What Australia Needs to Do After Trump
The election of Donald Trump brings with it uncertainty about America’s commitment to the current international political architecture. Australia will need to develop contingency plans to deal with the potential outcomes, and decide how it positions itself among regional powers.
When it comes to Donald Trump, Australia needs to think about four things.
First, Trump’s apparent perspective on security contains contradictions. He is intent on a strong military and on preserving the US’s external interests—but less so the commitments that underpin them. His approach to some allies, including Japan and Australia, has been reasonably reassuring. But others, for example in NATO, remain deeply concerned. And even those reassured by Trump’s undertakings worry about his impulsiveness, say, on Taiwan or Iran.
Second, Trump’s approach to international economic arrangements—as epitomised by his announced withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—do not augur well for the international trading system from which Australia has benefited. Trump will be partly pulled back by advisors and the real world, but not all the way.
Third, Trump and his closest advisors seem to know little and care less about the international treaty structure. One can criticise postwar international structures, institutions and agreements. But these have prevented nuclear war, lifted standards of living and sustained norms from which the world has benefited.
Fourth, since Word War II, the United States has propagated the democratic ethic as the fairest, if an imperfect, form of governance. Much of the rest of the world has subscribed or aspired to it. But democracy is not just about voting and institutions, it is about precepts. Trump is weak on the precepts.
The question is increasingly being asked: what is democracy if Trump is the result? And can Australia (or other democratic countries) continue to base its policies on the assumption of shared values if that assumption is false with this new Trump administration?
There has been no daylight between US and Australian security policy since 9/11. Australia has spent lives and political energy in the Middle East, where its strategic interests are limited. In Australia’s near region the ‘deputy sheriff’ tag lingers, limiting the degree to which Australia is perceived as having views of its own on security and derogating from Australia’s influence.
Australia’s armed forces are integrated into the United States’ military structures, in particular the Pacific Command. While protocols exist to withdraw these forces in the event of potential engagement, for example over Taiwan, this would be difficult in practice.
So should Australia look again at whether these arrangements are truly in its national interest?
If American policy in the region is at odds with our interests, we must be prepared to challenge such policies.
To differ with the United States on security—particularly with the group who will take power next month—may require political courage of an order to which Australians are unaccustomed.
To do this, Australia must think seriously about its dealings with Asia. This should involve a more ambitious attempt than in the past to educate Australians about Asia, as suggested in the 2012 Asian Century White Paper.
Australia should also encourage serious bilateral dialogue between the United States and China, rather than seek a bridging role. The issues are of will, not process.
Australia must maintain a strong dialogue of its own with China and emphasise strategic dialogues with the more independent-minded countries in Asia such as Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore—not just to exchange views, but to develop common approaches to regional security issues. Australia should also continue to consult with ASEAN as a group, while bearing in mind it is less cohesive than it once was and that bilateral channels are more effective.
If the United States wishes to abandon the TPP, so be it. Australia must pursue alternative trade liberalisation structures like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Even if the Trump administration walks away from the very international architecture that the United States was instrumental in creating and abandons some of the finer precepts with which it has led the world, Australia’s political class must avoid the temptation to allow Australian political discourse to be infected by Trump.
Australia must stick to its own values. And in four years, the United States’ outlook may revert to something with which Australia again has something in common.
John McCarthy is a former Australian ambassador to Vietnam, Mexico, Thailand, the United States, Indonesia, Japan and former high commissioner to India. He is immediate past national president of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
An earlier version of this article was published on the East Asia Forum on 1 January 2017. It has been republished with permission.
