Ever since Trump’s election, a Syria for Ukraine swap has been touted as a way of limiting Iran’s footprint in Syria. Will we see moves towards this when Trump and Putin meet at the G20 Summit?

Despite cancelling their planned meeting at the Paris World War I centenary celebrations at the request of President Macron, Trump and Putin have agreed to meet on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Argentina starting on 30 November. The two leaders did manage to discuss Syria in what interaction they could manage in Paris, and this issue is highly likely to be on the table in Buenos Aires, although likely to be overshadowed by Washington’s intended withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Ever since Trump’s election, a “Syria for Ukraine” swap has been consistently touted by some analysts as a way of resolving the thorny issues of Iran’s expanding footprint in Syria. Buenos Aires could serve as an arena for preliminary discussions on such a swap, before a deal is concluded when Putin visits Washington in 2019.

In exchange for forcing Iran from Syria – thereby assuaging Washington’s fear of Iranian expansionism – Washington would, or at least so the logic goes, be willing to ease its support to the Ukrainian Government, water-down sanctions on Russia and potentially even recognise Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. Trump has reportedly always been keen on such a deal and recently touted removing sanctions on Russia in exchange for concessions on Syria. For his part, Putin is still exploring ways to remove Iran from Syria.

At first sight, the possibility of such a deal is not completely without credence. At critical moments, Russia has shown a willingness to sacrifice its relationship with Iran for better ties with the West. For his part, Trump has somewhat brutally demonstrated that he considers no alliance to be sacred.

Yet, it is uncertain whether a Syria for Ukraine deal is actually possible. First and foremost, it is unclear how Russia could actually force Iran from Syria short of using military force. Given that an already thinly-stretched Russian military desperately wants to avoid another Afghanistan, it is difficult to see this eventuating.

Of course, Moscow could leverage the demands of most regional and local players for the Iranians to leave, but this approach underestimates how much Tehran cares about Syria. After all, for its considerable investment in both blood and treasure, Iran expects to reap reconstruction contracts as well as strategic rewards: most notably, the completion of the “Shia crescent” linking Iran to Iraq and Lebanon.

Although Damascus itself is wary of Iran’s increasing involvement in Syria, questions remain over whether President Assad would join efforts to force Iran from his territory. With no Iran in Syria, Assad would be totally reliant on Russia, which – unlike Tehran – is actually committed to the total liberation of Syria.

Nor can the Trump Administration simply “give” Ukraine to Russia. Actors ranging from the EU to Australia have all signed up to US-initiated sanctions. Because of deep-running concerns over Russia’s actions and threats to the international rules-based order, it is unlikely that these countries would unreservedly follow Trump’s lead and scale back sanctions.

Moreover, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act imposed in August 2017 was specifically designed so that Congress had control over the ultimate decision to weaken or abandon them. The very same suite of sanctions also affirms that the US will never recognise the annexation of Crimea. Finally, US shipments of lethal arms to Ukraine have already begun and, even if Washington pulled the plug, other countries like Canada already have deals in the pipeline.

Alongside the implausibility of any deal is the sheer gravity of the political risks associated with even trying to make one. Any significant overtures towards Russia would complicate an already fractious relationship with the EU. Although it would be misleading to characterise countries like Germany as Russia hawks, any unilateral US overtures towards Moscow would certainly inflame Europe’s security anxieties, especially given Trump’s consistent hostility towards NATO.

Attempts to strike a deal with Moscow would also engender severe anxiety in Asia, where Trump’s America First approach has already rattled allies; they may fear that they could be “swapped” as part of a similar grand bargain with China. Domestically, Trump’s confusing approach to Russia has proven unpopular, and any perceived betrayal of Ukraine would add fuel to the fire and inflame speculation that Trump is compromised or has colluded with Moscow.

Given the uncertainty over what Trump could actually deliver, Putin would be a brave man to risk effectively destroying his useful alliance with Iran in order to attempt a deal with Washington, which may in any case only last as long as the Trump Administration. From Syria to Afghanistan, Iran is a significant regional player. If Tehran perceived itself to be betrayed, it would be in a good position to frustrate Moscow’s regional leadership ambitions.

The idea of a Russo-American “grand bargain” is a quasi-imperial fantasy, harkening back to the days of Skyes-Picot where the great powers could draw up the world map at will. Russia is no longer a great power and has not been for some time. Although the US may lead the Western alliance, it in no sense controls it.

Unfortunately for Trump, the reality is that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar and attempts to forge a Syria for Ukraine deal will ultimately be frustrated by political reality.

Henry Storey is an Analyst at Foreign Brief and an editor at Young Australians in International Affairs.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.