The long-running dispute between NATO and Russia over plans to install a ballistic missile defence system in Europe remains on the boil. Presidents Obama and Putin did not discuss the topic during their meeting on the sidelines  of the G20 summit but Putin made clear in an interview on 1 September that it is a major cause of distrust. What if the situation were reversed?

Russia has previously called the project provocative, claiming the ballistic missile defence (BMD) system undermines its second-strike nuclear option, which guarantees mutually assured destruction in the event of a US attack. NATO denies its intention is to limit Russia’s military capacity, but its continuation of the project despite Moscow’s opposition demonstrates its disregard for Russia’s strategic position.

The BMD dispute began in 2004. With the prospect of rogue states acquiring ballistic missiles, then US President George W. Bush proposed BMD for the Euro-Atlantic region. The plan involved deploying missile interceptors in Poland with an air-defence radar located in the Czech Republic. It ignored commitments made to Russia to jointly cooperate on BMD in Europe. In 2009, the system was revised to include interceptors in Romania and BMD-capable warships in the Mediterranean. On 8 July 2016, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced that the BMD system had reached initial operational capability.

Moscow has long warned that BMD would provoke an arms race. Subsequently, as the project has advanced, Russia has modernised its missile arsenal. In February 2016, Russian sources revealed the development of hypersonic cruise missiles that can outpace and out-manoeuvre missile interceptors; in May, Russia’s Strategic Missile Force Commander discussed new intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to outfox BMD.

NATO has been dismissive of Russia’s worries. It has repeatedly stated that the BMD system is not directed at Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. It has also reassured Moscow the system will not be redesigned to target Russia in the future. Yet Moscow’s ongoing concerns about the BMD system are understandable if the fortunes of the Cold War adversaries were reversed.

Imagine the following counterfactual. It is 2007. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms worked and the Soviet Union’s economy now matches the US. Tension between the two superpowers remains high. Then the global financial crisis hits. The chaos prompts nine US states to declare independence, including California, New York, and Texas. The US economy and population halves and it loses a significant portion of its landmass. NATO collapses. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union has won.

In the aftermath, Alaska, Hawaii, and Florida apply to join the Warsaw Pact—the Soviet-led alliance—despite Moscow’s assurances the organisation would not expand into America’s sphere of influence. Soviet troops and military hardware rotate through the former states but the new US Federation, struggling economically, is unable to respond.

Over the next decade, former NATO allies Denmark and France establish close relations with Russia and join the Warsaw Pact. In 2020, Moscow proposes deploying a BMD system in Greenland and the French Caribbean to defend against a missile threat from a rogue Central American state. The US Federation objects to no avail. With its economy recovering due to a shale oil boom, Washington begins to reinvest in its military.

In 2024, sovereign New York forces attack a separatist enclave in the north. The US Federation intervenes in the conflict to punish New York for trying to join the Warsaw Pact, defeating them decisively. Soviet sanctions on the US Federation follow. Separately, the Warsaw Pact’s BMD plans are revised to include sites in eastern Canada and ships in the west Atlantic. Americans become certain the Soviets are attempting to encircle them while they are weak.

By 2030, the US Federation is recovering its pre-GFC strength. Though most of its former allies have now joined the Warsaw Pact, the remaining independent states have either declared neutrality or realigned with the US Federation due to its dominant regional economy and permanent military presence. Unexpectedly, the Washington-oriented President of California is overthrown by pro-Soviet protestors. The action ignites a civil war and the US backs pro-American rebels while the Soviets support the new administration. As the conflict rages, the BMD system reaches initial operating capacity.

The counterfactual broadly parallels Russia’s geopolitical experience since the collapse of the Soviet Union, echoing the expansion of NATO, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. It is clear why Russians view the US as an aggressor. Its actions seem designed to take advantage of Russia’s weakness and prevent it regaining great power status. Now the US, the dominant military power, is undermining Russia’s single greatest security guarantee, its nuclear arsenal. Viewed from a Russian perspective, is Moscow’s opposition to European BMD truly a surprise?

William Baulch is the International Security Fellow at Young Australians in International Affairs and an editor with Foreign Brief. He received his double Bachelor degree in international relations and international security studies at the Australian National University.

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