Violence has erupted across Northern Ireland as tensions between the Protestants, Unionists, and Loyalist and the Catholics, Republicans, and Nationalists intensify. The region has struggled towards reconciliation, and only with effort from the UK government and the EU will conflict subside.

For the better-part of two weeks, Northern Ireland has been engulfed in a resurgence of an ethno-nationalist conflict, with violence materialising at either side of the Belfast Peace Wall at a scale not witnessed in recent times. The violence is the by-product of what has become a naturally embedded theme in Northern Ireland’s national consciousness, that is, the tensions that exist between the Protestants, Unionists, and Loyalists (PUL) and the Catholics, Republicans, and Nationalists (CRN) and the questioning of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland.

The impetus behind the violence is a compilation of factors. The most apparent has been the chaos and uncertainty caused by Brexit and, more specifically, the opposition from the PUL to the Northern Ireland Protocol, which sees a border erected down the Irish Sea, thus separating Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK. Additionally, much of the initial violence emerged following the state prosecutors decision last month not to charge the leaders of the nationalist party Sinn Féin for breaking COVID-19 regulations in June by attending the funeral of a former IRA member. Many unionists perceived this decision as a sign of political favouritism, given that the unionists had to cancel their traditional 12th of July parades last summer.

Violence is nothing new to the north

If there is one dominant theme that defines Northern Ireland, it is undoubtedly religion. Indeed, when Northern Ireland was created as a separate legal entity on the third of May 1921 under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the undercurrent of the partition of what was to become Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was to separate the predominantly Protestant north from the predominantly Catholic south.

The early years of partition were often witnessed within an artificial frame. To put more simply, the Republic of Ireland had declared their independence based on the popular will of the Irish people, whereas Northern Ireland continued to rely on the British government for their constitutional recognition and self-governing status. This reality of reliance engineered the conditions for a hyper-cultural anxiety complex to emerge. That is to say, the PUL population have, since partition, feared for their position in the union because they rely on an external entity for their identity to emerge.

Modern narratives

The status of Northern Ireland was continually called into question with the onslaught of the Troubles, a three-decade-long internal conflict between the PUL and CRN populations. Despite this, Northern Ireland’s position in the union was apparently secured with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) on 10 April 1998. Although the GFA did much to end the physical violence, it brought about the conditions for a structural violence to occur, notably doing little to combat social inequality.

Now it is undeniable that social inequality is an issue not limited to Northern Ireland. However, the consequences of social inequality expresses itself in a different form, given the unique circumstances in which Northern Ireland was founded. The economic anxiety caused by social inequality, coupled with the uncertainty caused by Brexit, has manifested itself, as it typically does, in a cultural backlash against “the other.” Since Northern Ireland was founded on the basis of “otherness,” the capacity to engage in a cultural backlash is a natural by-product of the current situation. The use of violence as the avenue in which to engage in this cultural backlash is not surprising because violence maintains a symbolism in Northern Ireland, which people can and have returned to quickly.

The grounds on which to engage in this cultural backlash is driven by three primary narratives. The first is the perhaps natural resentment held towards the CRN populations insofar as the PUL populations feel that the Republicans are winning, given the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. The second is the resentment held towards the PUL’s representative party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which has shown weakness during the Brexit negotiations. Finally, and most importantly, is the resentment held towards the British government, the very entity that the PUL populations have relied upon for the validation of their identity. More specifically, the resentment towards the British government is driven by the promises made by Prime Minister Boris Johnson that there would be no additional checks on goods travelling between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, which were eventually broken with the signing of the Northern Ireland protocol. Therefore, for the most part, the PUL feel they are a community being left behind as a consequence of Brexit compared to the rest of the UK.

Where to from here?

The established cultural anxiety of the PUL populations, the chaos caused by Brexit, and the Sinn Féin funeral have engineered the conditions for the PUL to adopt the role of political entrepreneurs, taking affirmative action to bring about the change, or in this case, the lack of change they desire.

The actions taken have yielded some results, with the British government and the European Union agreeing to hold talks about how to solve the issue of the Northern Ireland Protocol. Despite this, it appears that the results from these talks will only be conditioned to end the violence, as opposed to any definitive alterations to the protocol.

If this is the case, then violence will likely continue across Belfast and the words of former DUP leader, the former First Minister of Northern Ireland and the face of hairline Protestantism, Unionism, and Loyalism Ian Paisley, “I believe that Northern Ireland has come to a time of peace, a time when hate will no longer rule. How good it will be to be part of a wonderful healing in our province,” will be discredited.

Conor McLaughlin is the Research Coordinator of the Defence Research and Engagement portfolio at Edith Cowan University (ECU).

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