7] This has left the Syrian Kurds in a relatively good position. They have obtained military support from both the Russians and the US; established diplomatic ties in both Western Europe and Moscow; and have avoided sustained conflict with the Assad government while still seeking political autonomy. But these successes seem to be coming to an end as the balance of power changes in the region and Rojava’s former allies pivot in their interests.

US support for the Kurds has been waning, as Turkish involvement and Russian tensions rise. Ankara has long been an opponent of the Kurds and has been pressuring the US to withdraw support. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been increasing military activity in Syria since the July coup, said the US needed to decide between “me (Turkey) or the terrorists (Kurds).”[8] Despite a recent decline in US-Turkish relations, it is unlikely the US would abandon its strategic relationship with Ankara in favour of the Kurds, as Turkey has the second largest military force in NATO and is a station for US nuclear weapons. The Kurds currently can only offer the US an effective counter to ISIS, who are increasingly less of a threat. Furthermore, the primary antagonist in the eyes of the West is no longer ISIS, but instead is Assad and the Russian backing he is receiving. The ability for the Kurds to play both sides will be stifled in conflict increasingly galvanized by the US and Russia. While ties with the US are on the decline, turning to Moscow does not seem like an ideal scenario for the Kurds either.

The improvement in Russo-Turkish relations means the Kurds will likely find reduced support in Moscow. Tensions between the two states reached their peak in 2015 after a Russian aircraft was shot down over Turkey.[9] Since the July 2016 coup in Turkey, Erdogan and Putin have reached an understanding and the Russians lifted the travel and trade restrictions imposed after the downing of the jet.[10] Moscow reversing their growing cooperation with Turkey seems unlikely. Even after the assassination of the Russian Ambassador Andrei Karlov, Putin responded not in derision, but by doubling down on forming stronger ties with Turkey.[11]

The balance of power is also shifting within Syria itself. Assad backed by the Russians has taken back Aleppo and now overpowers all other rebel groups. ISIS’ last major stronghold in Raqqa is under threat and what remains of the Free Syrian Army, the primary anti-regime rebel group, has degenerated due to infighting and mass desertions. This leaves the Kurds of the DFSNS as the foremost rebel group in Syria, rivalled only by a possible coalition between Sunni jihadists, campaigned for by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Assad has not shown any signs in the past of wanting to establish a dialogue with rebels, and has rejected previous Kurdish proposals to establish a federalist system in which they would act as an autonomous region.[12] If Damascus rejected the Kurdish deal when fighting rebel forces weakened them, it is doubtful that they would agree to the same proposal when they has the battlefield advantage.

Challenges for the Future:

In 2017, the Kurds of Rojava will start to lose friends, and are unlikely to establish new ones. The Kurds of Iraq would be the obvious ally for the Rojavans. However, the Iraqi Kurds are currently preoccupied with achieving their own independence, have a different political ideology, and are going through their own Détente with Turkey. Some smaller countries in Europe may also continue support, particularly non-NATO member states like Sweden. It is unlikely this will be enough to sustain Rojava amidst war. As the dynamics of the Syrian War change the Kurds are left in an awkward position, one that will leave them diplomatically isolated and hamper their ability to maintain there hold over

[1] Black, Ian, (2016) “Syrian human rights record unchanged under Assad, report says” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/16/syrian-human-rights-unchanged-assad accessed March 10, 2017

[2] Al-Arabiya, (2012) “Assad ordered killing of Kurdish activist Mashaal Tammo: Leaked files” https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/10/10/242928.html March 10, 2017

[3] Borger, Julian and Hawramy, Fazel, (2016) “US providing light arms to Kurdish-led coalition in Syria, officials confirm” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/29/syria-us-arms-supply-kurds-turkey March 10, 2017

[4] Dearden, Lizzie, (2016) “Syria war: US fighter jets scrambled to stop Syrian planes bombing special forces and allies in Hasakah” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-war-news-latest-air-strikes-us-fighter-jets-scrambled-hasakah-stop-syrian-planes-bombing-a7200956.html March 10, 2017; Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, (2016) “This highly advanced U.S.-made anti-tank missile could now be on Syria’s frontlines” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/23/this-highly-advanced-u-s-made-anti-tank-missile-just-popped-up-on-syrias-frontlines/?utm_term=.7dfc838624a8 March 10, 2017

[5] Youssef, Nancy and Van Wilgenburg, Wladimir, “U.S. Troops 18 Miles From ISIS Capital,” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/26/u-s-troops-18-miles-from-isis-capital.html March 10, 2017

[6] Tastekin, Fehim, (2016), “Russia, US and the Kurds: The friend of my enemy is — wait, what?” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-russia-syria-kurds-cooperate-russians.html March 10, 2017

[7] Ara News, (2016) ” Russia stresses importance of including Syrian Kurds in Geneva peace talks” http://aranews.net/2016/09/russia-stresses-importance-of-including-syrian-kurds-in-geneva-peace-talks/ March 10, 2017; Bozarslan, Mahmut, (2016) “Syria rejects Russian proposal for Kurdish federation” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-russia-mediates-between-kurds-and-assad.html March 10, 2017; Ibraham, Arwa, (2016) “ANALYSIS: The Kurdish ‘frenemies’ aiding Assad in Aleppo” http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/what-role-are-kurdish-ypg-forces-playing-aleppo-554547107 March 10, 2017

[8] Russia Today Staff, (2016) “’Me or terrorists?’ Furious Erdogan tells US to choose between Turkey and Syrian Kurds” https://www.rt.com/news/331711-erdogan-washington-syrian-kurds/ March 10, 2017

[9] BBC, (2015) “Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane – what we know” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581 March 10, 2017

[10] Al-Jazeera, (2016) “Russia closes ‘crisis chapter’ with Turkey” http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/russia-closes-crisis-chapter-turkey-160629131937917.html March 10, 2017

[11] Kim, Lucian, (2016) “After Diplomat’s Killing, Russia Doubles Down On Ties With Turkey” http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/12/20/506278517/after-diplomats-killing-russia-doubles-down-on-ties-with-turkey March 10, 2017

[12] Ara News, (2016) “Syrian Kurds don’t want federalism: President Assad” http://aranews.net/2016/10/syrias-assad-reiterates-kurds-no-right-federalism/ March 10, 2017